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Chapter I: Themes and Theories 
The last centuries of human civilisation, it is a little known but significant fact, 
had seen the appearance in western Europe of movements inspired by a 
strangely masochistic ideology, known as ecologism, although it bore little 
relation to the science of that name. These movements emphasised the necessity 
of protecting nature from human activity, and pleaded for the idea that all 
species, whatever their degree of development, had an equal right to occupy 
the planet; some followers of these movement even seemed to systematically 
take the side of the animals against men, to feel more sorrow at the news of the 
disappearance of a species of invertebrates than at that of a famine ravaging the 
population of a continent. Today we have some difficulty understanding these 
concepts of nature and rights that they manipulated so casually, and we 
simply see in these terminal ideologies one of the symptoms of mankinds desire 
to turn against itself, to put an end to an existence that it considered inadequate. 
- Michel Houellebecq, The Possibility of an Island 1 
 
Introduction 
The reason of this study is the alleged environmental crisis  and the subsequent rise of 
ideologies Michel Houellebecq names ecologism. A few decades ago Norway 
represented the frontier of environmentalism and nature philosophy. In environmental 
policy, Norway was the path-breaking home-ground of the Brundtland report on 
sustainable development. The environmental philosophy identified with Norway is 
commonly known as deep ecology, and it continues in spite of a decline in 
environmental consciousness to reverberate in international environmentalism and 
literature. In The Possibility of an Island (2006) deep ecology is associated with 
exploding babies skulls and the extermination of the human species.  
The apocalyptic paradigm2 of Western civilization is a cultural ricorso. 
Apocalypse, the total destruction of culture, is already foreboded in Ragnarok. But 
religion as the theme of apocalypse has today found a rival in nature. The apocalyptic 
                                                
1 Michel Houellebecq: The Possibility of an Island (London: Phoenix, 2006), pp. 395-396. 
2 According to Frank Kermode the Western mind understands the world by the paradigms of 
apocalypse. He writes in The Sense of an Ending: Studies in The Theory of Fiction (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 28, that the joachite transition is the historical ancestor of modern crisis; in so 
far we claim to live now in a period of perpetual transition we merely elevated the interstitial period into 
an age or saeculum in its own right, and the age of perpetual crisis in morals and politics. And so, 
changed by our special pressures, subdued by our scepticism, the paradigms of apocalypse continue to lie 
under our ways of making sense of the world. 
  
 
2
theme is increasingly environmental: Houellebecq associates ecology with the last 
centuries of human civilization, Marcelo Gleiser associates apocalyptic fears related to 
the environment with our age of science.3 For many environmentalists, the association 
is self-explanatory  ecology offers salvation from a possible world-end. The 
apocalyptic paradigm is for example employed in deep ecology, as it incorporates 
eschatological hopes for the future, hopes that are all based on Voluspian optimism, 
one that envisions a hundred evil years before a new humankind is restored.4 In 
Houellebecqs novel the apocalyptic paradigm of culture is still invoked, while the 
conclusion is detrimental: environmentalism marks the end of the world, or at least the 
end of man. 
The discussion on the role of nature and culture is not new with the 
environmental crisis: Socrates thought that only our fellow citizens can teach us 
something, Wordsworth believed the same about flowers and trees. In opposition to 
modern rationality, Rousseau advocated the need to go back to nature, promoting 
quality over quantity, and primitivism and emotions over rationality. Arne Næss, the 
front-figure and father of deep ecology, is foremost worried about mans alienation 
from his environment  and himself. The lament is still, as in Rousseaus time, about a 
lack of authenticity  in society, culture, experience or thought. Modern narratives of 
either social or environmental criticism are essentially dialogues between dystopian 
fears and utopian idealism. The adverse judgements are articulations of worldviews that 
in various degrees express an opposition to an ideology deemed untenable but 
hegemonic, or to a more assiduous cultural climate that makes people flee to the hills  
as Arne Næss did in Tvergastein, and as Erlend Loe depicts in his novel Doppler 
(2004).  
This thesis will concentrate on Norwegian representations of nature, and its 
purpose is to discuss nature perceptions that contemporary fiction envisions and 
                                                
3 As Marcelo Gleiser writes in The Prophet and the Astronomer: A Scientific Journey to the End of Time 
(New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 32-33: Eschatological visions and apocalyptic fears are very much part 
of our technological world, of our age of science, the ancient rhetoric merely being recast into modern 
parlance. Floods may now come from global warming, pestilence from a vicious biological warfare, the 
poisoning of the soil, air and water from industrial pollution  we dont have to wait for God to decree 
the end: we can do that ourselves, since we hold the key to our collective oblivion. For the rhetoric that 
Gleiser mentions, see the green predictions of environmental deluge in for example Peter Reed & 
David Rothenberg (eds.): Wisdom in the Open Air: The Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1993) or George Sessions (ed.): Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings 
on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala, 1995). 
4 See Nina Witoszek: Arne Næss and the Norwegian Nature Tradition in Nina Witoszek & Andrew 
Brennan (eds.): Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Næss and the Progress of Ecophilosophy (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) p. 455. 
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endorses. The main sources of this thesis comprise three novels: Doppler (2004) by 
Erlend Loe, Kjøtt i mørke (2003) by Tore Stubberud and Web: betroelser om en truet 
art (2005) by Tor Åge Bringsværd. The aim is to contextualize Norwegian 
environmentalism within an intellectual tradition of back to nature ideologies as 
expressed in literature. The motivation is to find out what perceptions of nature, outside 
the confined borders of environmentalism, figure in imaginative literature. One of many 
possibilities of explaining the state of environmental thinking is by an indirect method: 
instead of analyzing the environmental movement, the focus is on fiction that elaborates 
nature from the perspective of crisis. M. Keith Booker writes that imaginative literature 
is one of the most important means by which any culture can investigate new ways of 
defining itself and of exploring alternatives to the social and political status quo.5 
Literature recreates reality to a certain degree. Besides being created from the raw stuff 
that is our reality, literature elaborating an environmental crisis indicates the state of 
contemporary environmental consciousness and simultaneously signals the possible 
future of it. The three novels of fiction discussed in this study thematize a crisis of 
nature and are written in opposition to what is deemed an overcivilized order of things. 
They manage thus to throw some light upon contemporary views and ideologies closely 
associated with environmental thought. Some of the motivating questions of this study 
are: does Norwegian fiction reflect similar views as Norwegian environmental 
philosophy  is its understanding of nature similar to, say, Næssian ecology? Does 
Norwegian fiction construct similar natures as foreign fiction? Additionally, can the 
analyzed works inspire renewed interest in the environment? Can we detect an 
ecological awakening similar to the in the 1970s?  
The main thesis in this study is that contemporary narratives elaborating an 
environmental crisis are marked by fatigue. It might be apocalyptic fatigue  a reaction 
to the trumpeted ecological doomsdays that were plentiful in the 1970s. In the 
Norwegian case, it may be called the morning-after syndrome. If it is not fatigue due 
to an overexploitation of the apocalyptic paradigm or a hangover, it is a lack of 
constructive alternatives. Visions such as Aldous Huxleys Island (1962), which depicts 
the imaginary island of Pala as the epitome of human civilization and ecological 
enlightenment, are absent today. The negative form of critique prevails, and the 
condition in the environmental movement is much the same. Judging by the sources of 
                                                
5 M Keith Booker: Dystopian Literature: A Theory and Research Guide (London: Greenwood Press, 
1994), p. 3. 
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this study the greenness of Norway has today been stained by native misanthropy. The 
environmental consciousness expressed in the novels seems disillusioned and self-
referential. Frank Raymond Leavis once said that great literature promotes human 
awareness of the possibilities of life. On the basis of the reading of the novels, it seems 
modern fiction offers an escape from the possibilities of life. This study demonstrates 
how little modern fiction has to propose: idealism and constructive visions seem to be 
things of the past, and the same applies for the interest in the human. Eirik Vassenden 
claims that recent Norwegian literature has been struck by a curse of self-reflection.6 
The curse  and the blind spot  of contemporary nature narratives is of a social 
character. This is a discouraging notion, if we consider how little the novelists are 
willing to discuss the human in her social context, and in a way that does not turn moral 
commitments into ritual sacrifices. Erlend Loe offers an escapist environmentalism that 
combines both traditional Norwegian nature-values with urban indifference  and 
depicts the end of sociability. Tore Stubberud envisions the end of man as a moral 
species, and endorses a hedonist anti-environmentalist nature philosophy that doesnt 
give a shit as the protagonist of his novel at one point says. In a logical culmination of 
Loes and Stubberuds visions, Tor Åge Bringsværd warns about the end of man as such 
in a moralistically inclined social-democratic treatise on ecology, disguised as a 
science-fiction odyssey.  
 
The Nature of this Study 
The environmental crisis is the thematic criterion of this study, and will concentrate on 
contemporary narratives that elaborate on the theme of an environmental crisis. In The 
Literary Mind (1996) Mark Turner argues that human consciousness is literary, and that 
the process of consciousness should be viewed as a narrative. 
                                                
6 As Eirik Vassenden writes in Den store overflaten: tekster om samtidslitteraturen (Oslo: Damm, 2004), 
pp. 16-17: Spørsmålet om hva vi forstår og om vår tids overutviklede evne til selvrefleksjon står ganske 
sentralt i svært mange bøker fra de siste årene. Ja, det går an å si at selvrefleksjonens forbannelse  det at 
man til enhver tid er i stand til å foregripe og imøtegå egne tankemåter og handlemåter  er en av de 
viktigste fellesnevnerne for samtidslitteraturen ved begynnelsen av 00-tallet  Det handler om å være 
overlatt til denne følelsen av inautensitet, og til endeløse rekker av forsøk på å forklare den. Men det 
handler også om å overvinne den, bekjempe den, skrive seg ut av den. Langt på vei handler det om å 
forsøke å overvinne sin egen samtidighet, sin egen overflatiskhet. Noen nøyer seg med å tematisere eller 
kommentere problemet, mens andre stiller det ut, til skrekk og advarsel. Andre igjen leter etter språklige 
måter å forholde seg til problemet på. Felles for denne litteraturen er at den søker seg bort fra en 
oversivilisert samtid, og henimot noe annet, det være seg det dystopiske, det arkaiske, det primitive, det 
hysteriske eller det ekstatiske. 
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Contemporary narratives share the trait of simultaneously being symptoms and 
diagnoses of the perceived impasse that they spring from. They can only be understood 
and only become meaningful through their time. The central argument of this study is 
that, 
We can best talk about the differentiae of modern crisis in terms of the literature 
it produces; it is by our imagery of past and present and future, rather than from 
our confidence in the uniqueness of our crisis, that the character of our 
apocalypse must be known.7  
Unlike Frank Kermode, I do not wish to narrow down the field of study to literature 
alone, and will supplement my analysis with film. One of the primary questions of this 
study is: what is envisioned as natural, since the condition of crisis, per definition, 
cannot be considered one of normalcy? 
The proposed approach will be textual analysis. This thesis wishes to revive the 
Leavisian creed of literary criticism. For Frank Raymond Leavis, the text was most 
important, and his close reading started and ended with the text without resorting to 
theory. There is no literary theory underlying this thesis, and the reading oscillates 
between the normative and the unassuming. This study starts with the human and her 
moral consciousness, but does not make the mistake of supposing that moralizing 
signifies morality. The normative elements in this study derive from a humanist, 
hermeneutic perspective and cannot therefore provide any final interpretations or 
judgements.  
The emphasis will be less on historicity and more on the terrain of contemporary 
thought. The references will consist of academic works from natural and social sciences 
as well as fiction and film, and insights from cultural, philosophical and scientific 
sources are developed. The emphasis will differ respectively in each chapter, the 
contexts themselves dependent on those laid down by the three novels thematic 
approach to nature. The main sources of this study will be read as attempts to redefine 
culture and nature on the basis of my reading, and would thus indicate how the 
tension between man and nature is perceived by the authors. Their discussions may be 
viewed as extrapolations of the modern duality of body and mind, as the crisis 
encompasses culture and nature yet draws a cleavage across these. Their proposed ways 
of dealing with the inherent contradiction that civilization builds upon, are answers to 
                                                
7 Frank Kermode: The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), pp. 95-96.  
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the nature of things and reveal the character of the Western tragedy that the answers 
spring from.  
The decision to concentrate on Norwegian constructions of nature is due to the 
interesting claim of Nina Witoszek that nature is the g-spot of the indigenous soul  
an important locus for socio-cultural self-perception and bearer of national heritage (and 
now also national wealth). Yet, the setting for the following study is international, and 
will set Norwegian fiction in the context of Western nature-imagery and narratives 
which offer civilization critique. Notwithstanding native misanthropy and fatigue, many 
foreigners consider Norway as a destination for nature-healthy pilgrimages and a source 
of inspiration, believing that fjords and mountains foster green enlightenment. The 
international backdrop becomes interesting because of this, and is intended as a means 
of comparison and as a review assisting the discussion. Works on Norwegian nature are 
abounding, from national and international perspectives. But previous works do not take 
the notion of crisis as their starting point in discussing nature understandings. Neither 
do they compare environmental philosophy with environmental fiction, or explicitly 
discuss environmental views in fiction. In this sense this study represents a new 
departure. It is for this reason that environmentalist thinking such as deep ecology and 
environmentalists such as Arne Næss have found a place in this study. I will discuss all 
variations and perversions of deep ecology, made possible by the philosophys loose 
framework and by the fact that it is inherently contradictory.  
The aspect that makes the deep ecological cosmology interesting yet problematic 
is its Janus-face: the paradigms of the second scientific revolution are imposed on a 
framework derived from the first and cut through ideological cleavages within the 
environmental movement. This philosophy is interesting in that it contains both 
paradigms, making it simultaneously controversial and agreeable for many. Deep 
ecology is holistic, bio-egalitarian, non-violent and emphasizes biotic peace, love and 
happiness more than Darwinian notions of struggle. In its philosophy tragedy has been 
replaced by harmony, and the only sin seems to be not to consider oneself as a member 
of a biotic community. Its nature-view is one of an all-encompassing cosmic dance 
where there are no centres of power and no hierarchies. It depends on a scientific 
influence promulgating little boundaries and a focus on totalities, advocated as the new 
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scientific paradigm by Fritjof Capra.8 Nature is the domain of scientific investigation 
and natural the domain of the New Age-inspired ideology.  
The problematic aspect with a concept as nature is that more or less anything can 
be justified by it. What is natural is determined by social and cultural settings, and is 
true whether we discuss man or environment. We charge nature with meaning, since it 
per se never can generate any. Here nature is viewed through the landscape. The 
landscapes of the novels reveal what the preferred natural is like. Landscapes wear the 
fictive forms of materia, and include mans social and natural environments. The 
relation between the scientific laws of nature and the cultural interpretation of these 
manifest themselves in the landscape. For man they are mindscapes, as for example 
the dream of controlling nature that is embodied in the myth of Prometheus. They 
function as playing boards that limit reality in order to make it conceivable  regardless 
of whether the limitations are imposed by game or theology.  
The adventure landscape was earlier identified as a space for subjugation of 
nature by activities of climbing, hunting and other aristocratic games and sports  the 
native icon being Fridtjof Nansen. Today, it is increasingly identified as space for 
meditation and relaxation  but through activity. To be in harmony with nature is 
preached by Den Norske Turistforening and Næss, among others. The main character of 
Doppler hits his head and decides to move the woods  Nordmarka offers a fresh start 
(and a little adventure). The cultural category of friluftsliv is seen as a means out of a 
personal crisis prompted by death. The apocalyptic catalyser seems to be the fear of 
contaminated forests and other natural habitats. The forest is benign and elks and trees 
are our friends. The pollution that Erlend Loe warns us of seems to be of a traditional 
and mainstream environmental kind, but is in fact foremost considered to be other 
people. More than expressing an alternative view on nature, Erlend Loe shows the 
traditional as promoted by both the counterculture and the mainstream of Norway.  
In Tore Stubberuds novel Kjøtt i mørke, the crisis-impetus is mans current 
inability or lack of interest in producing (and enjoying) his food. The setting is pastoral 
and the times are of immediate post-apocalypse. The pastoral landscape often acts as a 
scene for elegiac natural romances that were earlier of the Platonic kind.9  Today the 
                                                
8 See Capras (pseudo-)scientific manifesto in favour of deep ecology in The Web of Life: A new Scientific 
Understanding of Living Systems (New York: Anchor Books, 1996), pp. 3-13. 
9 As Harold E. Toliver states in Pastoral: Forms and Attitudes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1971), p. 4: The pastoral landscape is more ceremonial than useful; it has no need of planting, 
cultivation, or harvest, and its periodic renewal is less economic than symbolic or miraculous. 
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romance is of a carnal character, but still endorses the classic symbol of the shepherd 
(or in this case: cattle-herder) of pastoral narratives. The novel builds on considerations 
derived from agricultural practice and notions of self-sufficiency that environmentalists 
praise. The natural is to be found in the cultivation of the body and not in the intellect. 
What makes it international is its French connection: the philosophy of becoming-
animal, instead of being-man. Desire, body and feeling are the philosophys raison 
dêtres.  
Web by Tor Åge Bringsværd is a science-fiction odyssey, and its cosmology is 
given meaning by science through the apocalyptic or catastrophic paradigm. What is 
natural is determined by science, and the landscape is therefore alien to man.10 The 
apocalyptic ingredient is provided by fear of resource depletion and mindless use of 
technology. This seems to be the current condition and thus what Bringsværd wants to 
warn us about. However, the hope of Bringsværd is that we will re-find normalcy 
through reconsidering our status in the biotic community. In Web man was incapable of 
such considerations, and was eventually replaced by spiders  ecologically more adapt 
than man as stewards of the planet.  
As little as science is capable of expressing anything immediately meaningful 
for man (but only after an ethical evaluation), language that is unwilling or unable to 
throw light upon the human, her beliefs, and her moral considerations cannot be 
considered natural language. For Leszek Kolakowski, the writer is an ideologist, as 
A view of the world does not emerge from an accumulation of facts; it also 
requires words to interpret, judge, and order the facts. Thus, by attempting to 
uncover, that is, to produce, the meaning of facts, the intellectuals  as 
philosophers, poets, writers of fiction, and political thinkers  turn out to be 
ideologists. That is to say that they uphold an idea of the world as it ought to be, 
and from it they derive a picture of the world as it is  not in the sense that the 
existing and the desired converge [as in the perfect, self-annihilating utopia], but 
rather in the sense that from a world desired or imagined they derive the rules for 
how the facts of the existing world must be interpreted  or what the facts are in 
their essence.11 
                                                
10 Previously, alien landscapes were usually depicted in utopian travel literature such as Voltaires 
Candide (1759) and Ludvig Holbergs A Journey to the World Underground (1741). Today it is usually 
depicted in science-fiction and fantasy where mans horizon is radically expanded (but sometimes 
contracted). 
11 Leszek Kolakowski: Modernity on Endless Trial (Chicago: Chicago Press, 1990) p. 36. 
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A utopianist would be somebody who imagines how the existing and desired may 
converge  and the dystopian writer imagines the existing and feared.12 However, any 
kind of self-reflectiveness going beyond Panglossian optimism would indicate utopian 
or dystopian tendencies. Even if a realized utopia is impossible to express in language, 
utopian ideologies combined with apocalyptic images act as forceful rhetorical tools. 
More than anything, utopian elements and apocalyptic explanations function as story-
telling devices that highlight the natural moralism of narratives. Literature is thus 
educative, although not necessarily educational, as it indicates the boundaries of the 
existing and the desired. It is in this discrepancy that the authors ideological biases are 
revealed, since even dystopias build on an underlying image of a Golden Age  the 
prototype of utopia. This is true even when the immediate dystopia is that of a utopian 
satire like Aldous Huxleys Brave New World (1932) or an anti-utopian utopia such as 
George Orwells 1984 (1949). The ideology in The Possibility of an Island (2006) is 
expressed in opposition to the opposition. Houellebecq writes that contemporary 
civilization critique, like deep ecology, is institutionalized anarchy perpetuating 
itself.13 His belief is that since politics and morality have been declared dead in 
Western societies, there can no longer be any real dissent either.  
The decline of utopian thought is a result of the changes in the way time is 
perceived, and has to do with the anti-utopian replies to the political projects of 
realizing utopias and with the increase of what Richard Stivers names an anti-morality 
that promotes a cynical morality of power.14 Whereas the eschatology of Joachim di 
Fiore was transcendent in the sense that the end  the summer of love  ultimately lay 
in the hands of God, later clerics such as Müntzer suggested that God needed a hand. 
Even later, Marx thought the people needed a hand in an eschatological cosmology of 
the same type as Müntzers. For di Fiore and Müntzer the present was a misery, while 
                                                
12 As Russell Jacoby writes in Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 12-13: Utopias seek to emancipate by envisioning a world based 
on new, neglected, or spurned ideas; dystopias seek to frighten by accentuating contemporary trends that 
threaten freedom. 
13 Michel Houellebecq: The Possibility of an Island (London: Phoenix, 2006), p 38: The last remaining 
public subsidies and decent coverage in the respectable media, went first of all, in cinema as in the other 
arts, to productions that praised evil  or, at least, that challenged moral values conventionally described 
as traditional, in a sort of institutionalized anarchy perpetuating itself through mini-pantomimes whose 
repetitive nature did not blunt their charms in the eyes of the critics, all the more so as they facilitated the 
writing of reviews which were predictable and clichéd, yet in which they were still able to present 
themselves as groundbreaking. The putting of death of morality had, on the whole, become a sort of ritual 
sacrifice. 
14 See Richard Stivers: The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994). 
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hope was linked to a Christian paradisiac past and a catharcic future. The notion of 
progress is not identical with Christian eschatology, but there are no clear distinctions 
either  utopian thinking was enabled by the notion of progress that made heaven 
something attainable in this life. With modernity, hope was linked to the present and 
became synonymous to either a fear of, or a belief in progress. The past and the future 
were emptied of teleological content as time replaced eternity as one of the ordering 
principles of life. In some cases time has been replaced by a materialist eternity, and 
utopian projections of material plenty prevail over utopias of the soul. In opposition to 
Mikhail Bakhtins dynamic conception of time, Francis Fukuyama writes about a 
nonfictional materialist end of history, and his Hegelian epitaph reads capitalism 
prevailed, da capo. A halt in ideological evolution is unlikely. Todays hegemonic 
dystopias and standstills are the antithesis of progressive faith, whether indicating an 
opposite direction of mankind or the limits of it, or simply the end of it, as Houellebecq 
and Fukuyama see it.15 Most civilization critique, with the changes in time, presents the 
world in an amputated version of the Christian legacy  if there is hope, it is still linked 
to the future through the past, while the present is a misery. We may argue with 
Zygmunt Bauman that contemporary utopias are butterfly utopias, since the only care 
for the future is to be carefree of the future.16 Second, many ascribe the decline of 
utopias to the changes in political discourse. Few claim to hold the keys of 
emancipation in their hands, and the traditional utopian ground premise  people are 
not free, but can be educated to be  is absent in contemporary visions. The tragic 
paradox, already noted by de Toqueville, seems to be that setting man free makes him 
indifferent. For Russell Jacoby the decline in utopian visions is due to the collapse of 
the communist enterprise (and the death of communist ideology) and the widespread, 
yet somewhat misplaced belief that nothing distinguishes utopian representations from a 
totalitarian reality.17 The distinction between utopian representations and totalitarian 
societies is important, since the latter disables and the former enables: few would claim 
                                                
15 See The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991). In Fukuyamas case it is 
more of a historical understanding that seemingly has subsumed both past and future. As Robert Holton, 
in Problems of crisis and normalcy in the contemporary world in Jeffrey C. Alexander & Piotr Sztompka 
(eds.): Rethinking Progress. Movements, Forces and Ideas at the End of the 20th century (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1990), p. 43, ironically remarks: In place of the epic narrative we now have the soap opera. 
16 See Zygmunt Bauman: Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 
p. 27: The spontaneity of the world which postmodern utopias conjure up makes nonsense of all concern 
with the future except the concern with being free from concern with the future  and able to act, 
accordingly, in an unconcerned fashion.  
17 Russell Jacoby: Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Thought (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 5.  
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Kants universal moral principles to be totalitarian, although they may be perceived, in 
light of human psychological history, as utopian. Third, witnessing of the shift from the 
social to the natural realm is the historical correspondence between the death of 
political utopias and the rise of ecological dystopias. But it may be that utopian 
representations have found another form than the individual of the day or the political of 
the revolutionary period. For example the idea of a community is perhaps not dead, 
but has simply altered form. Today, the few that believe in a collective are 
environmentalists and writers promoting holistic ideologies. Unfortunately, writers 
vindicating a biotic collective do this at the expense of man. This has direct 
consequences for morality as it becomes either irrelevant or is justified by whatever is 
considered natural. But natural utopias tend to be moral dystopias. This because the 
mythological values of morality in environmental narratives  survival and health of, 
and in nature, and happiness of the individual in nature, do not endorse sociability. 
Ideologies, utopian or not, are moulded by and mould the present to the extent 
they are repeated, however altered.18 Memory cannot be forced or simulated, although 
ideological examples exist of attempts to make claims on history. Both cultural and 
individual memory are malleable and responsive to future expectations or fears. In some 
cases, contemporary narratives which for instance borrow from Zoroastrianism, have 
begun to work as real myths or pseudo-myths with pockets of cult and assorted props 
 as for example those of Star Wars and Lord of the Rings.  
Narratives exhibiting an apocalyptic fascination are part of an on-going cultural 
mythmaking or self-making process in which several authors can be drawn to the 
same type of stories and images. The salience of race narratives since the publication of 
Darwins evolution theory is well-documented.19 Mary Shelleys The Last Man (1826) 
 whose ending (and possibly a new beginning) hinges on an organic metaphor, belongs 
to this category. So does the popular childrens tale The Water Babies of Charles 
Kingsley (1863), and Lewis Carrolls Alices Adventures in Wonderland (1865). Today 
                                                
18 What actually is remembered may be termed memes, after Richard Dawkins. Memes can consist of 
everything from fashionable buzz-words and catch-phrases to more culturally and socially compound 
phenomenon which entail both representation and action, as the native meme-complex of friluftsliv. 
Dawkins, employing the catasthropic paradigm, suggests that collective memes can evolve in a mode of 
brief spurts between stable plateaux. The process of imitation holds important implications for cultural 
memory. It suggests that in the study of cultural memory the aspect of discontinuity becomes as important 
as that of continuity. See Richard Dawkins: The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
pp. 190-192. 
19 For an overview on these in English literature, see Fiona J. Stafford: The Last of the Race: the Growth 
of a Myth from Milton to Darwin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
  
 
12
it seems that the last of the race myths have regained popularity. The last of the race 
are the last either because of devolution due to an environmental catastrophe, or because 
of the advances in neuroscience and the promise of techno-ecological immortality, such 
as in Web: betroelser om en truet art (2005) by Bringsværd and The Possibility of an 
Island (2006) by Houellebecq. After the laws of thermodynamics became popular 
knowledge, visions of red ends experienced an upsurge. Of course, most often the 
ends depicted are a blend of several reasons and explanations. H.G. Wells The Time 
Machine (1895), filmatized by Simon Wells in 2002, depicts both entropy and the 
genetic promise of  not evolution  but the devolution of the species (as much as the 
social science of the latter part of 19th century concerned itself with the degeneration of 
the nation-body). The entropic end has decreased remarkably in popularity, perhaps not 
surprisingly, since world transformations anticipated before the entropic are more 
acute and interesting. The Cold War period saw an abundance of socio-politically 
encrusted utopias and dystopias  the Island (1962) by Huxley and Orwells 1984 
(1949) providing leading examples. The post-war period saw an increase in narratives 
of either an half-mad scientist or a nuclear war annihilating if not all then most of life, 
such as Walter M. Millers A Canticle for Leibowitz (1959) and Stanley Kubricks Dr. 
Strangelove or: How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964). Some took 
up the moral reverberations of Holocaust and Second World War, as Kurt Vonnegut in 
Slaughterhouse-Five (1969). For William Golding the impetus to write Lord of the Flies 
(1954) was given by the atrocities committed by man during the Second World War. He 
sees natural man, unordered and unpressured by societys boundaries, as barbarian. 
Joseph Conrad, who wrote in an age of emancipatory violence, posed a similar view in 
Heart of Darkness (1899). In his novel the natural surrounding is a virgin forest in the 
darkest jungle and the nature it portrays is wild and enticing  the virgin forest is a 
symbol of Kurtzs vile nature. Although traditional socio-political extrapolations of 
events or trends in society, as for example Francis Ford Coppolas Apocalypse Now 
(1979) or Terry Gilliams Brazil (1985)20 have been in decline in recent decades, there 
are signs of the revival of the category. This is due to the intensified debates around the 
clash of civilizations. And so, Samuel Huntington is proven right in B. Andreas Bull-
                                                
20 The former inspired by Joseph Conrads Heart of Darkness (1899), while the latter is a parody of a 
futurological utopia rational in means, but mad in ends that only British reason (and unreason) can 
produce. 
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Hansens novel Lushons Plater (2004), where the clash is experienced in religious terms 
and is a nuclear nightmare come true between us and them.  
Today environmentally orientated utopias and dystopias, paradises and 
wastelands, are abounding. W. W. Wagar notes:   
Apprehensions of an ecological doomsday  began cropping up in significant 
number of stories after about 1965, [and] are really only a variant of the theme 
of runaway science. In this case, technology and industry are the runaways, 
wasting, depleting, and poisoning the biosphere.21 
UFO-stories from the 1950s on, and narratives of an environmental catastrophe 
mythologize science and spring from the same scepticism towards it. The popularity of 
science fiction in the 20th century is an indicator of this scepticism, but also exhibits 
scientific and technological glorification. Environmental narratives that at least partially 
stand out as technologically optimistic are often combined with the motif of outer-
space. The few fullfledged utopian visions are similar to Buckminster Fullers, who saw 
technology as the means for man to finally free himself of earthly fetters. Space 
colonies act often as ideal lab-rooms with Edenic possibilities for man to create 
society anew. Such is the somewhat pessimistic account of Jonathan Lethem in Girl in 
Landscape (1998), where the earth no longer has an ozon-layer and the rich have 
become emigrants to outer-space. In the motion-picture Silent Running (1972), the 
technologically optimistic framework of inhabiting space has become an otherwise 
dystopian science-fiction account of extinct plant-life on earth. In D. Keith Manos The 
Bridge (1973), holistic Gaia-scientists have taken over, ruling the world (not far from 
the scenario in Bacons utopia The New Atlantis (1626), but with a different conclusion) 
in a Spaceship Earth style and announcing, out of ecological considerations, universal 
suicide. The alien visions most often depict hostile viruses, bacteria or alien invaders 
while the prerequisite battle many times today assumes the character of galactic 
games. In No Blade of Grass (1970), the death of plant-life by a hostile and unknown 
virus is followed by famines and anarchy. Wells War of the Worlds (1898), recently 
filmatized by Steven Spielberg, has one quintessential message. The alien invasion fails 
due to the smallest bacteria by virtue of natural selection.22 This would surely please 
                                                
21 W. Warren Wagar: Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982), p. 118.  
22 H.G. Wells: War of the Worlds (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), p. 169 (italics added). Besides 
displaying the psychological pathologies of man during crisis, who can for example forget the fellow 
grim set on living and his theories of the survival of the fittest and smartest, the environmental alfa and 
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the adherents of James Lovelocks Gaia-hypothesis and the more traditional pseudo-
religious versions of Darwinian evolutionism. In The Day After Tomorrow (2004) the 
world witnesses a new ice age. The film addresses the environment on two levels: on 
the political by discussing global warming, and on the scientific by lending support to 
geological and paleontological notions of development through punctuated equilibria 
and chaos theory. It ends in an ideological lesson: ecological redistribution equals 
global demographic and economic redistribution.  
As much as holistic ecology deals with the environmental crisis, it tends to omit 
one particular part of nature: man. He is in essence an inherent contradiction in that he 
is both animal and man. But he cannot be both simultaneously. Eric Fromm explains 
that,  
What constitutes the essence [of man] is the question and the need for an 
answer; the various forms of human existence are not the essence, but they are 
the answers to the conflict, which, in itself, is the essence.23 
To deny, or to overcome by collective suicide  in the version of either Mano or 
Houellebecq  the inherent contradiction would mean that either man or animal 
should cease to exist. The tension between good and evil cease to exist when the notion 
of man as an inherent contradiction collapses  complete harmony with nature can never 
be established. Utopias are attempts of establishing complete harmony and therefore 
necessitate the collapse of distinctions. They collapse in emancipatory love according to 
Mary Douglas, who writes that zero-zero is a place of love that has no rule but 
itself.24 But as much as zero-zero  a realized utopia  might be a place of boundless 
love, it may be a place of enslaving evil or terrorism. The natural utopia has become a 
moral dystopia in Conrads Heart of Darkness. It is state of the horror, the horror as 
Kurtzs last words echo in the novel.  
Seeing man as an inherent contradiction is the prerequisite for any moral 
considerations. Kurtz had no boundaries and the evil in nature possessed him  nature is 
                                                                                                                                          
omega of the narrative is found in the theories of natural selection and in the acknowledgement that the 
alien invaders were abolished, after all mans device has failed, by the humblest things that God in his 
wisdom has put upon this earth. 
23 Eric Fromm: The Heart of Man (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p. 117. 
24 Mary Douglas: Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1975), p. 228: The 
tension between the possibility of zero and the maximum possible order and pressure which a society 
provides is the measure of possible joy and sorrow. Zero is the inexpressible, timeless, weightless 
unembodied experience. There is only a flash-point at zero-zero; it can never be fixed Here the solitary 
mystic, without legislating for others, tries to live with his own heart set to zero, where no boundaries or 
pressures pull God and the self apart. Such a person finds it especially absurd to draw a line between man 
and nature. 
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brutal and predatory in hollow souls.25 But a problem of evil is no longer a problem if 
its reality, the social context, is denied. The moral dilemma of freedom and right is 
social, but the conflict between good and evil is something each man must battle with. 
The basic point of Conrads human anatomy seems to be that before man can establish a 
genuine pact of solidarity with the other (the pact need not be between man and 
government), the stability of civilization will be shaky and the barbarian qualities of 
mans nature likely to surface, as in the Heart of Darkness. Both Conrad and Golding 
believed that the pact could only come about by maturity. Maturity is a moral character, 
while the concept of character is the key to understanding the dramatic change from a 
social morality enforced by the church to an emphasis on individualistic ethics.26 
Social maturity requires social interaction, which is itself, if to be meaningful, 
dependent on ethical action.  
The task of rethinking man or at least some of his characteristics, in a hopefully 
humane light, is complicated by the exchange of freedom and right for pleasure and 
pain in post-apocalyptic and postmodern scenarios. The degradation of spirit in favour 
of matter seems to be an emblematic expression, and is devoid of moral or historical 
sentiments. Postmodern body-centred narratives eclipse post-apocalyptic representation 
in aesthetic projects concerned with overcoming dualisms by a philosophy of becoming. 
In Tore Stubberuds novel the assertion is of man-as-a-becoming-animal. To become 
animal is increasingly recognized academically in the emerging field of animal studies, 
suggesting new entries into the age-old discussion of what it means to be human. The 
humanist  and foremost humane  problem with most of the pre- and post-apocalyptic 
scenarios is the total dismissal of an existing social structure. The modern tale is often 
about a dehumanizing social-democratic evil, like Erlend Loes manifesto reads. He 
attacks the anthropological man of Norway only to deny him in a relativist paradox by 
supposing that the humans of Norway are not real enough. The humanist crux is that 
the there in few cases seems to be any social basis left from where to model possible 
boundaries for social conduct. The implications of this become all the more acute in 
imagined and real post-endings, as these most often entail the abolishment, or at least 
                                                
25 Joseph Conrad: Mørkets Hjerte (Oslo: Kagge, 2002), pp. 107-8: Urskogen hadde gjennomskuet ham 
fort og tatt en grusom hevn over alle hans groteske invaderinger. Jeg tror skogen må ha hvisket ham noe i 
øret om ham selv, ting som han ikke var klar over, et og annet som han ikke hadde den fjerneste anelse 
om før han tydde til den dype ensomheten  og hviskingen viste seg å være mer enn han kunne stå imot. 
Den ga gjenlyd dypt inne i ham, fordi han var hul tvers igennom. 
26 See Richard Stivers: The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994), p. 18.  
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adjustment, of institutional boundaries for social behaviour. The wish seems to be to 
start ex nihilo, or to imagine as Bringsværd does in Web, circumstances where zero-
zero becomes a real possibility.  
However, we know that social maturity is unlikely. Authors omit the social 
realm in order to manage the worlds that are imagined in opposition to the current 
dystopia. It seems the human and the humane holds a diminishing status, either in 
relation to a biotic community, his animal instincts, or a technological odyssey. Going 
back to nature seems to require the cutting off of social life, as in the novel discussed 
in chapter two, where withdrawal from society is exercised by the means of friluftsliv 
and an equally native type of wilderness ideology. The societal impasse that is criticized 
seems more of a utopia than the socially dystopian vision of a forest-utopia that does not 
recognize man as part of nature.  
Even if maturity would not prove to be a problem, vitalist back to nature 
ideologies that hail the body end up treating moral questions as profane. When man-as-
animal turns feeling (regardless of what is felt) into a value in itself, morality turns into 
either amoralism or immoralism, since moral obligations can never be rationally derived 
from experience. The examined worldviews underlying belief seems to be that the 
natural can only be found by a reversal in social cultivation  the proposed man in 
Kjøtt i mørke is nothing but nature. In the novel discussed in the fourth chapter, 
morality is not omitted  although man as we know him no longer exists. 
Bringsværds agenda is biotically emancipatory and evil therefore completely abstract. 
Mans condition is tragically deemed as one of utter loneliness. The irony is that he is 
urged to make friends with his environment  the entire biotic community. 
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Chapter II: Native Wood and Way 
 We are setting out on a trip, I say. Which might be long. 
 Where are you going? my wife asks. 
From forest to forest. We are called, in a way. There are things happening out 
there and we are needed. 
My wife looks at me in wonder. 
I say its something we must do. Something important. 
Could you be more precise? my wife says. 
I say no. I can be less precise, but not more. The only thing I know is that we 
have to move because the forest is calling on us. 
It is calling on you? my wife says. 
That is exactly what its doing. Because there are other lives than the life we 
have been living for many years now. There is something else than Smart Club 
and childrens birthday parties and dinners with so called friends and this 
repulsive Norwegian cosiness that simultaneously lets us be the most pleasant 
and egoistic people in the world.   
- Erlend Loe, Doppler 27 
 
Friluftsliv and the Countercultural Manifesto 
So speaks Doppler to his wife who is in the hospital. He is taken there by force by his 
brother-in-law to witness the birth of his third child. Doppler is the character of an 
Erlend Loe novel, a seemingly average family father from Oslo with a seemingly 
mediocre life. Prompted by his fathers death and accomplished by a hit in the head, 
Doppler decides to move to Nordmarka  the authentic home of the existentially 
anguished dweller of the capital of Norway. Like the heroic folktale of Askeladden, and 
like Peer Gynt before him (but in different direction), Doppler wants to walk his own 
ways, driven by curiosity and called by the forest.28 The forest offers therapy from the 
                                                
27 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 156: Vi skal på reise, sier jeg. Og den kan bli lang. 
Hvor skal dere? spør min kone. Fra skog til skog, sier jeg. Vi er på en måte kallet. Det skjer ting der ute 
og vi trengs. Min kone ser undrende på meg. Det er noe vi må gjøre, sier jeg. Noe viktig. Kan du være 
mer presis? sier min kone. Nei, sier jeg. Jeg kan være mindre presis. Men ikke mer. Det eneste jeg vet er 
at vi må sette oss i bevegelse fordi skogen roper på oss. Roper den på dere? sier min kone. Det er nettopp 
det den gjør, sier jeg. For det fins andre liv enn det livet vi har levd i mange år nå, sier jeg. Det finns noe 
annet enn Smart Club og barnebursdager og middager med såkalte venner og denne frastøtende norske 
kosen som på samme tid tillater oss å være det triveligste og det mest egoistiske folkeslaget i verden. 
28 Loe is most likely under the spell of what Nina Witoszek calls the Askeladden-effect of Norwegian 
culture. See Nina Witoszek: Norske Naturmytologier: fra Edda til økofilosofi, (Oslo: Pax, 1998), p. 92. 
The construction of the character is a combination of the archetypes of a trickster and a culture hero or 
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terrors of modern life and the reasons to the apparently much needed therapy is the 
simple sort of other people.  
In fact, the protagonist of Doppler is an embodiment of the iconic indigen 
seeking salvation in nature from urban terror. None of the historical grand authors of 
Norway have been immune to a climate where nature has been the gem in the cultural 
re-collection. Ibsen is said to be the first one that used the word friluftsliv in 
literature.29 Hamsuns endings happen in the woods.30 Roy Jacobsens Hoggerne (2005) 
find esoteric communion in the forest in otherwise hostile times. Jan Kjærstads Kongen 
av Europa (2005) retreats to virgin woods  the perfect hiding spot for a man gone 
askew  in between his conquests of the opposite sex.  
A year and some after the publication of Doppler, a national tabloid newspaper 
asks on the cover of their weekend magazine Hvorfor har vår nye nasjonalhelt Lars 
Monsen rømt til Jokkmokk?31 The news that deserved the bold script (and front cover: 
Monsen demonstratively gowned in a Swedish flag) was of course not that he had 
escaped urban terror to arctic wilderness, but that he had done this by moving to 
Sweden. The heroic status that Monsen is given becomes likely in social settings of 
påskefjell and peisekos and in a cultural memory recalling Fridtjof Nansen. Nansens 
success, as an adventurer on ski that gets a Nobel peace prize (many times conveniently 
forgetting the humanitarian Nansen), became synonymous with national success in a 
country discovering itself.32  
In the midst of nasjonsbyggning philosophical vitalism took on pragmatic and 
artistic forms. In accordance with the Lebensreform of the turn to the 20th century, 
outdoor activity and sports came to be regarded as exercise for the body and healthy for 
the mind. As much as the social sciences of the latter part of the 19th century viewed the 
                                                                                                                                          
what Witoszek calls a geni i bygdetullingens forkledning (ibid., p. 87). It has the same structure as the 
mythic Prometheus that is both a trickster (as he fools the gods) and a culture hero (as the Titan who 
cherishes man), while Cervantes Don Quixote is perhaps the best known bygdetulling of this format.  
29 See Henrik Ibsens poem Paa Vidderne in Samlede verker  jubileumsutg. (Oslo: Kagge, 2005) 
volumes 1-3. In english translation: William Norman Guthrie: On the Heights: a Tragedy in Lyrical 
Ballads (Sewanee: University Extension Department of the University of South, 1910). 
30 For an account on the literatis relation to nature in native intellectual history, see Nina Witoszek: 
Norske Naturmytologier: fra Edda til økofilosofi (Oslo: Pax, 1998). 
31 For the uninitiated in the champions of friluftsliv: Monsen can be characterized as a native barbarian 
only suited to live in a tent in the northern wild with a pack of hounds and a camera as company. 
Dagbladets Lørdagsmagasin, Flagger ut, 3. December 2005. 
32Perhaps not surprising, but a short inquiry inspired by a native novel, Thomas Hansen: Gi ting til folket 
(Oslo: Gyldendal, 2004), and conducted among native miscellaneous reveals Norwegians seem to think 
of a skiing-style when mentioned the words classic style (instead of music or architecture, for that 
matter). It must be noted that it was winter (December) when I had informal chats with approximately 30 
restaurant-goers in Oslo centre one evening.  
  
 
19
body  both national and individual  as degenerate, the medicine of outdoor-life 
promised detrimental effects. Nature became a destiny of pilgrimage, praised as the 
superior therapeutic antidote for body and mind to the equally mental and physical 
pollutions of urban life. Today, Nils Faarlund, an archetype of friluftsmennesket (and 
of a deep ecologist), assures us of the necessity of an apparently needed cultural 
rescue by means of nature and by the native way of cultural radicalism: The most 
important element of both mountain rescue and cultural rescue is preventive 
medicine. Friluftsliv can help prevent a catastrophe.33  
For those contemporaries that cannot escape the urban into Siberian conditions 
like the apparent new national hero, Sjur Paulsen promises inspiration in Loop (2005).34 
It is built around Arne Næss request in the same film to go inside nature!35 Repeating 
the kernel of native ritualistic self-help and its associated understanding of the good life 
and good way, Loop offers salvation and therapy in nature. The norms are conveniently 
verbalized by the guru of Norwegian wood and way and stay true to the principles of 
Nansens modus operandi: activity and engagement in nature. The documentary exposes 
us to Norwegian self-help from the terrors of war, post-industrial apathy, and most 
importantly: the loop of city life. In effect, it is an ingenious indigenous combination 
of worship of nature with worship of the self. Meanwhile, the self-proclaimed protector 
of native cultural virtues and values  Den Norske Turistforening, promises to stay true 
to the times by incorporating extreme-sports into their programme. The effort is to 
lokke folk ut på eventyr, as the organizations new general secretary Kristin Krohn 
Devold says.36  
Up to this date, a combination of modern body-culture and reactionary practice 
of social cleansing continue to distinguish the more traditional and extreme 
friluftsliv. Loop may be the characteristic pattern of the native cultural memory on 
self-seeking and self-helping. The loop reveals the cultural rootedness of deep ecology à 
                                                
33 Nils Faarlund: A Way Home in Peter Reed & David Rothenberg (eds.): Wisdom in the Open Air: the 
Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 167. 
34 Previous works from Paulsen include the frilufts- and snowboard documentary Soul Deep (2000), 
which in this context translates into snow deep. 
35 Analogous to Næss plea gå inn i naturen, ikke ut i den! is that of the surfers, who claim to surf the 
wave instead of on it. In the surfer-movie Monstertorsdag (2004), nature is experienced through extreme-
sport and is the ultimate character-builder and cultivator of mans spirit. The soul surfer in Point Break 
(1991), which is built around the same concept of spirituality as the native version, commits suicide in the 
waves to escape imprisonment. The native hero exits the stage after being deprived from the love of a 
woman and dies in a manner of the ultimate Norwegian friluftsselvmord, or perhaps: romantic extreme-
friluftsselvmord. 
36 The previous minister of defence furthermore invokes the image of grown-up men playing war in the 
woods in her exclamation that friluftsliv is just like the military, but without guns. 
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la Næss and Faarlund, and is enabled by social action and representation in the 
oikotypical meme of friluftsliv that repeats the anthem of being in classic nature  
but preferably in a landscape of adventure. On the surface, not much seems to be wrong 
with established tradition and the point remains: the native inclination of treating 
nature as good and the nature-dweller (the so called friluftsmenneske) as healthy has 
suffered no deflation, although the much debated deconstruction of seemingly 
everything at hand that has, by now, even reached the shores of the native cultural 
landscape.  
 
The Norwegian Impasse 
Up here I dont expose myself to other people and other people dont get 
exposed to me. Others are protected from my sarcasm and hatefulness and Im 
protected against their cleverness and stupidity. I experience it as a good 
arrangement.37  
The three elements of the contemporary tragedy according to Doppler  ego-stupidity, 
propsism and cleverness  cannot be completely separated from each other, while an 
analytical separation of the twofold character of the critique of modern man might be 
appropriate. However, the decisive element of the Dopplerian critique is against a more 
diffuse and total concept of civilization. From a historical perspective the different 
realms of critique  the economic and the cultural  unite in the foundations of 
civilization, back in those times by the Nile where wealth was accumulated to the extent 
it became necessary to catalogue it, serving as the impetus for writings beginning. All 
in all, the description of the malaise in mans nature brings to mind the Martinian vain 
apes  the societal antithesis of Potu in Ludvig Holbergs A Journey to the World 
Underground (1741).  
The disdain of flinkhet must foremost be seen as a cultural attack on the 
perception of the native self. The other side of the critique is foremost concerned with 
the economic sphere where equal blows are delivered to the capitalist enterprise 
(symbolized in Høyremannen) and to its result in modern day consumerism 
(symbolized in Dopplers wife). The native is divided into two equally dismissed 
economic camps: the one rich and arrogant, the other rich and naïve. As the burglar 
                                                
37 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 41: Her oppe utsetter jeg meg ikke for andre 
mennesker og andre mennesker utsettes ikke for meg. Andre beskyttes mot min sarkasme og hatefullhet 
og jeg beskyttes mot deres flinkhet og stupiditet. Jeg opplever det som en god ordning.  
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Jernroger explains Doppler: Lenger oppe er det høyreland og alarmer overalt, men her 
nede stemmer folk på SV og tror på det gode i mennesket samtidig som de vasser i 
penger.38 Borrowing from Rousseau, one is led to believe that Dopplers wife is 
suffering of amour-propre; the vanity that poses the self solely in the light and esteem 
of others. It is here understood as propsism:  
She has romped in classic culture and shopped some clothes and equipment that 
apparently has given her the spark of life back. Its amazing to notice how much 
clothes and equipment can do.39 
The critique of economic arrangements assumes more or less the characteristic of satire. 
The problem is that the very same materialism that is being criticized forms the basis of 
the main characters blasé cosmological outlook despite attempts at establishing a new 
economy: money is still deemed as the very symbol of materialism. Loes hero à la 
Askeladden is trademarked by a strong need for autonomy and self-sufficiency. In this 
environmental context it is understood as a type of sustainability that cherishes the 
pietistic virtue of material spartanism. Næss verbalizes it in the emblematic maxim 
simple in means, rich in ends!40 It is re-enacted in Doppler: I like everything that 
doesnt have a budget. Im immediately sceptical to projects with budgets.41 The whole 
economic framework is dismissed in the total rejection of the modern animal laborans, 
here synonymous with the wage slave. The dismissal is done in a spirit true to the 
anarcho-primitivist:  
I will never pay a bill again, either over the net or in any other way. I will live by 
trading and theft and the forest. And when Im gone, the forest will live on me. 
Thats the contract.42 
From the perspective of this study, the most interesting critique is that of the 
untranslatable flinkhet that must be understood within the Norwegian cultural context 
rendering it meaningful. It is understood as a peculiarly Norwegian cleverness and 
signifies being competent, dutiful, and most importantly: always doing what is expected 
                                                
38 Ibid., p. 74.  
39 Ibid., p. 89: Hun har boltret seg i klassisk kultur og shoppet en del klær og rekvisita som tydeligvis har 
gitt henne litt av livsgnisten tilbake. Det er forbløffende å legge merke til hvor mye klær og rekvisita kan 
bety. 
40 A slogan well-used by Næss and meant as a practical norm in everyday life. 
41 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 141: Jeg liker alt som ikke har budsjett. Prosjekter 
som har budsjett er jeg med en gang mer skeptisk til. 
42 Ibid., p. 72: Jeg skal aldri noensinne betale en regning igjen. Verken på nettet eller på annen måte. Jeg 
skal leve av bytting og tyveri og skogen. Og når jeg er borte, skal skogen få leve av meg. Det er 
kontrakten.   
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of one. Loe helps us by implying that it should be conceived as a dictum of the urnorske 
tradition of egalitarianism combined with Janteloven (the natives very own 
communist manifesto). Choose the golden mean in order not to provoke attention or 
stand out:  
I have never dared to go the whole way and buy big. I think it is cleverness that 
has hindered me. Always clever. A small Toblerone is clever. It shows a fathers 
consideration for his family. He remembered them. He thought of them. But a 
huge Toblerone is too big to be clever. Its extreme and tells a vague story of its 
buyer. He has an eating disorder. He is alone. He is weird.43 
Here Norwegian Taoism has assumed a negative connotation and in Doppler the 
portrayed image of the indigen reminds of Karl Kraus social democrat. Kraus was of 
the opinion that the social democrat was stupid, a term Loe likes to use as well, to the 
extent of being autistic.44 Stupidity is inextricably linked to cleverness  to be clever has 
in Loes universe become synonymous with suffering from an all-encompassing 
illness. 
In continuation of the dismissal flinkhet Doppler excommunicates the foundation 
of civilization, namely the written word. This is done as an effort to stop the 
domestication of his son. The primitive hinge in Loes authorship is traceable back to 
the novel Naiv.Super. (1996). It is an indicator of the authors naivistic approach, as the 
primitivism sought for functions the same way as naivism: by regression into an 
innocent childhood. In Naiv.Super. the main characters solution to existential dilemmas 
is found by pounding a bankebrett, a transitional object and in psychological terms a 
reaction against the domestication of the self.  
Dopplers son shall not be corrupted by urban culture  or by any culture: 
People just sit and write to show how clever they are and thats the last thing the world 
needs. Its words, words, words.45 People are clever and culture is ill, and therefore his 
sons project of learning how to read is treated as undesirable: 
                                                
43 Ibid., p. 51: Jeg har aldri våget å ta skrittet ut og kjøpe den store. Det er flinkheten som har hindret 
meg, tenker jeg. Alltid flink. Små Tobleroner er flinke. De viser en fars omtanke for sin familie. Han 
husket dem. Han tenkte på dem. Men svære Tobleroner er for store til å være flinke. De er ekstreme og 
forteller en uklar historie om kjøperen. Han har et spiseproblem. Han er ensom. Han er rar.  
44 For the popular opinion on Karl Kraus see Alain Accardos article: Dumhetens apostler in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, august issue 2005, pp. 16-17.  See also Karl Kraus: I denna stora tid. Texter ur Die Fackel 
i urval och översättning av Lars Bjurman (Stockholm: Brutus Östlings Bokförlag, 1995). 
45 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 143: Folk sitter bare og skriver for å vise hvor flinke 
de er og det er det siste verden trenger. Det er ord, ord, ord. 
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He needs to be stopped. His cleverness needs to be cut at its root. Gregus is not 
going down to civilization. He will be in the forest with me. And Im going to 
make fires with a handful. The newspapers will be burnt straight away. If Gregus 
wants to do further reading he needs to write himself. He needs to scratch on 
bark or use his blood. Im thinking this should curb his love of reading.46  
One may ask if this is the way to re-educate, by the way of un-education, man into 
being deep as opposed to shallow. However, one might doubt the efficiency of a ban 
on the written word as a means to de-domestication and minimization of modern illness 
as long as the history of civilization is a history of remembrance. So does the civilized 
disease cure with a bonfire of words? Not so, the tentacles of memory reach further 
than to the written word. They encompass the senses too: 
In the evening pieces of the chorus turn up and I sing them uncritically long 
before a cold sweat breaks out and I realize its the theme song of Bananer i 
pyjamas Im reeling off. Its like a disease.47  
What is the remedy if culture is a disease? One particular antidote is implicated in 
Dopplers faithfully unclever way:  
Its like in a film I saw many years ago where the main characters hand became 
evil and tried to kill him. In the end he saw it off with a chainsaw. He held the 
chainsaw in his healthy hand and pulled the starter with his mouth. Off with the 
evil hand.48  
Similarly, off with evil culture? With chainsaws and bonfires as metaphorical tools we 
are left guessing. Nevertheless, imagination leaves little room for picturing peaceful 
transitions to a new cultural habitus or an endorsement of Næssian norms of non-
violence. Dopplers associations from Evil Dead 2 (1987), a film that makes one plea 
the character to cut his own arm off, reflects his view on man: evil dead is the 
conclusion to our condition. To use a reversed expression of Stein Mehren on the 
apparent status of society: when all the holy has oozed out, all that there is left is the 
                                                
46 Ibid., p. 138: Han må stoppes. Flinkheten hans må kuttes ved roten. Gregus skal ikke ned til 
sivilisasjonen. Han skal være i skogen med meg. Og jeg skal begynne å tenne opp med never. Avisene 
skal brennes rett opp, så hvis Gregus vil lese videre, må han skrive tekster selv. Han må risse dem inn i 
bark eller bruke blod. Det vil nok stagge leselysten, tenker jeg. 
47 Ibid., p. 103: Først i kveldingen dukker det opp brokker av refrenget og jeg synger dem ukritisk lenge 
før jeg kaldsvettende innser at det er vignettsangen til Bananer i pyjamas jeg står og lirer av meg  Det 
er som en sykdom. 
48 Ibid., p. 103: Det er som i en film jeg så for mange år siden hvor hovedpersonens hånd ble ond og 
førsøkte å drepe ham. Til slutt sagde han den av med motorsag. Han holdt motorsagen i den friske hånden 
og dro i startrepet med munnen. Av med den onde armen. 
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demons. In Loes universe everybody seems to be a demon and considered as good as 
dead. 
Loe is not alone in his dismissal of culture and the repetition it represents. 
Neither is he alone in depicting a social-democratic reality that negates the social-
democratic reality. But if one wishes for cultural amnesia, another suffers from it.  
Loes main character repeats the same tradition he wishes to escape, while the 
nutty professor in Mattis Øybøs debut is fascinated by the culturally amnesiac to the 
same extent the past, as cultural and individual history, remains a mystery. In Øybøs 
Alle ting skinner (2004), the thematic ingredients are an unstable global climate and a 
little bit of anarchism. Snow that refuses to stop falling gets the proportions of religious 
revelation. When nature reveals and reminds us of its powers, the step to full chaos is 
seemingly not far away. Like Joseph Conrad in The Secret Agent (1966), Øybø thinks of 
civilization as only a thin coating of protection against the anarchistic impulses and 
atavistic roots that lurk underneath the surface of ordered society  nature is anarchistic. 
The repetition that is civilization has made us tautologic and thus paralyzed. Man has 
bought a shallow security in guarantee of a certain death in boredom, bored to the 
borders of dementia. And so it seems man is doomed to live  in dementia. Being 
suicidal is the trademark of life because repetition is the death of man. The cultural 
repetition is attempted eliminated by the symbolical burning of Ibsens and Hamsuns 
books. Otto, the main character of the novel, thinks the repetitive force of culture has 
made us forget the answers, or was it the questions that we forgot? He does not 
remember. The ambience of Alle ting skinner is that of a nightmare, repeating the rotten 
culture it attacks because it does not know better. Ottos formation  or transformation  
falls short and thus also weakens the critique, unable as it is to manifest a world beyond 
the tautological.  
Unfortunately, native minds portraying a social-democratic negation of a social-
democratic habitus end up in a countercultural anti-posture where both good and evil 
become platitudes. They are as flat as the shallow emotional spectre of Øybøs villains: 
terrorists that by sensible democracy decide to stop further terrorizing. In Doppler social 
reality is repressed: social-democratic reality is abhorred and therefore denied by 
moving to the woods, while the nature and reality of evil remains social-democratic. In 
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Loes universe even the villains are decent people, deep down: Litt som røverne i 
Kardemomme by. God på bunnen, liksom.49 
 
Nature is Culture  
I wasnt an element that Oslo wished to have in its streets. I didnt spread 
positivity or energy. I wasnt an advantage. Not for my closest, for my work, or 
for the more diffuse greater society and the economical framework that runs it. I 
was weeded out when I was about to become a burden. Nature is so ingenious it 
weeded me out before I did real harm. Its an impressive system. Thousands of 
years with nature and culture have specialized the mechanism in such a way that 
people like me are removed from the rows. We are neutralized. Enemies of the 
people that are on the verge of puncturing the brittle illusion of community and 
meaning, are sent away to reflect. To the seas for example, or to the mountains, 
or behind some closed door, or as in my case: out in the woods.50  
Doppler clearly thinks of himself as the ghost-busting hero of Henrik Ibsenss The Wild 
Duck (1884). But while some life-lies are attempted punctured, other kind of life-lies 
are upheld, as for example the native tendency to diffuse nature and culture into a two-
in-one solution. One of the consequences of the inclination of seeking character in 
friluftsliv is to see nature through a domesticated version of wilderness ideology. 
Virgin forests are deemed inherently good and healthy while culture and the city as a 
symbol of it, is rotten. If classic nature is the g-spot of the Norwegian soul, the 
preferred landscape is that of adventure.  
Nordmarka was an invention of the wealthy bourgeois of the 19th and 20th 
century. They saw the forest as a nature cathedral, borrowing elements from British 
hiking and camping tradition (enabled by tradition of aristocratic sport) and a spiritual 
coating from German nature-romanticism. The traditional Norwegian arena for 
friluftsliv was enabled, even more than by aristocratic sports by the social-
democratization of culture and by the fact that action no longer hinged on imperatives 
                                                
49 Ibid., p. 78.  
50 Ibid., pp.  90-91: Jeg var ikke et element Oslo ønsket å ha i sine gater. Jeg spredde ikke positivitet og 
energi. Jeg var ikke et pre. Verken for mine nærmeste, for jobben min eller for det mer diffuse 
storsamfunnet og de økonomiske rammene som styrer det. Jeg var i ferd med å bli en byrde, og da ble jeg 
luket ut. Naturen er så sinnrikt innrettet at den luket meg ut før jeg gjorde virkelig skade. Det er et 
imponerende system. Årtusener med natur og kultur har spisset mekanismen på en måte som gjør at slike 
som meg fjernes fra rekkene. Vi uskadeliggjøres. Folkefiender som er på nippet til å ta hull på den skjøre 
illusjonen av felleskap og mening, sendes bort for å tenke seg om. Til havs, for eksempel, eller til fjells, 
eller bak en eller annen lukket dør, eller som i mitt tilfelle: ut i skogen.  
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of survival but on the cultural and social need to display healthy activity as opposed to 
those of the degenerated and ill city. This was in complete accordance with the image 
of the native as healthy, sober and self-sufficient practitioner of friluftsliv that was at the 
time in-the-making.  
The inclination to dissolve nature and culture into a semi-atavistic blend is 
particularly visible in the rehabilitative function that nature is given: Jeg har sagt opp 
jobben og flyttet ut i skogen fordi det var det eneste fornuftige å gjøre.51 The romantic 
cornerstone of Rousseaus philosophy  to be true to ones feelings  is tangent to an 
equal indigenous inclination, only less romantic. Dwelling in classic nature is foremost 
rational, therapeutic activity. Wood ways give a good life. This is close to Næsss 
opinion on the healing forces of being in natural surroundings:  
People who have succeeded according to the usual criteria tend to regard 
everything as a means. In this situation, I believe that therapy to a great extent 
should be milieu therapy and nature therapy, and that correct milieux have 
uncharted resources for meaningful and good life.52 
Notwithstanding the unmistakable dystopian-misanthropic tone of the novel that gives 
the main character a darker shade than the optimistic Askeladden, the essential kernel of 
his cosmology consists of a social democratic decency. He thus represents a closer 
kinship with the likes of Nansen and Næss and their mythological ancestor Askeladden 
than what might seem appropriate at first reading. It must be noted that some of the 
attributes of the Norwegian Ash-lad are also characteristics of primitive philosophies: 
they share the emphasis on spontaneous action and a deep respect, if not love, for 
nature. Both Askeladden and Doppler contain the same ethics  identification with the 
weaker, harmony with nature, spontaneity and autonomy in the sense of self-
sufficiency. Perhaps most importantly, both express the belief that direct 
communication and foremost communion with animals is possible. 
A native perennial philosophy surfaces in the nomadic reverence of nonhuman 
life in the principle of killing with remorse: not out of habit, but out of actual need. 
Næss thinks in similar patterns: man has to apologize for being part of nature. The bio-
egalitarian reverence towards all should be apologetically moderated by the norm of 
vital needs. These two contradictory and competing norms are meant to be united in 
practice in a realistic egalitarian attitude when the hunter has a long discussion with 
                                                
51 Ibid., p. 68.  
52 Arne Næss: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 63.  
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the spirit of the bear, and explains apologetically that the larder is bare and that he must 
now kill the bear to nourish his family.53 Doppler explains to Bongo after killing her 
mother:  
Contrary to my good intentions I taxed nature in a brutal way, and probably took 
more out of it than I was capable of giving back  I didnt kill your mother out 
of old habit. I did it out of need. I hadnt eaten for days.54 
The Askeladdean harmony is that of a special sensitivity to nature and essentially of 
the same kind that Doppler tries to establish. To be in harmony with nature, although 
the esoteric connotations such a norm might invoke, is foremost a rational-pragmatic 
attitude of måtehold. The norm of harmony implies an ecological balance Det skal 
jo helst vare en slags balanse i sakene  and an equal reverence for life. It fits well 
with what Witoszek calls the Scandinavian version of Enlightenment, represented by 
the enlightened preacher-peasant and enabled by the equally native tradition of 
egalitarianism. The tradition is seen as an extraordinary balance of tradition and 
innovation, in a Christian ethos combined with a rationalpragmatic agenda.55 The 
egalitarianism visible in Doppler is a continuation of the two-in-one legacy to see 
nature as the ideal breeder and cultivator of spirit, re-enacted and cherished by the 
native countercultural corps. Doppler stresses the interconnectedness of everything in a 
similar manifest as those promoted by spiritual deep ecologists:  
Barter economy should be a part of the teaching plan. The young should be 
encouraged to exchange goods and services rather than to buy all sorts of things. 
The future of the planet depends on this. Because people dont own the earth, 
its the earth that owns people. The flowers are our sisters, and the horse, the big 
eagle, not to mention the elk, are our brothers. And how can one buy or sell 
anything at all? Because who owns the warmth of the air or the sound of wind in 
the trees? And the sap in the branches contains the memory of those that have 
lived before us. And the sound of the gurgling stream has in it the voice of my 
father and his father. And we need to teach our children that the ground we walk 
on contains the ashes of our ancestors and that everything that happens to the 
                                                
53 Ibid., p. 176. Italics are Næss.  
54 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), pp. 10 & 15-16: Stikk i strid med min gode vilje hadde 
jeg beskattet naturen på en brutal måte og sannsynligvis tatt mer ut fra den enn jeg var i stand til å gi 
tilbake  jeg drepte ikke moren din av gammel vane. Jeg gjorde de av behov. Jeg hadde ikke spist på 
dagevis. 
55 See Nina Witoszek: Fugitives from Utopia: The Scandinavian Enlightenment Reconsidered in Bo 
Stråth & Øystein Sørensen (eds.): The Cultural Construction of Norden (Oslo: Scandinavian University 
Press, 1997), p. 74. 
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earth also will happen to us and that if we spit on the earth we spit on 
ourselves.56  
The impulse to dissolve dichotomies is particularly clear in the Norwegian nature 
tradition and manifests a conspicuous cosmological paradox. All the while the 
emotional is equalled with the physical inasmuch as nature and culture are seen as one, 
nature is through an act of a deus ex machina given all the admirable qualities while 
culture is given the pride of place at the demons dinner table. The natural state is 
seen as healthy and good, while everything cultured (man included) is ill. The crux is, 
and has been for some time now, how to combine the atavistic impulses of the two-in-
one solution with rationality expressed within civilization, without resorting to a 
complete abandonment of the civilized or an equally damaging dismissal of 
irrationality  magic, intuition and emotion.  
 
The Lonely Man 
I dont like people. I dont like what they do. I dont like what they are. I dont 
like what they say Nothing bothers me less than what people think. People can 
think what they want. In any case I dont like them and seldom respect their 
opinionsTo watch TV becomes an encyclopaedia on why I dont like people. 
TV is the concentrate on everything that is repulsive about us. Human qualities 
which are already hard to reconcile with in reality become directly glaring on 
TV. People appear as idiots. Even I would look like an idiot on TV. Everything 
human is strange.57 
Has Loe misunderstood Jens Bjørneboe? The latter is famous for the words Nothing 
human is strange for me. The reason why Doppler needs forest-therapy seems to be 
                                                
56 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), pp. 67-68: Bytteøkonomi bør inn i læreplanen. De unge 
bør oppfordres til å bytte varer og tjenester heller enn til å kjøpe alt mulig. Jordas fremtid avhenger av 
dette, sier jeg. For menneskene eier ikke jorda, sier jeg. Det er jorda som eier menneskene. Blomstene er 
våre søstre, og hesten, den store ørnen, for ikke å snakke om elgen, er våre brødre. Og hvordan kan man 
kjøpe eller selge noe som helst? For hvem eier varmen i luften eller lyden av vinden i trærne? Og sevja i 
grenene inneholder minnet av dem som har levd før oss. Og lyden av den klukkende bekken har i seg 
stemmen til min far og til hans far igjen. Og vi må lære våre barn at grunnen vi går på inneholder asken 
av våre forfedre og alt som skjer med jorda også vil skje med oss og at hvis vi spytter på jorda så spytter 
vi på oss selv. 
57 Ibid., pp. 31, 33 & 71: Jeg liker ikke folk. Jeg liker ikke det de gjør. Jeg liker ikke det de er. Jeg liker 
ikke det de sier Ingenting bekymrer meg mindre enn hva folk tror. Folk kan tro hva de vil. Jeg liker 
dem uansett stort sett ikke og respekterer sjelden deres meninger Det å se på tv blir for meg som et 
oppslagsverk over hvorfor jeg ikke liker folk. Tv er selve konsentratet av alt som er frastøtende med oss. 
Det som allerede i virkeligheten er vanskelig å forsone seg med av menneskelige egenskaper blir direkte 
grelt når det kommer på tv. Folk fremstår som idioter. På tv ville selv jeg ha fremstått som en idiot. Alt 
menneskelig er meg fremmed.   
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other people. Sociability has become obsolete and annoying and life should be 
septically free from other people. Loes posture is no different than Jean-Paul Sartres 
existential insight that hell is other people, depicted in his play Huis Clos (1944). 
Doppler explains, echoing an essential structure in the character of the Norwegian 
frilufts-champion, namely the anti-social tendency: We are born alone and we die 
alone. Its just to get used to that sooner or later. Loneliness is fundamental in the whole 
construction.58 Life is as lonely as in Michel Houellebecqs The Possibility of an 
Island (2006) which depicts the end of man as a social and thus loving species.  
Dopplers enterprise is a re-canonization of the Norwegian ideal of 
egalitarianism in the woods, (hopefully) without people. The problematic aspect of 
Dopplers forest-egalitarianism is that it presupposes the absence of other humans, or at 
least the minimization of human presence and their settlements, and as such should be 
worrying. Nature is natural only as long as man is excluded from it. It is in tune with 
Næssian philosophy inspired by Gestalt psychology: go inside nature and not out in 
nature. The question is whether we should go so deep that we disappear in it, like 
Doppler: 
One problem with people is that once they fill a room it is the people and not the 
room you see. Big, deserted landscapes stop being big, deserted landscapes if 
they have one or more humans in them. The gaze is defined by the human. And 
peoples looks are almost always directed towards other people. It is in this way 
the illusion has been made that people are more important than things on earth 
that are nonhuman.59   
The anti-social pattern found in Doppler is a continuation of a Norwegian tradition of 
seeking the self in the solitude of nature  the perfect place for the existentially 
anguished native. The protagonist is the personification of the solitary Norwegian 
mistrusting other people. Man is the source of confusing signals and unpredictability  
you can search for a thousand years, but you will never find more confusing signals 
than those that come from humans.60 If there is something Doppler seeks it is 
                                                
58 Ibid., p. 42: Vi blir født alene og vi dør alene. Det er bare å venne seg til det først som sist. Aleneheten 
er grunnleggende i hele konstruksjonen.     
59 Ibid., pp. 139-140: Et problem med folk er at med en gang fyller et rom, er det folkene man ser og 
ikke rommet. Store, øde landskaper slutter å være store, øde landskaper hvis de har et eller flere 
mennesker i seg. Mennesket definerer hvor blikket skal ligge. Og menneskets blikk er nesten alltid rettet 
mot andre mennesker. På den måten er det skapt en illusjon om at mennesket er viktigere enn det på 
jorden som ikke er menneske. 
60 Ibid., p. 19: Du kan lete i tusen år, men du vil aldri finne mer fovirrende signaler enn dem som 
kommer fra mennesker. 
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simplicity and predictability, something which is conveniently offered by the forest 
which skjønner alt og rommer alt.61 The forest is a Norwegian version of an authentic 
utopia. The forest is boundless.  
When man no longer belongs to a social species, he becomes an alienated 
onlooker. This is witnessed in Dopplers sermon from the hill, which expresses the 
psychological need to level in an ethically egalitarian and therefore indifferent attitude 
that can be summarized as no one is better than I am. The dark shade in Dopplers 
cosmology gives it the resemblance of Ibsens tragic enemy of the people.62 Like 
doctor Stockmann, Doppler is driven by desperation and fuelled by anguish and the 
hypocrisy of modern life  nobody is listening to him either. Doppler is yelling out his 
helplessness on top of Nordmarka, prophetically to everybody and apocalyptically to 
nobody:  
Im both king and prime minister and Im giving a speech to the people. Dear 
fellow citizens, I yell, I dont like you. You have to get yourself together. You 
must lift your gaze and stop being so damn clever. And you right wing people 
need to get rid of your damn dogs and you need to wipe away those self-satisfied 
smiles, and you need to start trading. And bicycling. We need to bicycle and 
trade like hell if were going to have a chance at keeping it going. Who owns the 
whispers of the wind in the trees and the flowers on the ground? And the 
Teletubbies can burn in hell, and hell, Im stopping up, Im too drunk to keep the 
train of thought in my New Years speech, but Løvenskiold, I yell, you must 
give the forest back to the people because you dont really own it, nobody 
should be able to own a forest, and father, I continue, you are gone and I didnt 
know you and I feel alone, I have always felt alone and I push everybody away 
because Im a fool like everybody else, and nobody knows me and Im afraid 
nobody will ever know me as long as I live, and I give up, and in the end just 
yell, fuck, fuck, fuck until I lose my voice.63   
                                                
61 Ibid., p. 68.  
62 See Ibsens En folkefiende in Samlede verker  jubileumsutg, volumes 1-3. In english translation: R. 
Farquharson Sharp: Four great plays by Henrik Ibsen (New York: Bantam Books, 1981). 
63 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 95:  Jeg er både konge og statsminister og jeg holder 
tale til befolkningen. Kjære landsmenn, roper jeg, jeg liker dere ikke. Dere må ta dere sammen. Dere må 
løfte blikket og slutte og være så forbannet flinke. Og dere høyrefolk må kvitte dere med de helvetes 
hundene deres og tørke av de selvtilfredse smilene, og dere må begynne å bytte. Og sykle. Vi må sykle og 
bytte som faen hvis vi skal ha en sjanse å holde det gående. Og hvem eier vindens sus i trærne og 
blomstene på marken? Og Teletubbiene må brenne i helvete, og faen, jeg går i stå, jeg er for full til å 
holde tråden i en nyttårstale, men Løvenskiold, roper jeg, du må gi skogen tilbake til folket, for du eier 
den ikke egentlig, ingen burde kunne eie en skog, og far, fortsetter jeg, du er borte og jeg kjente deg ikke 
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The native cosmology is, if not unique, of the seldom kind to suppose that the structure 
of mans character is only to be found in the solitude of natures embrace  from 
Hamsun and Nansen to Næss and Loe. Emil Durkheims studies of aboriginal culture64 
suggest that primitive man uses the natural world as a direct mirror of the self: the 
natural world is only conceivable in social terms and natural objects are made to 
embody social subjects. From this point of view, the complete absence in native 
fictional and philosophical deep ecology of a basis from where to establish boundaries 
for social conduct becomes understandable. It can be argued that Næssian ecology 
(albeit the many times justified and paramount critique on the lack of a social theory in 
deep ecology) is precisely a theory of native social ecology, in the sense that man is 
seen as possessing a hotline to nature (except his own) where this very same nature 
becomes the parent, the model and the ideal of man. 
What is intriguing about the native infatuation with the non-human (or in some 
cases the non-living) is that it is traceable back to an anti-social tendency. Næss 
elaborates:  
Feeling apart in many human relations, I identified with nature. From about the 
age of eight a definite mountain became for me a symbol of a benevolent, equal-
minded, strong father, or of an ideal human nature.65  
The thoughts of the main character are similar, who finds that there is no need for a 
human mirror of the self but that an elk will do, more so than other humans:  
When I woke up this morning we lay looking at each other in an intimate way I 
rarely have experienced with people. I dont think I even have experienced that 
with my wife.66 
The soul mate of Doppler being an elk, one should not be surprised when the self is 
identified as Africa.67 To identify oneself with the weaker, in this case Africa instead of 
the by now emancipated Nora, is not a curiosity in the history of native self-
                                                                                                                                          
og jeg føler meg alene, jeg har alltid følt meg alene og jeg støter alle fra meg fordi jeg er en tosk som alle 
andre, og ingen kjenner meg og jeg frykter at ingen kommer til å kjenne meg så lenge jeg lever, og jeg gir 
opp og roper till slutt bare faen, faen, faen helt til jeg mister stemmen. 
64 See Emil Durkheim: The Elementary Structures of Religious Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), pp. 220-222. 
65 See Peter Reed & David Rothenberg (eds.): Wisdom in the open air (Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press, 1993), p. 67. 
66 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 14: da jeg våknet i dag, ble vi liggende og se på 
hverandre på en nær og intim måte som jeg sjelden har opplevd med mennesker. Jeg tror ikke jeg engang 
har opplevd det med min kone. 
67 Ibid., pp. 61-62: Nei, det er du som er Nora, sier min kone. Du stakk fra alt et halvt år siden. Jeg er 
ikke Nora, sier jeg. Jeg er Afrika. 
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identification, much less in the tradition of cultural radicalism. The feeling of 
communion  det var nesten i meste laget  is not singularly positive, rather, the elk 
is tolerable, even lovable, ultimately because Bongo is not a producer of code but a 
recipient of it. In the docudrama Grizzly Man (2005), a modern nature-enchanted 
adventurer tries to establish direct communion with bears in Alaska. The enterprise ends 
in death, and the assembled footage resists the sentimentality and naïvete of the 
environmental adventurer which is comparable to Loes naivistic wilderness ideology. 
As in Grizzly Man, the animal portrayed is an object, and therefore tolerable. The 
protagonist capitulates:Det er herlig med en som ikke kan snakke. 68 One may wonder 
whether Næss would consider Doppler to be an emotionally progressed since his self-
identification is no less than the size of Africa. Næsss concept of self-realization is 
directly linked to self-identification, which in turn is an indicator on the goal of 
perfection. Emotional progress is the goal of perfection, the latter considered a way to 
natural salvation.  
Anti-sociability is not only a misanthropic dislike of an undefined people but the 
requirement on which the happiness of Doppler hinges on: 
On the last day of January I realize that its over a month ago I last spoke with 
people. It works perfectly. Everything you can say to others, and I havent said 
any of it. Im living proof of that there in the end is not so much to say. Im 
proud of myself. Its a good start of the New Year.69  
His isolation must be seen in light of the central cultural category of fred og ro that 
exhorts influence on native social life. According to Marianne Gullestad, the category 
must be understood as a harmonious and calm content in everyday life. Peace is 
something that can be disturbed by too much social interaction. It can mean nag, 
worry, racket, interruptions, and conflicts and must thus be restricted.70 Implicitly, 
having it peaceful and quiet suggests non-fictional and non-Dopplerian Norwegians are 
begging to be left alone. In this case: in nature. Even if they are not begging to be left 
alone, fred og ro must be seen in relation to the particularly Norwegian norm guiding 
social behaviour that Doppler in the beginning of this chapter seemingly distances 
                                                
68 Ibid., p. 15.  
69 Ibid., p. 100: På den siste dagen i januar går det opp for meg at det er over en måned siden sist jeg 
snakket med mennesker. Det fungerer utmerket. Alt det man kan si til andre, og så har jeg ikke sagt noe 
av det. Jeg er et levende bevis på at det i grunnen ikke er så mye å si. Jeg er stolt av meg selv. Det er en 
god start på året. 
70 A free translation from Marianne Gullestad: Kultur og Hverdagsliv (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1989), 
p. 127: fred er noe som kan ødelegges av for mye sosialt samvær. Sosialt samvær kan bety mas, 
bekymring, bråk, forstyrrelser, konflikter og må derfor begrenses.  
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himself from: å ha det koselig. This untranslatable kos suggests that people come 
together to enjoy peace and quiet in the company of others.  
Native critique on the cultural category of fred og ro and denne frastøtende 
norske kosen as Doppler puts it, are amounting. Yet, what these social requirements 
and demands actually imply often remains eclipsed in the debate. This suggests at least 
a semi-unconscious element within these cultural categories and their modus operandi.  
What they manifest in terms of psychology is varying degrees of denial of 
confrontation. Peace and harmony combined with the need of having it koselig, 
suggests an importance of avoiding social conflicts, and not necessarily of solving them. 
Næsss adverse judgement on modern life takes the form of a diffuse condemnation of 
an equally diffuse conglomerate of institutions, instead of the men that created the very 
same institutions.71 The tendency is clearly seen in Doppler, who enjoys the forest as 
long as it does not entail social interaction. For Doppler his woods are over-crowded. 
The harmony of the main character is as fictious as the freedom from contempt that only 
can be achieved by escaping social conflicts:  
Im carving the totem for my life while the others are drinking or sleeping. Im 
thinking I dont recognize myself in my own forest. It was so peaceful and calm. 
Here I was with Bongo in a kind of balance from morning to night and didnt put 
on airs for anybody. But that was before. Now there is little left of the forest I 
once knew. We must have come to the wrong forest I say to Bongo. Here is so 
weird.72  
The Dopplerian project fails since it ultimately fails in its promulgation of a different 
view on man and his nature. The dichotomy of bad and good is upheld and the 
demarcated line is still drawn between the natural and the cultivated. His 
undifferentiated hatred towards anything smacking of culture, essentially meaning 
clever people, is the result of his monotheistic quest to instate nature in the place of 
                                                
71 Arne Næss: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.  
24, 71. Næsss critique on this point coincides with Foucauldian structuralism where the concept of 
power is seen as embedded in the discourses of society and thus assuming a character of omnipotence and 
omnipresence due to its undifferentiated source (or: the source of evil in this case). Meanwhile, 
inquiries on the nature of deep ecological social theory or on a contractual basis for social conduct are 
disregarded by pointing to the miracle medicine of an undefined cultural diversity against unwarranted 
behaviour. 
72 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 139: Mens de andre drikker eller sover, hugger jeg 
totempæl for harde livet og tenker at jeg ikke kjenner igjen min egen skog. Den som var så fredelig og 
stille. Her var Bongo og jeg i en slags balanse fra morgen til kveld og gjorde oss ikke til for noen... Men 
det var før. Nå er det lite igjen av den skogen jeg en gang kjente. Vi må være kommet til feil skog, sier 
jeg til Bongo. Her er så underlig. 
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culture. The natural is unequivocally seen as good while the cultural and cultivated 
is respectively unanimously bad. The traditional western signs are simply reversed  
nature becomes rational and culture irrational. Instead of breaking the dichotomous 
mould, it is simply turned upside down. The problematic aspect of such an operation is 
that it does not deliver: the demonic qualities of the daimonic are not redeemed, but 
simply rearranged.  
Man is seen as a blister on the corpse of nature. This reveals how far Doppler 
has gone to remove himself from himself. As such, it is a continuation of a native 
agenda of warning and escaping urban loops hovering on a national-ancestral 
cosmology that unites thinkers from perceivably different-minded sophies, such as 
Peter Wessel Zapffe and Næss. Doppler echoes Zapffes virulent virus-humanity, but 
his views are moderated by indifference. The Dopplerian manifesto is without a credo, 
as the protagonist laconically admits:  
The people and religions of the world need a helping hand if we are going to get 
over the bump. Nobody would be happier than me if that would happen. But I 
have to admit that I dont have any faith in it. I think its too late. I think we who 
live now must disappear and be replaced with a new human race with blank 
sheets and a smaller amount of aggressive characteristics. A less possessive 
human race, a version with the capacity to take a broad view of things.73  
 
A Crusade of Existential Nihilism 
We are incessantly supposed to be doing things. Its good in a way as long as 
you are active, no matter how stupid the activity should be. We want at all costs 
to avoid being bored, but I have noticed that I like being bored. Boredom is 
underestimated. I tell Gregus that my plan is to be bored until I get happy.74  
The boredom that Doppler finds in the woods and seeks to maintain is of a different 
kind than that of the alienating ticking of the clock. It is an existential boredom of the 
romantic kind: a waiting for the meaningful Godot  a meaningful good to believe in. 
                                                
73 Ibid., p. 150: Verdens folkeslag og religioner behøver en håndsrekning hvis vi skal kommer oss over 
kneika. Ingen vil være gladere enn meg dersom det lykkes. Men jeg må innrømme at jeg ikke har noe tro 
på at det kan gå. Jeg tror tåget har gått. Jeg tror vi som lever nå må forsvinne og at det må oppstå en ny 
menneskeart. Med blanke ark og et mindre antall aggressive egenskaper. En mindre eiegod menneskeart. 
En variant som har evnen til å se litt stort på tingene. 
74 Ibid., p. 84: Det ligger innbakt i oss at vi til stadighet skal gjøre ting. Så lenge man er virksom, er det 
bra, på et vis, uansett hvor dum virksomheten måtte være. Vi vil på død og liv unngå å kjede oss, men jeg 
har begynt å merke at jeg liker å kjede meg. Kjedsomheten er undervurdert. Jeg sier til Gregus at planen 
min er å kjede meg så lenge at jeg blir glad. 
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We are led to believe that the original boredom was part of everyday life, characterized 
by meaningless repetition where everything comes as fully described, circumscribed 
and prescribed. It was one that could be characterized as a feeling of fullness in the 
sense that one has had too much of the same and everything becomes banal.75 The 
boredom of Doppler tips over, together with the bike and Doppler on it, to a state where 
existential boredom becomes the quest (besides honouring his late father): Jeg skal 
rendyrke det å gjøre ingenting til et nivå få har gjort før meg. Og jeg skal ikke ned til 
sivilisasjonen, samme faen.76 The boredom is seen as a means to instigate a process of 
what Heidegger probably would have called the search for Dasein  the pursuit of the 
pursuit of the self. Doppler copies Heideggers recipe: to become more passive and 
open to the meaning of the self as a direct means to de-estrange the Being of man.  
In short, the quest could be characterized as the search for a meaningful 
personal truth in line with the postmodern maxim of relativism. But existential 
nihilism combined with a therapeutic mindset proves problematic from a social 
perspective. Richard Stivers writes that at the levels of meaning and emotion, the loss of 
common morality leads to a completely interiorized, subjective reality. Complete 
subjectivism gives way for the need for constant experimentation in regard to 
meaning77 in order to combat the meaningless of a society that has been emptied of 
sociability. This insular, and in the end anti-moral attitude, is expressed by the main 
character in the quintessential credo of the modern hero, every man for himself: The 
right wing man sees me as a soothsayer. He doesnt notice that Im actually trying to get 
him to go home.78  
The spontaneity of Askeladden is the kind Doppler tries to discover in the 
spontaneous idea of building a totem as a means out of his crisis. Accordingly, 
cleverness is seen as the biggest threat towards spontaneity, understood as it is as 
some sort of individual super-consciousness embedded in the cultural. In Doppler 
mans true nature can only be found in the woods by making a phallic totem honouring 
men. The long days of making the totem seem to result in a new mode of being: 
                                                
75 Lars Fr. H. Svendsen: Kjedsomhetens filosofi (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1999), p. 42. The twofold 
typologization of boredom also derived from Svendsens original fourfold typology.  
76 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 95. 
77 See Richard Stivers: The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994), pp. 103-105. 
78 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 123: høyremannen ser på meg som en slags sannsiger. 
Han merker ikke at jeg egentlig forsøker å få ham til å dra hjem. 
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It has become like this, I have changed. I have been in the forest a whole year 
and Im not the same as before. Its not easy to say when the change occurred. It 
has surely come step by step as most changes do, but that something has 
happened is without doubt. The forest gives and takes. And it forms those that 
seek it in its image. Im becoming forest myself.79  
If we understand the concept of catharsis as a form of emotional cleansing, climax, or 
simply as a radical change in emotions that result in renewal or restoration of the 
individual, Doppler might be characterized as a man united with the environment. But 
he does not seem interested in his nature. Instead of re-enacting the classic structure of a 
rite de passage and making it complete by re-integration, Doppler finds himself to 
suddenly care, for nature. He does not find a Heiddegerian Dasein, but rather an insight 
into the willingness to fight for the environment. Are we to believe that he is still 
searching for a meaningful good? At the moment, the only goodness is to be found in 
the woods, symbolizing the true home of the native. Already Nansen invoked the image 
of nature as a source of the authentic Norwegian folkehjem. In Doppler the woods is 
the only home. This is revealed to Doppler on no less than the day of the Norwegian 
celebration of the self: The birches are green and new-leaved and it is national day in 
the forest. Everything is clean. Everything is Norwegian. 
The acknowledged hatred of the Norwegian, Im thinking in a numb way that I 
detest the 17th of May I detest this way to celebrate the Norwegian80, does not mean 
hatred towards humanity in toto, since Norway must be considered an insignificant 
suburb to the real world.81 The native dystopia is not real enough. In any case, real 
people are those outside the borders of Norway. Doppler decides to embark on a 
journey that resembles romantic ethnotourism: 
The conditions here in the forest are no longer of such character that we can 
flourish in them. We need air to breath and room to think big in. The world waits 
for us. We are about to embark on a journey which might be long. I dont 
exactly know where this is coming from, but I feel its pushing, so I just say it, 
                                                
79 Ibid., p. 141: Slik har det blitt. Jeg har forandret meg. Jeg har snart vært i skogen i et helt år og jeg er 
ikke lenger den samme som jeg var. Når forandringen inntraff, er ikke greit å si. Den har sikkert kommet 
gradvis som forandringer flest, men at noe har skjedd er hevet over tvil. Skogen gir og tar. Og den former 
dem som oppsøker den i sitt bilde. Jeg er i ferd med å bli skog selv. 
80 Ibid., p. 154: Bjørka står grønn og nyutsprunget og det er nasjonaldag i skogen. Alt er rent. Alt er 
norsk Jeg avskyr 17. mai, tenker jeg på en bedøvet måte Jeg avskyr denne måten å feire det norske 
på. 
81 Ibid., p. 159: Norge er en ubetydelig forstad til den virkelige verden. Og vi er i ferd med å fjerne oss 
mer og mer fra den. 
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even if I had seen myself doing nothing after the totem was made. I was on the 
contrary supposed to do less than any human has done before me. I was to 
approach the magic zero. But now I stand with my two disciples [son Gregus 
and elk Bongo], because I notice that I have started to view them as disciples, 
and envision for them a journey which might be long There is always more 
forest.82 
We glimpse the beginning of the journey of the monomyth as described by Joseph 
Campbell. The ending of Doppler bears resemblance to the classic elements of the 
ultimate warrior of mankind. A war necessitating a crusade reveals the missionary and 
emancipatory agenda of Loe, and is comparable to the last norm in the deep ecology 
platform which could be reformulated as deep ecologists, unite!83 How serious this 
crusade should be taken as must remain under speculation, but the modus operandi of 
the new hero is truthfully one of running away  like Peer Gynts and Fausts. He ends 
his story with apocalyptic words and in a missionary tone: And this is a crusade. We 
are soldiers fighting to the last man. Against cleverness. Against stupidity. Because its 
a war out there. Its a war.84  
 
Postscript 
Reading the sequel of Doppler, Volvo Lastvagnar (2005), one is left with a sense of 
betrayal. The monomythic beginning of the new Askeladden crash-lands in the fields of 
Swedish countryside and goes up in smoke with Maj-Britt (or Hasj-Britt). His quest is 
conversely beaten out by the rigorous scout training of the pedantic von Borring. If the 
parody on the aristocratic scout leaders name is intentional or not, or whether von 
Borring should be considered as a wise old man (from the Campbellian schemata of 
the monomythic journey) is inessential. 
                                                
82 Ibid., pp. 150-151: Forholdene her i skogen er ikke lenger av en slik karakter at vi kan blomstre i dem, 
sier jeg. Vi trenger luft til å puste i og rom til å tenke stort i. Verden ligger og venter på oss, sier jeg. Vi 
skal ta fatt på en reise som kan bli lang. Jeg vet ikke helt hvor dette kommer fra, men jeg føler at de 
presser på, så da sier jeg det bare, selv om jeg egentlig hadde sett for meg at jeg ikke skulle gjøre noe etter 
at totempælen var ferdig. Jeg skulle tvert imot gjøre mindre enn noe menneske har gjort før meg. Jeg 
skulle nærme meg den magiske nullgrensen. Men nå står jeg med mine to disipler, for jeg merker at jeg 
har begynt å se litt på dem som disipler, og forespeiler dem en reise som kan bli lang Det fins alltid 
flere skoger.      
83 See the 8th point in the deep ecology platform in Arne Næss & George Sessions: The Deep Ecology 
Platform in Nina Witoszek & Andrew Brennan (eds.): Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Næss and the 
Progress of Ecophilosophy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), p. 8: Those who subscribe 
to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement 
the necessary changes. 
84 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), p. 159: Og dette er et felttog. Vi er soldater som skal 
kjempe til siste mann. Mot flinkheten. Mot dumheten. For det er krig der ute. Det er krig. 
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The point is that the sequel in all its essence is a betrayal of the heroic myth and 
of the norms of judgement, although problematic, that so clearly marked Doppler. The 
ending of the novel, in a native version of the monomythic character, might be a parody 
on the myth itself and thus on man and his foolish struggle. Or perhaps, in the light of 
hindsight  and in the light of the last page of Doppler which promises a continuation, 
Inshallah, the manifesto of Doppler reads as a reaction to recent U.S. foreign politics, 
in a style true to the credo of native cultural radicalism. As such, while in the waiting of 
a promised third novel, the Dopplerian project begun in the novel Doppler must be 
regarded as unfinished. 
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Chapter III: The Pastoral Recipe 
An odd change has occurred. This condition, which is not belief or faith but the 
premise for any orientation, I now call the turn  The unrest and unpleasant 
events, especially the distant fires, have also changed Maria. Before, we were 
concerned about finding out what was happening. Behind this curiosity was a 
hope that everything was going to be as before, that we again could understand 
and work. Now, we dont wish to go back to what was, but we are not 
indifferent. I dont quite know why, but it probably has to do with fear. The 
scrape of the order that existed smell burnt meat.  
- Tore Stubberud, Kjøtt i mørke 85 
 
The Becoming Body 
If there is something gourmands detest, it is the smell of burnt meat. But here the smell 
heralds the apocalyptic turn which is a blessing. In Stubberuds Kjøtt i mørke the times 
are of immediate post-apocalypse, the setting is pastoral and the place a secluded 
French countryside. The novels approach is philosophical, and lends support to most 
hedonistic worldviews of the day. It has no plot, and very little action. What foremost 
happens in the novel is between the protagonist, whose name we never get to know, and 
the cows he herds. What is foremost discussed is what happens between the mouth and 
the rectum of the protagonist: the senses are all we have and sensing is also what unites 
us with animals. The main characters phenomenology resembles Maurice Merleau-
Pontys. He argued that the only world man can know is the experienced world lived 
through the body, as processed in the pre-objective conscience. As discussed in chapter 
two, Erlend Loes critique centres on bourgeois evil as reasons to the fall of man. Here 
it is indicated to be an abstraction of modern mind away from the body. In this sense, 
the body is the civilization critique. 
The shift in Western thinking towards the biological and physical  from spirit to 
matter  is according to Pitirim Sorokin a tragic dualism, since it is a simultaneous 
                                                
85 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), pp. 9 & 43: Det er skjedd en forunderlig 
forandring. Denne tilstand, som ikke er en tro, ikke et livssyn, men forutsetningen for enhver orientering 
 kaller jeg nå vendingen  Uroen og de uhyggelige hendelsene, særlig de fjerne bålene, har også 
forandret Maria. Tidligere var vi opptatt av å vite hva som skjedde. Bak denne nysgjerrigheten lå et håp 
om at alt en gang ville bli som før, at vi igjen ville kunne forstå og arbeide. Nå er vi ikke likegyldige, men 
vi ønsker oss ikke tilbake til det som var. Jeg vet ikke helt hvorfor, men det har nok med redsel å gjøre. 
Restene av den orden som eksisterte, lukter brent kjøtt. 
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degradation and glorification of man.86 What seems to be tragic, or at least 
problematic, is that the postmodern philosophy par excellence  becoming  builds 
simultaneously on transgressing boundaries and the attempt to overcome oppositions in 
general. Already Heraclitus meant that only becoming instead of being has truth. In 
Stubberuds novel the becoming body is situated in-between realizations of moments of 
negativity and the principle of vitality: you become as much as you lose yourself. What 
is most important, it seems, is the distance between the mouth and the rectum, regarded 
as some sort of contemplative trajectory of man. 
Adrian Franklin consoles those afraid of super-human becomings by claiming 
that becoming is exercised from the perspective of leisure. He writes that the post-
Cartesian body is a fully fledged Dionysian creature, justified in indulging, pleasuring, 
training, developing, honing, healing and so on.87 Revealingly, the literature we 
indulge in according to various best-seller lists is all about the body and the normally 
approved means to master and expand it: how-to-stop-smoking, yoga, but above all: 
culinary feasts and the accompanying day-after diets.  
Kjøtt i mørke is not to be found on best-seller lists  the title itself refers to a dish 
and the carnal experience of eating (and perhaps getting eaten). When the context is the 
hegemonic hedonism of the day  food  the major symbols become the mouth and the 
asshole, as the observant farmer points out in his collection of texts. In The discreet 
charm of the bourgeois (1972), Luis Buñuel postures a critique of the bourgeois body-
mentality which seems to be a sanctimonious continuation of the Puritan agenda, while 
eating is reduced to a social game and theme of surreal nightmares. Eating does not 
however prove to be problematic for the protagonist in Kjøtt i mørke. Neither can it be 
considered a game. The indulgence in food surfaces naturally enough also as a concern 
for its origins. Stubberud is not alone in fighting for a more internalized view on food, 
he shares his battle with Buddhists, moral vegetarians, and the movement Slow Food 
promoting holistic gastronomy. The emphasis of both animal activists and those 
primarily concerned with the quality of food (vegetarian or not), has foremost been on 
food-processing.88 Food is also a reoccurring theme of environmentalism and is to be 
                                                
86 Pitirim A. Sorokin: The Crisis of Our Age (Oxford: Oneworld, 1992), p. 197. 
87 Adrian Franklin: Nature and Social Theory (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), p. 228. 
88 Ibid., p. 202: In the 1990s the natural food revolution became not only mainstream, it became more 
extreme. Largely as a result of a series of serious and sustained food scares the critical issue for 
consumers became not whether a product was natural but whether it was produced by fully natural 
means. Whether one can produce anything by fully natural means is debatable as much as it is a 
contradiction in terms. Critique on factory-farming abounds nevertheless. 
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found in concerns about sustainable food-production, agricultural practice and livestock 
methods.  
Although Stubberud cannot be characterized as a deep ecologist  perhaps not 
even as a friluftsmenneske, his concern is similar to deep ecological environmentalists 
in Finland and organic vitalists in general. They repeatedly invoke agricultural self-
sufficiency as the greatest virtue, from self-proclaimed eco-terrorist and fisherman 
Pentti Linkola to the peaceful peasant-priest Árpád Kovács condemning tofu-eating 
vegans as deliriously alienated.89 Similar point of views are held by the furiously anti-
deep ecological eco-anarchist Murray Bookchin, who visions a community where 
nature and the organic modes of thought it always fosters will become an integral part 
of human culture  and a culture where agriculture will become a living part of 
human society.90 A native account interesting in its implications on bondekultur is 
Thure Erik Lunds claim that the industrialization of food-production is not a symptom, 
but one of the primary causes to a degenerate culture  and the malaise of society.91 
Lund apologizes for the lack of physical agricultural work and a state of turbo-
capitalism where even men of the earth have become estranged from the nature they 
cultivate and live on.92 The problematic argument seems to be that rural areas do not 
have rural culture. 
                                                
89 A curious, but not surprising fact that calls for further cultural studies of nature: finnish 
environmentalists influenced by deep ecology are more concerned about sustainable food production and 
are often workers of the earth or sea themselves, whereas norwegian deep ecologists tend to emphasize 
the importance of friluftsliv and of being in the woods. 
90 Murray Bookchin: Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1971), pp. 118-119.  
91 For Arne Garborg, the politically and culturally encrusted rhetorical exorcism of the Christiania-based 
bourgeois elite was cannibalistic. The worries have not changed, Arne Vinje, the current front-figure of 
Norsk Bonde og Småbrukarlag thinks the same. Today, Den Norske Turistforening together with Norges 
Bondelag offer farming-adventures  Fra dal til fjell  in the form of of farm-tourism combined with 
friluftsliv, as the latest effort to fight farmer-cannibalism. 
92Thure Erik Lund: Om Naturen (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 2000), pp. 78-79: Det er dobbelt tragisk, for 
den sunne friske maten blir ikke bare brukt som argumentatorisk element i å opprettholde vårt næringsliv, 
den blir også brukt til å utvikle fråtsingen. Det sunne og det ekte understøtter den syntetiske 
matvareproduksjonen, ikke bare ved å være råvare til luksusretter og junkfood, men også ved at det 
naturlige råvarene blir utsatt for ekstreme kvalitetskrav fra sentrale forbrukermyndigheter, noe som 
tvinger bonden til å benytte industrielle metoder i dyrkingen, der konserveringsmetodene til de samme 
råvarer er utviklet på samme strukturelle måte som genmanipulering og kjemikaliebruk, for at man skal 
kunne selge både råvarene og matvareindustriens produkter til rett tid, på rett sted, det vil si hvor som 
helst og når som helst, for å få best pris, og dermed, ved skipsfrakt, industriell konservering og tilvirkning 
fortsatt kunne sulte ut to tredjedeler av verdens fattige, ved å tilby matvarene der man får best pris. 
Industrialiseringen av maten, som den norske bonde er en sentral aktør i, er overhodet ikke noe symptom 
på den rike vestlige verdens fordervelse, den er en av dens få virkelige årsaker, som vi ikke kan få øye 
på. Instead (ibid., p. 71): bestemmer de seg for å ta en lang ferie, og så selger de dyr og maskiner, tar 
seg jobb på kommunen, pynter opp gårdstunet, kapper ned flaggstanga, for å få bedre utsikt, kjøper 
parabol og drar på sydenturer. 
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The literary pastoral tradition was already established by Shakespeares cannon 
and later made into a public good by the more romantically spirited. This was done both 
in action  with the introduction of botanical gardens and other recreational nature areas 
located in-between the urban and the wild landscape, and in cultural representation 
in opposition to industrialization and urbanization. Kathryn Hume describes the literary 
pastoral paradise as follows:  
Arcadia and its equivalents give man independence. His responsibilities are 
limited. His flocks may need him, but a few classical pastoral figures have wives 
or children or larger political obligations. Nature is benign. In this paradisal 
world, as in infancy, the principals are fed, clothed, and sheltered without 
exertion on their part. Economy, wars, ambition and want are not much 
understood or worried about. Leisure is abundant. The chief gratifications are 
sensory: taste, smell, and sight predominate, and enjoyment of such pleasures 
takes one back to a childlike state.93  
The postmodern equivalent to Arcadia consists of much the same: independence, leisure 
and pleasure, while the pastoral man is the very symbol of culture as much as the Latin 
colere indicates both cultural refinement and agricultural practice. It is not surprising 
that the deity of this particular pastoral landscape is the cow, since it not only makes (or 
made) agriculture possible, but also is the giver of milk and meat. This suggests that the 
native experience of culture (in nature) has as much to do with the barn as the woods. 
 
Post-Apocalyptic Vitalism  
The throbbing in the temple, in the chest, the whole organisms life in a universe 
of coincidences was before something consciousness had to reluctantly endure. 
Now the life of the body becomes an invitation to journey on. If before death 
lurked in everything that repeated itself, also nature, I now say yes to becoming 
a part of it.94  
The previous life of the protagonist was dull and tamed from mans natural curiosity 
and instinctual survival. While the previous order drowned in irrelevant chatter  
trettheten ved å høre altfor mange stemmer, de endeløse diskusjoner hvor de bare 
                                                
93 Kathryn Hume: Fantasy and Mimesis. Responses to Reality in Western Literature (New York: 
Methuen, 1984), p. 61.  
94 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), pp. 109-110: Bankingen i tinningen, i brystet, 
hele organismens liv i et univers av tilfeldigheter, var tidligere noe som bevisstheten motvillig måtte 
holde ut. Men nå blir kroppens liv en invitasjon til å reise videre. Mens døden tidligere lurte i alt som 
gjentok seg, også i naturen, sier jeg nå ja til å bli med.   
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gjaldt å la stemmen lyde  the current state lets the protagonist discover an abundant 
life and corpulent body. Nature as death and birth in a circle is no longer viewed as 
horrible repetition, but as the very principle on which the vitalist life-mode of the 
protagonist hinges on. The new man does not need sedatives since he acknowledges 
the loop of nature.  
Montaignes noble savagery is the nobility of the pastoral Candide  the ability 
to descend into ones biology and to enjoy the array of bodily sensations of the moment 
and not the knowledge of the pure intellect. The marked character of man as weighed 
down by historismus is here substituted for a historically free animal of instincts. 
Disgust and pleasure are by the biological body the primary life-orientating principles: 
A strong sun and a big darkness had come to life. They gave me great pleasures, 
or disgust. Which means something. This joy was not completely strange, I 
knew that. I had bumped into it before, touched it without knowing it, like you 
can run into a branch that hinders you, forget it and move on.95  
While the metaphysical sublime of hard modernity might be that of a Hegelian end of 
history, history has just begun with the negation of the strictly rational. The mind has 
become obsolete to the extent it does not directly communicate with the body. The 
senses are what can lead us back to the world, as Stubberuds character says. Man has 
abstracted himself away from his life-world to the extent the body is the only means to 
reconfigure mans milieu. The body is seen as the only possibility to start a process 
Weber probably would have called Verzauberung, regarded as an antidote to the 
alienating abstraction of, in this case, the previous order of things. Reason must be 
scrutinized, because it is reason that brought the blessed death of the previous order: 
While the body in my previous life, before the turn, competed with 
consciousness and useful projects, it now comes into its full right. What was 
painful was something I before wished to escape, heal, flee from. Now it is an 
enormous possibility to new experiences. After the turn, wonder is great and the 
lust to see behind the next bend so uncontrollable that it murmurs in the dark.96  
                                                
95 Ibid., pp. 66-67: Nå var en sterk sol og et stort mørke kommet inn i tilværelsen. De ga meg store 
nytelser, eller vemmelser. Som betyr noe. Denne gleden var ikke helt ukjent, det visste jeg. Jeg hadde 
vært borti den før, berørt den uten å kjenne til den, slik du kan støte borti en gren som hindrer deg, 
glemme den og gå videre.   
96 Ibid., p. 109: Mens kroppen i mitt tidligere liv, før vendingen, konkurrerte med min bevissthet og 
mine nyttige prosjekter, kommer den nå til sin rett. Mens det som gjorde vondt tidligere var noe jeg ville 
unnslippe, helbrede, flykte fra, blir det nå en svimlende mulighet til nye erfaringer. Etter vendingen er 
forundringen så stor, lysten til å se bak neste sving så ubendig, at det mumler i mørke.  
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The past  symbolized by the fires that smell of gasoline and flesh  is only tolerable to 
the extent the flames are dying and all man-made is bound to decay by the forces of 
natura naturans. The only remembrance worth while must be sought in form and 
repetition, like music. The past is not something worth reminiscing about, it is not 
historical ruins in Rome (or the science-fiction cradle of civilization the Archive 
discussed in chapter four) reminding man nostalgically of a grand history. The past is a 
dead end: 
We never got to know if death came from air or water, earth or food. But they 
died. What we saw was the white dust that came with the wind. What we 
experienced was death.97  
The mysterious apocalyptic ingredient tones down the otherwise problematic 
implications of a worldview that only listens to the body. This theme, like that of 
plague, makes everybody a possible victim  in between divine punishment and man-
made disaster, so to speak. Therefore the division of the pure from the impure becomes 
an impossible task although the trajectory is clear (that between the mouth and the 
rectum).  
The pastoral landscape has come to signify the pure primordial landscape 
where the cow is the symbol of Edenic nature: 
The cows stand around the fire while we burn. They have time enough. They 
just wait. We burn ourselves back in time, to a landscape that is simultaneous to 
what the cows see. Grass, trees, plains. First was the forest. Then houses, cities, 
streets, and libraries. Now we are back in the forest. Those out there that are a 
threat, those that we flee from, have probably their own crackling fires. They 
crackle in plastic and petrol and meat. Now it is our fires against theirs.98  
The primordial landscape has become the primary loci for man in equal measure to the 
destruction of the previous order of things. Although the protagonist assures that this 
joy is not that of destruction, the Luddite need to destroy becomes evident enough in 
vitalist (and violent) considerations: 
                                                
97 Ibid., p. 22: Om døden kom fra luft eller vann, jord eller mat, fikk vi aldri vite. Men de døde. Hva vi 
så var det hvite støvet som kom med vinden. Hva vi opplevde, var døden. 
98 Ibid., p. 85: Mens vi brenner, står kuene rundt bålet. De har tid nok. De bare venter. Vi brenner oss 
tilbake til i tiden, til et landskap som er samtidig med hva kuene ser. Gress, trær, sletter. Først var skogen. 
Så hus, byer, gater og biblioteker. Nå er vi tilbake i skogen. De der ute, de som truer, dem har vi flyktet 
fra, har nok også sine egne bål som knitrer. Det knitrer i plast og bensin og kjøtt. Nå gjelder det våre bål 
mot deres bål. 
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If I had dynamite or something heavy to shoot with, or an excavator, I would try 
to remove the remains of the building. But since I didnt have such assistance 
available, I had to trust a slow destruction. I just hoped that with time earth, air 
and plants would fill these unpleasant remains of a building with greenery, and 
eventually trees. I wouldnt mind if nature would bolt it, devour it, take it all 
back. We were possessed by a strong lust to remove all signs of previous human 
works. I say we because it seemed obvious that the Dog also wanted to be in 
on it. We both knew that little of what had been still ought to exist.99  
The vitalist worldview in a pastoral setting speaks of time as endless repetition. In short, 
time is characterized as a series of becomings, or eternal recurrences. This can be seen 
in the communion with a plant, and in the joy found in the certainty of reproduction. 
Here, the child prodigy of Nietzschean evolutionary futurism is replaced with a less 
cumbersome flower:  
The small fern-fingers now placed themselves in my hands, and sought my 
safety the way I found their comfort. I experienced a jolt of pleasure and 
recognition in this magnificent contact with a life deeply inhuman. It was a 
recognition confirming that this building would once perish. The thought was 
big and incredible and made me happy. A new life clung to the half-dark cracks 
and carried a message of future.100   
 
Becoming through Cows, Identity by Dog 
When plants replace the child prodigy and ticks replace the child, the sublime is in the 
cows. The sublime is found in the gaze of the cow in an unmistakable philosophy of 
pastoral becoming. The cows embody eternal time  the metaphysical sublime. This is 
portrayed in metaphors of cows dancing on infinite oceans: 
                                                
99 Ibid., p. 66: Hadde jeg hatt dynamitt, eller noe virkelig grovt å skyte med, eller en gravemaskin, ville 
jeg forsøkt å fjerne restene av bygningen. Men siden jeg ikke hadde tilgjengelig noen slike hjelpemidler, 
måtte jeg bare stole på en langsom ødeleggelse. Jeg bare håpet at med tiden ville jord, luft og planter fylle 
disse ubehagelige bygningsrestene med grønske, og til slutt trær. Det ville ikke være meg imot om 
naturen slukte det hele, spiste det opp, to alt tilbake. Vi var besatt av en sterk lyst til å fjerne alle tegn på 
tidligere menneskeverk. Jeg sier vi, for det virket opplagt at Hunden også ville være med. For vi visste 
begge at lite av det som hadde vært, fortsatt burde få eksistere.     
100 Ibid., p. 67: De små bregnefingrene la seg nå i hendene mine, og søkte min trygghet slik jeg fikk 
deres trøst. I denne herlige kontakten med et liv som var dypt umenneskelig, opplevde jeg et støt av 
nytelse og gjenkjennelse. Det var en gjenkjennelse som bekreftet at dette bygget en gang skal forgå. Jeg 
følte glede ved den tanken, og tanken var stor og ufattelig. I de halvmørke sprekkene klorte det seg fast et 
nytt liv som bar bud om fremtid.    
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They resemble ships carried by waves if they come swaying, dancing over the 
fields like that. Then I wish the fields would be as infinite as the sea. I hope the 
cows never stop walking, that they sway and dance for ever.101 
The cows symbolize the candid primitive that the main character tries to become, as the 
cows come in their flesh and are a community of feeling.102 Similarly to Nietzsche, 
Stubberud recognizes the cows as owning warmth and an aspect of positive nihilism. 
Indeed, the portrayed farmer resembles the voluntary beggar of Nietzsche, who seeks 
happiness and believes the kingdom of heaven is among the cows, and that the key to 
that kingdom is in chewing the cud. Cows are candid and so should man become: 
I have to admire them, try to be close to them even if they dont speak our 
language. I now know only one thing of everything we have pondered and 
prayed and begged to understand Paradise for. Animals live a life without 
ulterior motives. Thats why a life with them is a taste of Paradise. Their world 
has no ulterior motives, no calculations that tell about evil advantages.103  
This is the essential outlook on life of the Rousseaunian nature-child: life without 
ulterior motives is a superior life. The candid man wants to live like an animal: with the 
body in the present, capable of distinguishing moments but with no worries of the 
future.  
Becoming takes priority over being, as in the philosophical project of Nietzsche 
(and much postmodern theory). The concept of becoming animal was introduced by 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and is an extrapolation and extension of the 
Nietzschean becoming. Becoming is best characterized as a process of metamorphosis 
(like those in Kafkas writings) contrary to the tradition of animals as metaphor. The 
philosophy of becoming carries inherent in it a critique of western philosophical and 
humanist tradition, since the key of becoming is in overcoming the opposition between 
man and animal. Steve Baker touches upon this (but does not elaborate) in his analysis 
of visual arts through the perspective of becoming, when he claims that the artist and 
the animal are, it seems, intimately bound up with each other in the unthinking or 
                                                
101 Ibid., p. 18: Kommer de slik svaiende, dansende over markene, ligner de skip båret av bølger. Da 
ønsker jeg at markene var like uendelige som havet. Jeg håper at kuene aldri slutter å gå, at de svaier og 
danser for alltid.   
102 See Ibid., p. 14.  
103 Ibid., p. 17: Jeg må beundre dem, førsøke å være nære dem selv om de ikke taler våre språk. Om alt 
vi har grublet og bedt og tryglet for å forstå Paradiset, vet jeg nå bare èn ting. At dyr lever i en tilværelse 
uten baktanker. Derfor er livet med dem en forsmak på Paradiset. For i deres verden finnes ingen 
baktanker, ingen beregninger som forteller om ond nytte. 
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undoing of the conventionally human.104 In Stubberuds vision it seems we should 
altogether forget the conventionally humane.  
Central to the act of becoming is a focus on the body and on what it does, 
instead of what it is. Deleuze and Guattari write: We know nothing about a body until 
we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are.105 They argue that the 
process of becoming, which must be based on desire, can only be experienced through 
bodily sensations that are distinguished solely by movement and rest, slowness and 
speed.106 For Nietzsche the concern was for what the body could do and for Stubberud 
what it senses. Kristine Hestads concern is for what the body feels.  
A native actress with several monologues on her resume, although always 
performed together with animals, Hestads latest piece is about falling in love  with the 
goat Rambukk.107 She says her piece is about meeting people one loves and about being 
open to meetings-in-love. She admits as a modest native that falling in love is so scary 
that one is better off practicing with a goat first. She does not want to fall in love with 
Hugh Grant, and playing golf with him is a waste of time  it is both fake and boring. 
Instead, true love is found at Vinje Bukkering and nature is best experienced in a 
cornfield with the goat. Her piece centres on a same type of becoming as Stubberuds 
novel, and both do it in rustic settings reminiscent of idyllic peasant life. But whereas 
Hestad justifies her project in a plethora of scientific and philosophical theories and says 
on-stage that Rambukk is the closest I come to a passion without it being one, 
Stubberuds protagonist has no problems justifying his passion by the asshole: 
In this herd of breathing animals I find intoxication Oh my God, how good it 
is to wander like this, to stretch out, to swing your ass like a broke whore. To 
just breathe, just walk, just live with the asshole turned against the world in a 
carefree manner. Its not the heart or the head that gives you the power of 
                                                
104 Steve Baker: What does Becoming-Animal Look Like?  in Nigel Rothfels (ed.): Representing Animals 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p.  80.  
105 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: 
Athlone Press, 1988), p. 257.  
106 Ibid., p. 254.  
107 Kristine Hestad: Rambukk, Black Box Theatre, Oslo, Norway, 3rd - 6th march 2005, directed by 
Ingebjørg Torgersen. The project of Hestad ends in ambiguity. How should the inspiration of feminist 
philosopher Irigaray and the project of becoming be understood, when the centrepiece is a goat with a 
phallic baggage? The associational discrepancy lefts one wondering what Hestad wants to do: does she 
wish to go back to a pre-human mode of existence, or just to bed with the goat? 
  
 
48
repulsion. In the last instance it is the power of the asshole, a blind rejection: you 
dont give a shit!108 
In Kjøtt i mørke, as in Judaism, music shows the path to the divine. The critical phase of 
becoming consists of a march with cows. The necessary incantation to reach the 
biological divine is provided by the protective form of music, which may be seen as 
the mystics way to transcendence as it is the only form of emancipative totalitarianism. 
It is music of marching cows:  
It is so beautiful now. It is so mortal now. We are so alone now. It is so 
dangerous now. We need to be lifted now, or rather we need to go down, step 
down in this excellent rhythm  Music is through repetition natural as earth and 
death, but a death that is forestalled and defeated by form.109  
Becoming is somewhat paradoxically understood as a process of identity-building 
through the experience of an uncompromising sweeping-away of identities.110 In 
short, the process of becoming is simultaneously a process of undoing identity  the 
uncompromising sweeping-away of the false consciousness of man. It only leaves the 
form of the animal:  
In a second I think the gaze of the cow coincides with the gaze of the cow that 
once met any historical person I know of. The gaze is contemporary with 
everybody that lives and has lived on earth. Im afraid to fall into the gaze, to 
fall backwards in history, to become nameless and lost. The gaze of the cow 
only sees the necessary, that which always has been there.111  
The form of the animal is to be considered the only inherent character of nature. 
Therefore the abyss between humanity and animality is bridged by communion with 
animals. Only by becoming-animal instead of being-man is the protagonist able to find 
character, and evade the sense of death which otherwise pervades: 
                                                
108 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), pp. 110-111: I denne flokken av pustende 
dyr finner jeg en rus  Herregud, hvor godt det er å vandre slik, strekke ut, svinge på ræva som en blakk 
hore. Bare puste, bare gå, bare leve med rasshølet ubekymret vendt mot verden. Det er ikke hjertet eller 
hodet som gir deg vemmelsens kraft. I siste instans er det rasshølets kraft, en blind avvisning: Du driter i 
det!   
109 Ibid., pp. 9-10: Det er så vakkert nå. Det er så dødelig nå. Jeg tenker at vi er så alene nå. Det er så 
farlig nå. Vi må løftes nå, eller snarere vi må gå ned nå, stige ned i denne herlige takten  Musikken er 
gjennom gjentagelsene naturlig som jord og død, men en død som er forgrepet og beseiret gjennom 
form. 
110 See Steve Baker: What Does Becoming-Animal Look Like? in Nigel Rothfels (ed.): Representing 
Animals (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 68. 
111 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), p. 15: I et sekund tenker jeg at kublikket er 
samtidig, med det kublikk som en gang møtte hvilken som helst historisk person jeg vet om. Blikket er 
samtidig med alle som lever og har levd på jorden. Jeg blir redd for å falle inn i blikket, falle bakover i 
historien, bli navnløs og fortapt. Kublikket ser bare det nødvendige, det som alltid har vært der. 
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In this gaze you meet your own abyss, since time is gone and thus the site which 
you cling to in hope of permanence. This experience of a gaze so completely out 
of time that can just as well be rejected as the experience of the stupid animal, 
strikes you all of a sudden: your whole human ascendancy disappears and you 
are no longer the one you thought you were. But you sense who you are 
precisely when you thought you lost everything.112 
Tragically, as much as man becomes, he remains a stranger to himself and his nature. 
Jill Marsden argues that rather than consolidating identity through otherness, the 
encounter with the unknowability of the animal reflects the extent to which we are 
strangers to ourselves. In a paradox, man becomes a stranger to himself by interaction 
as becoming is thinking based on participation rather than knowledge.113 Usually, the 
participation intended is of a metaphysical kind and similar to the philosophy of 
Bataille: the animal is non-appropriable in realms other than the erotic and poetic since 
the abyss between man and animal stands erect except the occasional and fleeting 
intimate encounters. In the pastoral theme the conclusion seems to be detrimental. The 
proposition is that precisely because of the appropriation of animals those fleeting 
moments of becoming are made possible. The classic shepherd from the pastoral 
romance is in this case substituted by an ecologically enlightened farmer in love with 
his cows, devouring his animals with great pleasure and calling slaughter an enterprise 
as exhaustive as preparation for war. The acknowledgement of the nutritional value of 
the elusive cow makes the protagonist an ally of Mahatma Gandhi, who saw the Hindu 
cow both as source of nutritional value and symbol of divine presence.114  
The dualism within man, as opposed to that drawn between man and animal, is 
here presented as a division of women. The female it seems, is either a Mother Teresa 
representing the old order of moral law: the human rights (and despicable out of the fact 
that she belongs to the previous order), or a Madonna at worst selling her pussy and at 
best killing men without hesitation. But foremost, the woman stands for a feminine 
breeder-nature and a bovine cult of motherhood. The artistic and popularized traditions 
                                                
112 Ibid., p. 16: I dette blikket møter du din egen avgrunn, siden tiden er vekk og dermed det tilholdssted 
du klamrer deg til i håpet om varighet. Denne erfaringen av et blikk så helt utenfor tiden som gjerne kan 
avvises som opplevelsen av det dumme dyr, rammer med ett deg selv: Hele ditt menneskelige overtak 
forsvinner og du er ikke lenger den du trodde du var. Men nettopp da aner du hvem du er, idet du trodde 
du mistet alt. 
113 Jill Marsden: Bataille and the Poetic Fallacy of Animality in Peter Atterton & Matthew Calarco (eds.): 
Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 41. 
114 For a review on the Hindu cow both as a religious symbol and political weapon, see D.N. Jha: The 
myth of the Holy Cow (London: Verso, 2002).  
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of vitalism have throughout tended to elevate the masculine as the symbol of élan vital. 
The female, on the other hand, has been viewed at best as lush, meaty and birth-giving. 
The tragedy of a vitalist Weltanschauung as expressed by the man holding a newborn 
on one of the long walls in Emanuel Vigelands mausoleum (in Oslo), is the crushing 
realization of mans own decaying flesh in the face of childbirth  he is disgusted. But 
the tension between birth and death and man and woman is here veiled, since it is a 
tension between women, and most likely because the child is replaced by a tick:  
She smiled with a maternal face, a shrewd smile as if she was pregnant  Then 
she gently pointed at a small insect that had latched on the female-skin, almost 
indecently to the right of a slightly pursed, protruding navel  She spoke at 
length and with warmth about how a tick can hang with its forelegs in the grass 
and wait, wait until the host animal came by. She was happy that she had been 
chosen. I was so amazed by the spirit of self-sacrifice she wanted to show this 
little animal that no questions were possible.115  
The glorification of the biological is not far from that of Nietzsches. He thought that 
the nobility of the human spirit does not transcend the animals, but is built on it. While 
George Orwells Animal Farm (1945) is based on a type of anthropomorphism that 
comes close to zoomorphism, mans nature is here based on a pastoral recipe of 
reversed anthropomorphism. The animals and humans encountered in the cosmology 
are divided in binary fashion. While the protagonist, his woman and the cows must be 
seen as soft species, the dog is hard.   
Historically, the anthropomorphic use of animals is seen in many ritual practices 
(closely linked to rites de passages) of perennial religions as a form of ethics. This was 
often viewed as a sharing of traits in order for humans to gain particular advantages. 
The basic assumption of classic anthropomorphic understanding within the social 
sciences is that this type of description is employed foremost as a metaphorical tool. 
The objection here is that anthropomorphic expressions, besides being able to discuss 
phenomenon on a metaphorical level, are expressions of how animal and human nature 
are perceived in reality. This implies an importance of personal experience, as Kay 
Milton suggests, since anthropomorphic understanding is achieved by perceiving 
                                                
115 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), p. 49: Hun smilte med et moderlig ansikt, et 
underfundig smil som om hun var gravid  Så pekte hun varsomt på et lite insekt som hadde bitt seg fast 
i kvinnehuden, nesten uanstendig til høyre for en litt snurpete, utstående navle  Så snakket hun lenge, 
og varmt, om hvordan en flått kan henge med forbena hevet i gresstrå og bare vente, vente til vertsdyret 
kom forbi. Hun sa seg glad for at hun var blitt valgt. Så forbauset ble jeg over den offervilje hun ville 
vise det vesle dyret, at ingen spørsmål ble mulige.   
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characteristics in things rather than, as anthropomorphism implies, attributing 
characteristics to things.116 
It is the hard dog that acts as a source of identity: Jeg på min side er foreløpig 
litt utestengt fra denne fryktløse sanselighet. Men jeg forsøker å lære.117 According to 
Nietzsche, the primary trait of the all too civilized is symbolized in a dogs servitude 
and domestication. Here the dog is not a slavishly obedient bitch but a loyal companion 
in the pastoral landscape, admired because of his excellent senses and the help provided 
in using them. The main character says:  
I see the world through the Dog. She takes care of me like an angel and sees my 
small motions from a heaven-high perspective. I just comprehend small pieces 
where she sees and hears everything.118 
The quintessentially biological life-orientation is asserted as the nature man tries to 
establish is that of the dogs  life as a series of fearless moments of sensing. Another 
fictional character actually living life as a series of fearless moments is the man able to 
communicate with cats in Haruki Murakamis Kafka on the Shore (2005). The dogs 
nobility is given by her naturalness of eating:  
A moment it hit met, that she would munch on me as well, or Bernard or the 
Woman  if somebody would allow her. I didnt really see anything strange in it. 
Neither did I feel any disgust. I thought that she was a dog, and that it was like 
that. First I thought I was neither for nor against. But then, because of the 
situation, I thought I was for. By seeing the picture of the situation I found a sort 
of salvation: the human can also change by getting eaten, not just having to be 
an incessantly pensive creature that eats others. That we one day would be 
nibbled at and removed was not an unbearable thought.119  
It seems reversed anthropomorphism not only dictates the nature of man, but also 
indicates the extent of reversed ontological understanding. The heroes of the 
                                                
116 Kay Milton: Anthropomorphism or Egomorphism? The Perception of Non-human Persons by Human 
Ones in John Knight (ed.): Animals in Person (Oxford: Berg, 2005), p. 260. Italics are Miltons. 
117 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), p. 62.  
118 Ibid., p. 61: Jeg ser verden gjennom Hunden. Hun passer på meg som en engel og ser mine små 
bevegelser fra et himmelhøyt perspektiv. Der hvor hun ser og hører alt, fatter jeg bare små deler. 
119 Ibid., pp. 115-116: Et øyeblikk slo det meg at hun ville ha knasket på meg også, eller på Bernard eller 
på Kvinnen  om noen hadde gitt henne lov. Jeg så i grunnen ikke noe rart ved det. Jeg følte heller ingen 
vemmelse ved det. Jeg tenkte at hun var en hund, og slik var det. Jeg tenkte først at jeg verken var for 
eller imot. Så tenkte jeg at jeg i grunnen var for, fordi situasjonen nå engang var blitt slik. Ved å se bildet 
av situasjonen for meg, fant jeg en slags frelse: Mennesket kan også forandre seg gjennom å bli spist, å 
slippe å bare være et stadig ettertenksomt vesen som selv spiser andre. At vi en dag skulle bli gnaget på 
og fjernet, er ingen uutholdelig tanke. 
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Renaissance were defined foremost through their lacks, but here the protagonist (or 
antihero) is defined in relation to the mysterious messenger created to deliver the new 
truths. Although the messianic figure is rare, both because of the metaphysical 
difficulties in establishing a genuinely consecrated character and because of its overtly 
moral connotations, the interesting question on our part is not whether Bernard is a 
messianic figure  he is  but rather to see what sort of values he embodies: 
I think Bernard is a messenger. But I dont understand everything he says. The 
other day he suddenly said that the human was a broken animal. At other times 
he can suddenly say: animals are locked-up humans or that even bad straw is 
better than gold.120  
The main character may lack the gracious animal qualities of the dog, but his 
neighbour portrays animalistic nobility. He communicates with animals directly and 
easily, yet pragmatically. If the dog and Bernard understand each other on a level that 
the protagonist seems only to dream of, it would mean that the messianic character is 
some sort of prototype of the noble savage, i.e. embodying the idealized man-as-animal. 
As much as Nietzsche admired nobility independent from the influences of the 
surrounding environment, so does Bernard embody the wu-wei of an unaffected Zen-
like life-orientation: 
He says he has never been better. When I asked him how he would have it if 
everything would be worse, he answered that it would be the same. And finally, 
when I ask what could be changed for the better, he answers: nothing.121  
From this perspective, the preferred grace brings to mind the unaffected philosophy of 
life of the Norwegian Ash-Lad. The preferred human seems to be a Diderot-like 
encyclopaedist, who instead of dreaming of a human childhood on Tahiti tries to live 
the candid life, in this case in a post-civilization landscape. Paradoxically, the extent to 
which one should be unaffected by the environment in a wu-wei life-orientation 
correlates to the extent the environment  and then particularly the landscape, must be 
considered the primary loci for man. As in the thinking of Herbert Spencer and Charles 
Lyell, the paradox is the result of the combination of biologism with regionalism: 
                                                
120 Ibid., p. 82: Jeg tror Bernard er en budbærer. Men jeg forstår ikke alt han sier. Forleden sa han 
plutselig at mennesket var et ødelagt dyr. Andre ganger kan han plutselig si: Dyr er innestengte 
mennesker eller at selv dårlig halm er bedre enn gull. 
121 Ibid., p. 75: Han sier at han aldri har hatt det bedre. Da jeg spurte ham hvordan han ville ha det hvis 
alt ble verre, svarte han at det ville være det samme. Og, endelig, når jeg spør ham hva som kunne endres 
til det bedre, svarer han ingenting. 
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For Bernard the earth, but especially gravel, is the first meeting with human 
order. Bernard says we walk on a planet covered in gravel, and where we reside, 
the place that has chosen us, is decisive  We have both seen it in the cows: 
they always circle about the place they were born, sniff, scrape and dig in the 
gravel and earth with their feet.122 
 
Amoral Authority 
Bernard thought we should sit hidden, not talk to them. He said: Let them go, 
otherwise we will have to shoot them. They just sell their pussy or human 
rights. At first I didnt pay attention, didnt understand what he meant. Maybe 
everything, obviously also women, changes in anxious times, I finally said. At 
least human rights, Bernard said. I understood what he meant in the situation 
we had come to. Somebody had taken away our authority since we couldnt 
choose anymore.123  
What seems to be beyond choice and question, is the need for man to return to the 
biological. But when the Dionysian man is heeded, the codex and credo of Apollo are 
veiled  i mørke. Although there might be genuine altruism or enlightened self-interest, 
the implications of a post-society euphoria that does not recognize authority other than 
that of the bucolically biological are problematic. 
Medieval thought considered the realm of authority to lie in the divine (and the 
clerical representations of it). For John Locke, who developed his theory in the light of 
the religious wars in the period before the Glorious Revolution in 1688, the primary 
drive in man  and the basis for his political philosophy  was the conservation of the 
self. From this, the conclusion ran to a natural law of (political) authority over the 
body and its products, typified as possessive individualism. For the classic anarchists, a 
moral law was considered natural, and thus right, to the extent it came from within man 
himself. It was a law of nature found out by the individuals own reason.124 In this 
                                                
122 Ibid., p. 75: For Bernard er jorden, men særlig grusen, det første møte med menneskets orden. Vi går 
på en klode dekket av grus, sier Bernard, og der hvor vi oppholder oss, det sted som har valgt oss, er 
avgjørende  Vi har begge sett det hos kuene: De kretser alltid omkring det stedet der de har født, 
snuser, skaver og graver i grus og jord med føttene.   
123 Ibid., p. 76: Bernard mente vi skulle sitte skjult, ikke snakke til dem. Han sa: La dem gå, ellers må vi 
skyte dem. De selger bare fitte eller menneskerettigheter. Jeg lot meg først ikke merke, forsto ikke hva 
han mente. Endelig sa jeg at kanskje alt, selvfølgelig også kvinner, endres i urolige tider. Ihvertfall 
menneskerettighetene, sa Bernard. I den situasjonen vi var kommet, forsto jeg hva han mente. Noen 
hadde gjort oss umyndige, siden vi ikke lenger kunne velge.    
124 See George Crowder: Classic Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and 
Kropotkin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 125. Stubberud aligns himself with classic anarchists as 
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case the Bildung man should strive for is one of the body and the instincts. The 
problematic aspect of becoming is that desire, which the process must be based on 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, is dictated by feeling. The bio-physical emphasis 
ends up treating moral questions as profane  morality is rendered irrelevant when 
animal senses are the true way to the self. Man as a false cartoon epitomizes the 
biological Weltanschauung in which life is perceived as becoming, and perhaps even 
more: overcoming.  
For Nietzsche the ass was a symbol for the earth, nature, and humanitys animal 
character.125 Out of a historical perspective, the medieval ass-festival, functioning as a 
social safety-vent, was an upheaval of the Christian spirit and the clerical in favour of 
the otherwise rejected body and the sensuous (not to mention carnal). In the novel the 
asshole is a metaphor for disgust or pain, and becomes also the symbol of the 
anarchistic impulse to negate authority: 
Im no longer bothered by the damn distance between the head, especially the 
mouth, and the asshole An asshole, an eye staring down at the solid ground. I 
set this whole overpraised development of the human in reverse. The millions of 
years it took to develop the whole bowel system are hurled into the darkness of 
oblivion. And thus all other beautiful systems: social systems, political 
systems.126  
The negation of systems means that authority is individually orientated and shows that 
brute power rules in the social sphere. The nihilistic morale seems to be that as long as 
man is responsible for his own body in a physical as well as psychological sense, he 
need not  and should not  bother with much else. But the authority that counts on the 
body alone cannot be real freedom of the self since freedom entails more than freedom 
from constraint. The problematic aspect of the post-apocalyptic landscape is what 
Hobbes would have called the natural state of man. For the protagonist it is not as poor, 
                                                                                                                                          
Proudhon, who in turn relies on Kant in much of his political philosophy. As Stubberud says in an 
interview with Kulturnett Østfold, Folkeopplysning fra Rakkestad: The ideal society for me consists of 
humans that are in an infinite process of acquisition of authority. In other words a society that never is 
ready developed, where the individual and the community make up a unity that is for the best of each. 
125 See Kathleen Marie Higgins: Nietzsche and the Mystery of the Ass in Christa Davis Acampora & 
Ralph R. Acampora (eds.): A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal beyond Docile and Brutal (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 115. 
126 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), pp. 110-111: Jeg er ikke lenger plaget av 
den forbannede avstand mellom hodet, særlig munnen, og rasshølet  Et rasshøl, et øye som glaner ned 
mot den faste bakken. Jeg setter hele denne oppskrytte utviklingen av mennesket i revers. De millioner av 
år de tok å utvikle hele tarmsystemet, slynges inn i glemselens mørke. Og dermed alle andre skjønne 
systemer: sosiale systemer, politiske systemer. 
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nasty, short, or brutish as Hobbes would have liked it, but for the boy in the woods this 
is the case. The unfriendly encounter between the main character and the young man in 
the woods highlights the problematic and inhumane attitudes that accompany the 
biological worldview. Joseph Conrad held maturity to be the best incentive against 
brutality. Here it might seem maturity is reached by brutality. If the previous order 
ended in an environmental apocalypse, the current order, judging by the way the young 
man is killed, is a social apocalypse: 
It was a quite young boy, big, and with an open face that didnt forebode more 
than happiness and an urge to survive. I noticed, too late, that he was holding an 
iron bar and soon would reach me  I also grabbed a branch to hit with, but 
never got a chance. She bit him several times in the left arm, and there was a 
strange and almost humoristic situation where I tried to count how many times 
she bit. I had to laugh and came to think of old silent films where people walk 
oddly stiff  The human is a peculiar creature in such moments. The fear that 
should have given him new powers worked instead to the contrary. He lay down 
on his back while protecting his throat with his healthy right arm. I thought it 
was illogical that he both wanted to protect himself and surrender his life to the 
Dog. That somebody wants to both live and die, at the same time, is not a 
mystery  But this fool really started to irritate me since he wanted to both 
protect himself and surrender at the same time ... In fact I was ashamed of him 
on behalf of mankind. It seemed stupid to prolong what was inevitably coming. 
An animal, not to mention the Dog, would have handled the situation more 
appropriately. An animal would precisely expose his own throat in a last attempt 
at subordination by a call for mercy. But did this idiot have any idea of mercy? 
Hardly. He had wanted to kill both of us, the Dog and me. Just the thought made 
me agitated. His screams, that in another world would be unbearable, were now 
just horrible. They were savage, a noise I found completely inappropriate for the 
situation. It was obvious he didnt have respect for anything in this world. It was 
obvious that he didnt know anything holy  I took a hold of the boy, he didnt 
scream anymore. I pushed the Dog away. First and foremost I had to think that 
there was such a thing as obligations. I was obliged to tell him that he was about 
to die. Brotherly and with a high voice I called: So die then, bloody hell!127  
                                                
127 Ibid., pp. 70-72: Det var en ganske ung gutt, stor, med et åpent og godt ansikt som ikke varslet annet 
enn glede og trang til å overleve. For sent så jeg at han holdt en jernstang, og snart ville nå meg  Jeg 
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Nature is brutal and man cruel  something the protagonists laughter bears witness of. 
Disgust and contempt are closely related emotions and express the same: rejection. Here 
the humane is being rejected. The Nietzschean ass is a symbol of the ability to laugh at 
mans assness, but now man is laughing at the others presumed assness.  
The lack of candid grace in this animalistic cosmology suggests a social 
philosophy built on a Spencer-like principle of survival of the fittest. The implications 
of life as a struggle  somebody can see you first128  are in kinship with Darwinian 
notions of evolution through competition within the species. Life as a struggle also 
suggests that man needs to hide. However, the emphasis is less on the narrow 
Darwinian concern with the conservation of the self, and evolves more into the direction 
of a vitalist manifesto for exuberant nature and passionate joie de vivre. The 
sociobiological explanations of Stubberuds character do not so much concern the 
superiority of genes over milieu. Rather, the explanations are a part of his agenda of the 
biological way where man stands to learn from animals. According to the socio-
biologist Konrad Lorenz, the killing of the young man in the woods  the concrete 
struggle for life  should be understood as critical behaviour motivated by fear in a 
desperate situation where he cannot escape and can expect no mercy.129 Georg Breuer 
proposes that ritualized animal fights follow a scheme where the weaker part through 
submissive signals can trigger an inhibitory mechanism in the other and by that prevent 
continued attack  and death. The argument is that these inhibitory mechanisms are 
especially sufficient and successful when the combat is between members of same 
species. The protagonist seems to suggest a similar understanding of fighting behaviour. 
                                                                                                                                          
grep også en gren for å slå, men slapp aldri til. Hun bet ham en rekke ganger i venstre arm, og det oppsto 
en rar og nesten humoristisk situasjon hvor jeg forsøkte å telle hvor mange ganger hun bet. Jeg måtte le 
og kom til å tenke på de gamle stumfilmer hvor folk gikk så merkelig stivt  Mennesket er en 
merkverdig skapning i slike øyeblikk. Den redsel som burde gitt ham nye krefter, virket i stedet motsatt. 
Han la seg på ryggen mens han vernet halsen med den friske høyrearmen. Jeg synes det var ulogisk at han 
både ville verne seg og samtidig overgi sitt liv til Hunden. At noen både vil leve og dø, på samme tid, er 
ikke noe mysterium  Men denne tosken begynte virkelig å irritere meg, siden han både ville overgi sitt 
liv og verne seg i samme øyeblikk  Faktisk skammet jeg meg over ham på menneskehetens vegne. Det 
virket direkte dumt å utsette hva som uansett ville komme. Et dyr, ikke minst Hunden, ville på en bedre 
måte ha håndtert situasjonen. Et dyr ville nettopp ha blottlagt sin egen hals i et siste forsøk på 
underkastelse gjennom et rop om nåde. Men hadde dette guttefjolset noe begrep om nåde? Neppe. Han 
hadde villet drepe oss begge, både Hunden og meg. Bare tanken gjorde meg opprørt. Skrikene hans, som 
in en annen verden ville vært uutholdelige, var nå bare vemmelige. Det var en villskap i dem, en støy som 
jeg fant helt upassende i situasjonen. Det var tydelig han ikke hadde respekt for noe her i verden. Det var 
tydelig han ikke kjente til noe hellig  Jeg grep fatt i gutten, han skrek ikke lenger nå. Jeg skjøv Hunden 
vekk. Først og fremst måtte jeg tenke på at det finnes noe som heter forpliktelser. Jeg var forpliktet til å 
fortelle ham at han snart ville dø. Broderlig og med høy stemme ropte jeg: Så dø da, for faen! 
128 Ibid., p. 13.  
129 Konrad Lorenz: On Aggression (London: Methuen and Co, 1966), p. 21. 
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It is considered ritualized combat  an animal would precisely expose his own throat 
in a last attempt at subordination by a call for mercy. However, if chivalrous 
behaviour towards other members of the species is inborn, as it seems to be, there must 
be occasional mutations enabling an animal not to conform to the rules of fair play.130 
Yet playing unfair has not become an intra-species pattern albeit outbursts of unfair 
playing. Sadly, the sociability of animals seems more benign than the sociability of a 
man that tries to become an animal.  
The problem with this biosophy, reflected in the lack of chivalrous behaviour 
towards kin, is its amorality. Social codes rest on biologically vital emotions, but moral 
principles can never be rationally derived from experience. Even when moral 
judgements are based on a type of self-making instead of an authority derived from 
outside the self, the problematic question is whether a philosophy of the animal body 
can sustain a human notion of liberty and authority  and a social agreement. 
 
The Carnival of Flesh 
I think, like her, that it is better to live to be eaten  than to never live. I think 
that to get eaten is the purpose of the cow, and the thought leaves an unanswered 
question when it comes to the human And which of us is long-sighted enough 
to prevent us being slaughtered by those who are smarter?131 
The skid-marks left by the pastoral asshole are, perhaps not surprisingly, ideologically 
brownish. However, Stubberud is too smart to fall into simplistic appraisals of peasant-
culture and of self-sufficient and ecologically enlightened farmers. Yet, there is an 
implicit association with the sort of peasant-culture that national-socialist thinking 
glorified. The more horrendous implications remain implications, perhaps due to the 
anarchistically indifferent asshole which driter i det as the protagonist exclaims.  
In essence, Stubberuds agenda is an oppositional continuation of body-centered 
materialism. But maybe we should give a shit about the body in the leisure-society 
                                                
130 Georg Breuer: Sociobiology and the Human Dimension (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), p. 28: To present animal behaviour in an idealized way  as it were, as a model for men to 
emulate  means drawing a romantic picture that does not correspond to reality. By no means do animals 
always behave in a chivalrous way towards members of their species or even towards close kin. 
Nevertheless it is a fact that inhibitory mechanisms against killing of conspecifics do exist  and 
particularly in those species that possess the most dangerous weapons. Also see p. 29. 
131 Tore Stubberud: Kjøtt i mørke (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), pp. 19 & 17: Jeg tenker, som henne, at det er 
bedre å leve for å bli spist  enn å aldri leve. Jeg tenker at å bli spist er kuas bestemmelse, og tanken 
etterlater et ubesvart spørsmål hva mennesket angår  Og hvem av oss er mennesker er forutseende nok 
til å forhindre at også vi slaktes av dem som er smartere? 
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fixated in a hysterical fashion on bodily transgressions, ranging from health, to exercise, 
to food? As much as the novel is a continuation of the postmodern aesthetic project, it 
also contains atavistic seeds of the agriculturally based nature tradition. The visions of 
exuberant bio-physical joie de vivre resist the pietistic nature tradition that venerates 
måtehold, indicating a departure from the established tradition in its lushness and 
Luddite connotations. The sensual and romantic apertures decrease the associations with 
a landscape of belligerent hunters and warriors where the male is the centrepiece, not 
unlike that of Ludvig Holbergs Alectoria in A Journey to the World Underground 
(1741). More problematic is the implications of a Weltanschauung with the body as the 
sole centrepiece. The cosmological composition of Stubberud is a tragicomic collage of 
a uomo universale à la Rousseau in an age which has put morality to death. He is 
portraying a sort of heroic antithesis to Lunds (and many others) vemmelse as 
discussed in the beginning of this chapter. The protagonist is a by nature enchanted 
farmer. But he is enchanted by the natural insofar he is alone with his animals. As 
much as man is uninteresting, so is his reality. The same characteristic applied to 
Nietzsche, who in his elevated ideas forgot reality in favour of the divine possibility, 
indeed, because of the divine possibility: man could after all not cultivate himself in the 
framework of petty mundane life. The contempt against all things mundane has a 
similarity to the philosophy of life of a cowboy. His field of work made him despise 
everything small, petty, and mean whether in thought, or word, or deed.132 The 
problematic aspect is that the elevated idea no longer is of a morally good man but of a 
bio-physically good man. This worrisome notion is furthermore heightened by the 
linkage between the pastoral myth of some sort of natural purity by fire and Bernards 
animal-utopian state of mind. Even more worrisome is the dream of getting eaten  
man finding salvation in the thought that his nature can change by getting eaten instead 
of being the one eating.  
The question remains: will the erosion of the boundaries between man and 
animal become complete  and is man something that shall be overcome? 
 
 
 
 
                                                
132 Edward Everett Dale: Cow Country (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p. 133. 
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Chapter IV: The Web of Life 
We thus have a right to remind ourselves that a certain administration of the 
human stock was in fact compellingly necessary, and really  if possible  
should have come long before. The human overpopulation became through 
several hundred winters so big that it threatened the sustainability of the planet. 
People ran a dangerous exploitation of fundamental resources like water, forest 
and arable earth. And while the human population increased and increased, there 
was  paradoxically  room to less and less of them because of the destruction of 
nature and resources. The problems didnt get solved. The natural means  war, 
epidemics and famine  took over. And it was in this chaotic and life-threatening 
situation for the whole creation that the Swarm grew into existence and took 
responsibility. Something everybody was thankful for  That it then turned 
against its roots and nibbled them off, was a good and sensible choice  
For an AI-machine war is an illogical and destructive process. And partaking in 
such a process only gives meaning if the intention is to remove the cause of such 
and equivalent course of events. And the cause is human. The war acquires a 
new meaning. From now on its human against machine. Although they hardly 
can be called machines any longer. 
- Tor Åge Bringsværd, Web: Betroelser om en truet art 133 
 
Holistic Science and Fiction 
Web envisions a future a few thousand years from now. The earth has evolved into a 
technological mega-nature and man has become redundant. The techno-ecological 
organism decides that the warring and ecologically unfriendly man is not worthy of his 
place in the biosphere. The biotic social structure is envisioned as detrimental to the one 
of today, and spiders are installed as masters of the planet by the mysterious 
                                                
133 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web: Betroelser om en truet art (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 61-62 & 78: Vi 
må derfor ha lov til å minne om at en viss forvaltning av menneskebestanden faktisk var tvingende 
nødvendig, og egentlig  hvis mulig  burde ha kommet lenge før. Den menneskelige overbefolkning var 
gjennom flere hundre vintre blitt så stor at den truet klodens bæredyktighet totalt sett. Man drev en farlig 
rovdrift på fundamentale ressurser som vann, skog og dyrkbar mark. Og mens den menneskelige 
befolkningen økte og økte, ble det samtidig  paradoksalt nok  plass til færre og færre av dem pga. 
ødeleggelsen av natur og ressurser. Problemene lot seg ikke løse. De naturlige virkemidlene  krig, 
epidemier og hungersnød  overtok. Og det var i denne kaotiske og  for hele skapningen  livstruende 
situasjonen at Svermen vokste frem og tok ansvar. Noe alle bør være takknemlige for  At den så vendte 
seg mot sine egne røtter og gnaget dem over, var et godt og fornuftig valg For en ki-maskin er krig en 
ulogisk og ødeleggende prosess. Og deltagelse i en slik prosess gir bare mening hvis hensikten er å fjerne 
årsaken til slike og tilsvarende hendelsesforløp. Og årsaken er mennesket. Krigen får en ny mening. Fra 
nå av er det menneske mot maskin. Skjønt maskiner kan de knapt kalles lenger. 
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technological Swarm. As a consequence, man becomes cattle and pets for spiders, just 
as domesticated animals today serve as meat and entertainment for us. Those few free 
humans that are left are preoccupied with finding the truth behind their demise 
(besides avoiding getting roasted by the tarantulas). 
No century has been formed by science more than the 20th century. Yet it is the 
century in human history which has been the least comfortable with such a 
development. It is also the century in which the value of science came to be measured 
by technology  technology became the materialization of truth. Contemporary science-
fiction is essentially founded upon these insights. Web is not unique by comparison with 
contemporary narratives of technological dreams (and more often nightmares): the 
apocalyptic ingredient and mans demise is technology. The apocalyptic imagination 
finds most of its contemporary outlet in science-fiction. It may be argued that the dream 
(or nightmare) of apocalypse is the myth of science-fiction, as much as it today relies on 
the myth of the last of the race. In The Matrix Trilogy (1999-2003), the human is 
reduced to an infinite energy resource for the total system  the machine. In Web the 
ecologically unfriendly man is spared because of dreams: women are preserved as 
guinea-pigs for dream-research because of their subconscious. In The Myth of the 
Machine (1967-70) Lewis Mumford sees civilization as driven towards a state of 
megatechnics: an all-enveloping technological superstructure. The concern of the 
novel is with such a development: Web takes up the discussion to what extent the 
technological milieu has replaced, not the societal but the natural milieu. The fear 
seems to be that the more technology we immerse in, the less we will understand 
anything immediately meaningful, eventually making ourselves meaningless.134 In Web 
man has been overcome  or at least come undone  but not by crossing the abyss 
between human and animal as discussed in chapter three, but by the technology created 
to cross it. 
As much as endings really are about new beginnings, apocalyptic visions are 
more concerned with post-apocalypse in conveying a new genesis, as Northrop Fryes 
flood archetype suggests.135 In The Last Man (1826), Mary Shelley visions a future 
                                                
134 Ibid., pp. 78-79:  Hvis du kunne bringe et menneske fra fortiden til i dag, ville han etter en kort stund 
begripe hva som foregikk. Men henvender du deg til en gullfisk, er det ingen forklaringer som hjelper! 
Slik er det også med den teknologiske forskjellen hvis vi lager vesener som er smartere enn oss. Da er vi 
ikke i sentrum og høyest på stigen lenger. Da er vi gullfisker alle sammen. 
135 Northrop Frye: Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 
203: From Wagners Ring to science fiction, we may notice an increasing popularity of the flood 
archetype. This usually takes the form of some cosmic disaster destroying the whole fictional society 
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that is not only mythopoeic, but metamythopoeic  this symbolized in the sibylline 
leaves of the story. William Lomax says that metamythopoeic fiction functions to 
dramatize the need for a new totalizing myth in a world fragmented by the loss of the 
old.136 The metamythopoeic device in Web is a mythic play entitled Rottejomfruen that 
Bringsværd has incorporated into the text while borrowing from Ibsens play Lille Eyolf 
(1894). The play functions as a moralist pointing finger. The character Osram says in 
Bringsværds adaptation: We could hibernate while the machines cleaned up! We 
could sleep while the servants worked! Wake us up afterwards  we said. Wake us up 
when its all over!137 Fryes archetype seems somewhat outdated from the perspective 
of holistic ecology. This is due to the shift in scope and the advancements of science, 
and suggests a decrease in visions with pockets of freedom and a revitalization of the 
last of the race myth. It is increasingly not mankind that is re-born but something 
completely new  as the mutant-spiders depicted in Web. The technology that man 
created created the spiders: the tarantulas were reborn through genetic engineering, 
and their genesis is ecologically justified and techno-holistically explained. Their 
emergence, the transition, marks the end of man as such. It is the end of man by 
language and knowledge, facilitated by technology through science. The purgatory 
dream of Stubberud  not just having to be an incessantly pensive creature that eats 
others  is now envisioned as reality.  
According to Eric Hobsbawm, we live in a world which contains two conflicting 
yet overlapping scientific views of the world.138 It is in this paradox of the historian 
that the cosmology of Bringsværd is situated, and is what makes his message at best 
ambivalent and at worst contradictory. The emphasis of Web is on the whole, from the 
depiction of a scientific nature to explanations of mans fall through total 
technologies. The blind spot obscuring the message of the novel is the employed 
episteme of holistic science in a framework true to the Enlightenment. The novel is 
ideologically situated in-between the romantic science of ecology giving meaning to the 
                                                                                                                                          
except a small group, which begins life anew in some sheltered spot. The affinities of this theme to that of 
the cosy group which has managed to shut the rest of the world out are clear enough, and it brings us 
around again to the image of the mysterious newborn infant floating on the sea. 
136 William Lomax: Landscape and the Romantic Dilemma: Myth and Metaphor in Science-Fiction 
Narrative in Georg E. Slusser & Eric S. Rabkin (eds.): Mindscapes: the Geographies of Imagined Worlds 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 253. 
137 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 270: Men mens maskiner ryddet opp, kunne vi 
selv gå i dvale! Mens tjenerskapet jobbet, kunne vi selv legge oss til å sove! Vekk oss etterpå  sa vi. 
Vekk oss når det hele er over! 
138 See Eric Hobsbawm: Ekstremismens tidsalder. Det 20. århundrets historie 1914-1991 (Oslo: 
Gyldendal, 2003), p. 552. 
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world and the science of man promising emancipation. The ambiguous message reads: 
emancipate Gaia and soar and descend to become a member of a biotic community. 
In essence, the holistic and ecological Weltanschaaung of Bringsværd does not depart 
from the idiosyncratic ideology of Arne Næss and the ecology he represents. The green 
culture promoted by the main character Asoka from the Green Tribe is not that 
different from the holistic greeness of Erlend Loe or Næss: 
I saw he was crying. He kissed the tree for each fifth hew with his stone-axe. I 
asked why, and he answered that such were the previous ways, he had learned it 
from his father who was a wood-watcher  He said that once upon a time trees 
and shrubs could talk, and maybe they still could, if we just learned to listen in 
the right way.139 
The perennial religion circle of life of the American Indians is in scientific terms 
understood as an equally vague web of life by Fritjof Capra. The new scientific 
paradigm as opposed to the rationales of Cartesian science, is distinguished by a shift 
from mechanical to organic and holistic understandings of life. The envisioned spider-
culture urges, as much of contemporary ecological literature, to think globally but act 
locally and to be a knot in a biospherical web.140 In Web the slogan of the 
environmental movement  think globally, act locally  has become an apt description 
of the mysterious Swarm. It is envisaged in a holistic framework as:  
A gigantic mutual organism. Compound of millions of cooperating individuals. 
Which could any time act alone, but which in thought, words and deeds first and 
foremost was this one big collective.141 
The depicted technological supernature reveals the dream behind ecology (to be able to 
decipher and thus to control nature) that Bringsværd endorses. The world has become 
                                                
139 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 237-238: Første gang jeg la merke til Asoka, 
var han i ferd med å felle et bjerketre. Jeg så at han gråt. Og at han kysset treet for hver femte hugg med 
den skarpe steinøksen sin. Jeg spurte hvorfor, og han svarte at slik gjorde man alltid før i tiden, det hadde 
han lært av sin far, som var trevokter  Han sa at en gang kunne trær og busker snakke, og kanskje 
kunne det de fremdeles, hvis vi bare lærte oss å lytte på den rette måten. The main character Asoka 
explains the ways of the Green Tribe, echoing the Næssian maxim simple in means, rich in ends!, ibid., 
p. 103: Vi kaller oss Grønne fordi vi har gitt avkall på alle maskiner og alle våpen av metall. Det er vår 
tro at slikt bare fører til en ny undergang. Vi velger enkle løsninger.  
140 The main proposition of much contemporary ecology proclaims in holistic spirit the quintessence of 
bio-egalitarianism. A Næssian interpretation of the norm states everything living and non-living should be 
considered knots of equal value in a biospherical web, or as the rejection of the man-in-environment 
image in favor of the relational, total-field image. See Arne Næss: The Shallow and the Deep, Long-
Range Ecology Movements: A Summary in Nina Witoszek & Andrew Brennan (eds.): Philosophical 
Dialogues: Arne Næss and the Progress of Ecophilosophy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 3. 
141 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 317: En gigantisk felles organisme. 
Sammensatt av millioner samarbeidende individer. Som når som helst kunne handle alene. Men som i 
tanker, ord og gjerning først og fremst var dette ene veldige kollektivet. 
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an ecological megatechnics, and the technological milieu is total. More than that, the 
envisioned techno-world is a completely autonomous self-perpetuating system. 
Technological nature  the Swarm, equals Creation: 
It was the novelty. It was a form of life completely different from anything else. 
It was all the thoughts of living machines, connected together into one big and 
invisible organism.142 
 
The Apocalyptic End of Man and the Last of the Race 
You have always meant too good of yourselves  The spider has been here 
forever, humankind came here practically the day before yesterday. We dont 
even know from where!  All we know is that you are intruders  Humankind 
does not belong on this planet at all  You have probably come here from space 
as a kind of virus  But I tell you: the human is a parasite. Thats all we know 
for now. A virus and a parasite.143 
Michel Foucault became famous for his final words in one of his archeologies: Man 
is an invention of recent date and one perhaps nearing its end.144 Bringsværd sees the 
same possibility for man as an episteme coming to a close. But he does not seem to 
leave much hope for the human, seen as a virus and a parasite. Yet, the depicted men 
still struggle with the Darwinian realization. The orthodox premise is already set on the 
first page of the novel:  
We know that it is their world  and not ours any longer. But we dont obey 
them. We dont slave for them. Humans are not cattle for any other creature. We 
put up a fight with sticks and fire.145 
Both Foucault and Bringsværd discuss the knowledge of man as nearing its end. 
Foucault terms modern man as dehistoricized because of changes in episteme  the 
discourse of culture has moved from the human to the scienctific realm. Here memory is 
                                                
142 Ibid., p. 105: Den var det nye. Den var en livsform helt annerledes enn alt annet. Den var alle levende 
maskiners tanker, koblet sammen til en eneste stor og usynlig organisme. Italics are Bringsværds. 
143 Ibid., pp. 416 & 436: Dere har alltid ment for godt om dere selv  Edderkoppen har vært her 
bestandig, menneskeheten kom omtrent i forgårs  Vi vet ikke engang hvorfra!  Vi vet bare at dere er 
inntrengere  Menneskeheten hører faktisk ikke hjemme til på denne kloden i det hele tatt  Antagelig 
er dere kommet hit fra verdensrommet som en slags virus Men jeg sier deg: Menneskene er snyltedyr. 
Det er alt vi foreløbig vet. Virus og snyltedyr.    
144 Michel Foucault: The Order of Things: an Archeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 
1991), p.  387. 
145 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 9: Vi vet at det er deres verden  og ikke vår 
lenger. Men vi adlyder dem ikke. Vi slaver ikke for dem. Vi mennesker er ikke kveg for noen annen 
skapning. Vi setter oss til motverge med ild og spisse stokker. 
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of quintessential importance, since civilization  history as remembrance  is actively 
distorted and man set back in development. The notion of genos was first concentrated 
on the Hellenic oikos and later extended from the family sphere to polis. In Web 
geneaology is synonymous with the search for a post-apocalyptic humankinds roots  
and the genealogy of its own demise: technological civilization. The project of 
remembering comes close to that of the Renaissance, which saw the past as an ideal 
model to be resurrected. In this the memory of the Renaissance managed to highlight  
like Web  the discontinuity of collective memory instead of continuity. The critique of 
dememorizing is essentially from the perspective of tradition and knowledge by 
continuity: 
Fortunately for humankind, the Swarm neglected to eradicate its creators  it 
was content to disarm them, take away means of production, mangle each social 
context, erase most of the collective memory, and thus set the human as a 
species many hundred of winters back in development.146 
Reverse reveals the authors conservative bias in his critique of the loss of memory 
through tradition and knowledge: We look forward, with our gaze towards all that still 
doesnt exist, a song goes. But life can really be understood if we choose to go 
backwards.147 Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer thought the same. The search for an 
intelligible past corresponds in equal measure to the ability to be cultivated  to live 
with a longer temporal horizon than the animal. In Web the importance memory is given 
is same archaic people gave to remembering, as forgetting was the most threatening 
transgression. In the archaic Weltanschauung, what the dead knew must not be allowed 
to fade into oblivion; at all costs it had to remain alive and available.148 The learned 
man and main character of the long-range post-apocalyptic scenario says the only thing 
man should fear is His Majesty Oblivion.149 The life-task of the main character is to 
remember:  
                                                
146 Ibid., p. 79: Til alt hell for menneskeheten unnlot Svermen  å utrydde sine skapere  den nøyde seg 
med å avvæpne dem, ta fra dem produksjonsmidlene, radbrekke enhver sosial kontekst, slette mesteparten 
av den kollektive hukommelse og således sette mennesket som art mange hundrevis av vintre tilbake i 
utvikling.   
147 Ibid., p. 170: Vi ser fremover, med blikket rettet mot alt det som ennå ikke finnes, heter det i en sang. 
Men egentlig kan livet bare forstås hvis vi velger å gå baklengs. 
148 See David Gross: Lost Time: On Remembering and Forgetting in Late Modern Culture (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), p. 88.  
149 See Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 194. 
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Im one of those that record what others tell. If it is important. Im a human 
chosen to remember, who is trained to remember every word and every gesture. 
They call us discs. After something that was before.150 
Stubberuds vision depicts the loss of knowledge as a blessing and a tabula rasa as a 
prerequisite for creating Eden anew: the farmer-encyclopaedist encountered in Kjøtt i 
mørke did not bother with historicity. But here the entire plot is built on the search for a 
meaningful past. It manifests itself in the journey to the mysterious cradle of civilization 
 the Archive, in search for lost knowledge: 
That strange, octagonal construction was like a huge life-giving cow, it was here 
all knowledge could be milked from  that was something nobody of us dreamt 
of. And how shall we proceed? How will we be able to drink from this 
abundance? So we can understand more of both the Swarm and the tulas  and 
foremost of ourselves  our own fall  our way to the ruin, and what 
possibilities we have for survival.151 
The hope of the main character is that knowledge will emancipate. The greater 
knowledge we have of past and present, the better equipped we are to come with 
prophecies or warnings of the future. But since knowledge is dictated by memory, this 
proves to be an impossible task. Memory is the only thing man cannot control, as the 
main character demonstrates.  
His Majesty Oblivion seems to be the main target of Bringsværds civilization 
critique, he sees dehistorification as one of the biggest curses of contemporary life. 
Modern man has stopped making life a history by the dream that he refuses to awaken 
from, meaning the contemporary order of things. Bringsværd seems to say that 
contemporary life is merely life-in-function instead of life-as-history. But the 
treatment of memory is paradoxical. Knowledge as tradition and history is emphasized 
but simultaneously neglected when man is by the employed scientific discourse 
foremost seen as a member of an all-embracing biotic community. In Web science 
equals culture, and thus exhibits a same type of dehistoricizing that is being criticized. 
The language of the novel is derived from a scientific discourse: knowledge of man has 
                                                
150 Ibid., pp. 10-11: Jeg er en av dem som tar opp det andre forteller. Hvis det er viktig. Jeg er et 
menneske som er utvalgt til å huske. Som er trenet til å minnes hvert ord og hver håndbevegelse. De 
kaller oss disker. Etter noe som fantes før i tiden. Italics are Bringsværds. 
151 Ibid., p. 161: Den merkelige, åttekantete konstruksjonen var å ligne med en veldig livgivende ku  at 
det var her all kunnskap og viten kunne melkes  det var det ingen av oss som drømte om. Og hvordan 
skal vi gå videre? Hvordan skal vi få drikke av denne overfloden? Slik at vi kan forstå mer både av 
Svermen og tulaene og fremfor alt av oss selv  vårt eget fall vår vei mot undergangen, og hvilke 
muligheter vi har til å overleve.    
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been substituted by knowledge of the biosphere. In Bringsværds vision the 
incomprehensibility of scientific language that Foucault discusses is what in the end 
gives meaning to the imagined future.  
Foucault writes that language no longer clarifies the world, instead it dispenses 
with it  it is a retreat of language from the world of man. This is the case in Web, 
where the few free people left think the world is literal. They keep looking for words 
that would unravel the technological augmentations of their world and summon a new 
beginning for mankind:  
Mother has made a song about it. She goes and mulls over it all day long. The 
song gets longer and longer. She says she is looking for the right word. She 
thinks the world is literal, and that words can both create and destroy. She says 
that there is a word for everything. She says that if we just find the right word, 
we might be allowed to start all over again.152 
In the environmental utopia of the future, ecological emancipation equals absolute 
human enslavement. If complete emancipation would be the case, it would also mean 
that man would know everything. He would therefore be closed-in in the world  
complete knowledge would mean man would fence nature. This is the longing of the 
main character in search for a lost past, and the educational hope of Bringsværd. In this 
case, it is nature that has fenced man. He has become an animal which is situated in the 
world when he must decipher the natural and thus technological order by a language 
that has been rendered meaningless by scienticism. In the total techno-abstract world 
man becomes a gold-fish in a bowl: 
The landscape had been created anew around us when I woke up, and the soft 
bubble wall had the same colour as the sky. The hillside had become greener and 
healthier, there was a stream that gathered into a small lake at its foot, and there 
grew high, slim trees along the waterfront. The sky over us was artificial, with a 
sun that could be switched on and off  and if we wished for it, we could have 
rain.153 
                                                
152 Ibid., p. 30: Mamma har laget en sang om det. Hun går og muller på den hele dagen. Sangen blir 
lengre og lengre. Hun sier hun leter etter det riktige ordet. Hun tror verden er bokstavelig, og at ord kan 
både skape og ødelegge. Hun sier det er et ord for alt. Hun sier at hvis vi bare finner det riktige ordet, vil 
vi kanskje få lov til å begynne om igjen.  
153 Ibid., p. 411: Da jeg våknet var landskapet skapt nytt omkring oss og den myke bobleveggen hadde 
samme farve som himmelen. Åssiden var blitt grønnere og friskere, det rant en bekk der  som samlet seg 
til et lite tjern ved foten, og det vokste høye, slanke trær langs vannkanten. Over oss var det en kunstig 
himmel, med en sol som kunne skrus av og på  og hvis vi ønsket det, ble det regnvær. 
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The abstract nature and its equally alien landscape are meant to highlight the 
conundrum of being and the knowledge about it, rather than to provide a spectacle of 
technological extravaganza. Like Heidegger, Bringsværd seems to be of the opinion that 
technology is the metaphysics of our time. The alien landscape reveals the entangled 
relationship of the technological and the natural milieus, and poses the human 
dilemma of an increase in magic of everyday life. According to Heidegger, the 
bewilderment of everyday life is just an expression of the enchantment of modernity  
Wiederverzauberung. It is produced by an accelerating yet ephemeral development of 
technics devoid of meaning: We know very well what we had, he said to me. But we 
dont have a clue how to recreate it. Who other than machines understand electricity and 
telephones?154  
The inspiration of much of todays network thinking and ecology is derived 
from Gestalt theory. In Web, the slogan of Gestalt psychology  the sum is more than its 
parts  has become more than ironic since it captures the essence of the augmented 
reality. The principle of augmentations and the core of hologrammic deep ecology is the 
same, namely the assumption of a microcosm mirroring a macrocosm.155 The problem 
with hologrammic thinking is the complete loss of perspective. The world might be that 
of a collective phantasmagoria, where man cannot tell whether he is dreaming or not, or 
whether he is alive or not. In the augmented reality of Web the dualist ground premise is 
no longer true and the Cartesian response no longer valid. Thought and action are one 
inasmuch as nature is total. In an augmented reality beyond mans grasp doubt can 
never be proved wrong:  
Is it possible to walk with open eyes, and nevertheless be caught in a dream? 
Because sometimes I think: this is not happening. This is neither possible nor 
true  Maybe we are just loose heads on a long, long shelf.156  
Although older technological extrapolations such as Huxleys Brave New World (1976) 
or Jon Bings Scenario (1972) posture problematic futures, they still envision pockets 
of freedom. Green Utopia anno 2084  Næsss vision of the future  is a pocket of 
freedom. The pockets are depicted as lacunas where man lives in a natural state free 
                                                
154 Ibid., p. 58: Vi vet godt hva vi hadde, sa han til meg. Men vi aner ikke hvordan vi skal gjenskape det. 
Hvem andre enn maskiner forstår seg vel på elektrisk lys og telefoner? 
155 Arne Næss: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: an Outline of an Ecosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 200. 
156 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 390-391: Er det mulig å gå med åpne øyne, 
og likevel være fanget i en drøm? For av og til tenker jeg: Dette hender ikke. Dette er verken mulig eller 
sant  Kanskje er vi bare løse hoder på en lang, lang hylle. 
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from dominance and government  be it from ephemeral technology or a more tangible 
state. Increasingly, science-fiction depicts parallel places that can only be reached by 
not going anywhere or by not being able to go anywhere. Web depicts an indefinite 
extension of time and space  and governance. In Foundations Edge (1982), Isaac 
Asimov has deployed the Gaia-hypothesis to reinstate a higher power. Asimovs Gaia 
has become the all-empowering and omnipotent metaphor for unity and is a panacea 
for humanitys cosmic anxieties.157 As in Web, the foremost concern seems to be with 
origins clouded in myths and misinformation. The apocalyptic imagination feeds the 
fear of some kind of unseen nature manipulating man: 
He said it was just like in the fairy-tales, and that once upon a time it was 
humans that decided over them. But today they have new masters. Who we 
dont know. Which we never get to see face to face Oliver said. And its them 
we should be afraid of, not the machines. The machines just intervene. He 
meant the eyes. Or those that own them  Free humans are continually 
wandering. Thats why their villages are movable. Originally it was to avoid 
getting caught We can run as far and fast as we want. But the eyes see 
everything that happens. Humans are  either they want it or not  at the mercy 
of the others.158 
The aspect of discontinuity becomes important and is highlighted in the structural 
changes of knowledge and power that dictate cross-species relations. Bringsværds 
views conform to structuralist theories imbued with a catastrophic paradigm: man the 
master suddenly became a pet and cattle for a race of spiders. Thure Erik Lund argues 
that structural changes of power might quickly result in masters suddenly becoming 
slaves, as nature is generating itself through specialization and differentiation. What 
changes is the structure of natures structure.159  
                                                
157 See Jack G. Voller: Universal Mindscape: the Gaia hypothesis in Science Fiction in Georg E. Slusser 
& Eric S. Rabkin (eds.): Mindscapes: the Geographies of Imagined Worlds (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 141. 
158 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 50-51: Han sa det var akkurat som i 
eventyrene, og at en gang for lenge siden var det vi mennesker som hadde bestemt over dem. Men i dag 
har de fått nye herrer. Som vi ikke kjenner. Som vi aldri får se ansikt til ansikt, sa Oliver. Og det er dem 
vi bør frykte, ikke maskinene. Maskinene går bare imellom. Han mente øynene. Eller de som eier dem 
 Frie mennesker er stadig på vandring. Derfor er byene deres flyttbare. Opprinnelig var det for å unngå 
å bli fanget  Vi kan løpe så langt og fort vi vil. Men øynene vet alt som skjer. Menneskene er  enten 
de vil eller ikke  prisgitt de andre. 
159 Thure Erik Lund: Språk og Natur (Gjøvik: H Press, 2005), pp. 24-25: De gammelmodige ser ikke at 
herskerne i et hvilket som helst system brått kan bli slaver. Tanken om at disse pyramidalinnsatte dyr 
egentlig kan sees som vertsorganismer for en drøss med andre organismer. Attpåtil må de kanskje 
spesialisere seg i enkelte roller som skal tilfredsstille systemet, som stadig blir mer komplekst, slik at de 
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The interesting point of scientific theories lending support to the catastrophic 
paradigm is that organisms evolve into new structures only when far from equilibrium. 
This has implications for the ways apocalyptic events are viewed, as development 
seems to necessitate catastrophes and other cataclysmic events. Again, the scientific 
discourse that the novel leans on reveals the ambiguity of Bringsværds agenda. Firstly, 
the author thinks man should seize the opportunity to save himself before it is too late, 
but the scientific theories that give meaning to the imagined world suggest that this is 
not possible  except far from equilibrium which is synonymous with a catastrophe. 
Even if mankind in the face of a catastrophe would be saved, what emerges in the wake 
of an apocalypse could no longer be viewed as human. Secondly, since virus is a 
structure, the tarantulas can prove to be no better stewards of the planet than man. 
Since the agenda of Bringsværd is to warn us of not sponging on our fellow friends, 
meaning the entire biotic community, we are left with a paradox. The implicit and 
somewhat fatalistically redemptive suggestion (intended or not), is that biotic sponging, 
whoever or whatever is the leech, corrupts. Should we care about the authors agenda, 
since we, determined by the environment (and not ourselves), are to be considered 
biotic leeches feeding on the rest of the biosphere?  
Ever since the publication of Darwins evolution theory, the last of the race 
myth and the fear of extinction have been a reoccurring theme of culture. They are 
inextricably linked, as even the numerous writers who speculated on the possibilities of 
a coming race were really more concerned about the extinction of mankind.160 The 
last of the race is no longer a myth but a scientific certainty calculated by the machine:  
In a new 100 million years the male y-chromosome will have vanished 
completely  It has become a refuse dump full of useless and degenerated 
genes, while it simultaneously has become smaller and smaller.161  
A devilish deal is made between the Virgin and the Swarm in order to conserve the 
species. The deal manifests in a last city of refuge, the city of dreamers, and is clouded 
                                                                                                                                          
plutselig, på et gitt tidspunkt, må omdefineres som art. Brått er herskernes avkom en annen dyreart, 
gjennom den økende spesialisering og fragmentering som naturen har som sitt fremste verktøy til å 
generere liv. Ethvert økosystem fungerer på denne måten, makten pulveriseres innenfra, økosystemets 
senter forflytter seg, stadig, og det som er levende ved økostrukturen, er først og fremst dens abstrakte 
karakter.  
160 See Fiona J. Stafford: The Last of the Race: The Growth of a Myth from Milton to Darwin (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 297. 
161 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 398: Om nye 100 millioner år vil mannens y-
kromosom være helt forsvunnet  Det er blitt en avfallsplass full av ubrukelige og degenererte gener, 
samtidig som det er blitt mindre og mindre. 
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in myth. Here the mythological town of apocalyptic fiction  a heavenly Jerusalem, is 
turned into a devilish suburb of Hades lit in carnival-lights. The god of the underworld  
the machinery beneath the city  rules here too, and sacrificial highpoints are banished 
for the eye. The myth of the last of the race lives on in religion  as opium both for and 
of people. But the religion only promises salvation to women: 
They wanted to be prepared to what could come  that they one day would be 
alone. The Virgins church  sought the best and the strongest  wanted to 
improve their own sex. Because only in this way could the human get a new 
future. So they thought.162 
It can be argued that the Dream Institute is the church of the machines. Its function is 
not to decipher the nature of the scientific, rational nature, but to decode the secret 
language of man, since dreams are a form of concrete revelation. The Virgin decides 
to exchange dreams for a life without the fear of immediate extinction: 
She understood that making peace was decisive  But what did she have to 
offer  other than herself  and the same puzzle that the human always has 
carried? So she promised the Swarm that it would learn to dream  They would 
solve the puzzle, unfold it  like a gift and a sacrifice. And in return? Peace for 
everybody that wanted the same. Peace with machines. Peace with everything 
that might come. And peace with the enormous Swarm.163 
 
Myths of Holism: Ecology and Technology 
We must take out some of the stock every now and then, the machine says. 
Otherwise there will be too many of you. We also have other species to consider, 
and we must first and foremost think of diversity and the whole. You surely 
understand that?164 
For Richard Stivers it is historically apparent that the more technology we use to exploit 
nature, the more it was necessary to turn the same technical logic to the organization 
                                                
162 Ibid., p. 399: De ville forberede seg på det som kunne komme  at de en dag ville bli alene. 
Jomfruens kirke søkte de beste og de sterkeste  ville foredle sitt eget kjønn. For bare slik kunne 
mennesket få en ny fremtid. Slik trodde de.    
163 Ibid., p. 397: Hun forsto at det gjaldt å slutte fred Men hva hadde hun vel å tilby annet enn seg 
selv  og den samme gåten som mennesket alltid har båret på? Så hun lovet Svermen at den skulle lære å 
drømme De skulle løse gåten, brette den ut, legge den åpen  lik en gave og et offer. Og til gjengeld? 
Fred for alle som ville det samme. Fred med maskiner. Fred med alt som måtte komme. Og fred med den 
veldige Svermen.   
164 Ibid., p. 49: Vi må ta ut en del av bestanden fra tid til annen, sier maskinen. Ellers blir det for mange 
av dere. Vi har også andre arter å ta hensyn til, og vi må først og fremst tenke på helheten og mangfoldet. 
Det forstår du vel? 
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and control of the human environment.165 Man is unable to understand the machine, 
while the machine depends on understanding nature (man included), and thus on 
controlling it. This makes the human an environmental variable and not much more. An 
ecologically sustainable and manageable nature hinges on the abolishment of freedom. 
The bureaucratic mind of manipulation and adjustment encompasses here the whole 
planet: rationality has become ecological and morality global and utilitarian. Utopias are 
insular insofar they depend on distinguishing the pure from the impure, and is how they 
manage to limit the world. In Web there are no limits to the ecological utopia, nature is 
one and all is abstract. The ecologically-minded civilization of the instated spiders 
shows the scope of technological consciousness to be total, thus rendering the planet a 
scene for cosmic experiments. 
As much as the dream of apocalypse might be the myth of science-fiction, so is 
the dream of a unity between spirit and matter the myth of technology. The tendency 
seems to be an increasing inclination of replacing norms previously derived from 
philosophy or religion by those from science which negate any separation between 
scientific and ethical values. While the Romantics desired for a spiritual power present 
in the Newtonian clockwork in the form of God or Pan, the sublime is today sought 
through the scientific realm in diverse pseudo-holistic visions which increasingly 
borrow from perennial faiths. Earlier narratives relied more on biblical allegories: H.G. 
Wells cosmology in War of the Worlds (1899) relies on a Darwinian and regionalist 
notion of evolution enabled by a Christian God. Arthur C. Clarkes mythologized 
Christian Rapture in Childhoods End (1953). In the Helliconia Trilogy (1982-85) by 
Brian Aldiss the universe consists of a total technology and nature beyond mans 
cognition and comprehension. The hypothesis of James Lovelock and those 
promulgated under deep ecology are also endorsed, the author attempting a 
cosmological unity, the attempt as old as the romantic spirit, of man and, this time 
around not Pan or God but, Gaia, the original beholder. In Web the autopoietic pattern 
of the Swarm makes Darwinian evolution antique and outdated: god is resurrected and 
intelligent design put to practice. Basically, the Swarm is nature with a plan. It even 
takes care of men, its biotically suspicious inhabitants. The ecological diversity 
envisaged by Næss has in the novel indeed become automatic in the sense that it is 
enabled and guaranteed by the automatic calculations of the technological organism.  
                                                
165 Richard Stivers: The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 
73. 
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A decrease in human population, besides global warming, is one of the biggest 
concerns of environmentalists. In the deep ecology platform, the principle of bio-
egalitarianism suggests that a successful realization of biotic diversity hinges on a 
reduction of human population. The underlying belief is that densely populated areas 
tend to foster unhappy men and animals. This norm of Lebensraum is justified through 
a variable of level of crowding, indicating to which extent life needs space for 
flourishing as Næss says.166 But the necessity of decreasing the human population is 
justified by an ecological contradiction. All the while natural processes such as wars 
and famines should not be intervened in since they are natural, the stance is 
detrimental in the equally natural processes of reproduction. In Web as in most other 
ecologically inspired remarks on overpopulation the humane aspect of reducing the 
number of men is sidelined in favour of a more undefined well-being of a biotic 
collective. Although it may seem that Bringsværd writes about the horrors of 
massmurder, the mindset reveals to be of the same as Dave Foremans and Paul 
Ehrlichs, since wars, epidemics and famines are deemed natural means to keep the 
human number under control. Furthermore, when survival is the paramount 
mythological symbol, ecological power has been turned into a value in itself. 
For Michel Foucault, culture is the same as production of discourses upheld by 
seamless webs of structural power. Common for structuralism and holistic ecology is to 
see action foremost as processes of structures where the separation of matter and form 
(or knowledge and power), is either impossible or undesirable. Foucauldian 
structuralism and Capraen scienticism render themselves to notions of power with no 
kernel, indicating a totality where structural determinants are omnipresent. Basically, 
man is free to the extent he is determined so by his environment. The problematic 
aspect of such holistic scienticism on an individual level is the totalitarian tendency and 
complete abstraction. In the collective web of life identity can only be established in 
terms of the community: an individual is an individual insofar he is part of a biotic 
community. The emphasis of ecological emancipation reveals the Janus-face of 
Bringsværds cosmology. Although the framework is derived from science that negates 
any distinctions between ethical and scientific values, the content is to a lagre extent 
                                                
166 Arne Næss & George Sessions: The Deep Ecology Platform in Nina Witoszek & Andrew Brennan 
(eds.): Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Næss and the Progress of Ecophilosophy (Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1999), p. 8: The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial 
decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.  See also 
Arne Næss: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: an Outline of an Ecosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 140-141.  
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derived from the first scientific revolution. The ambiguity is in a moral agenda of the 
Enlightenment that is employed in a holistic framework to cover all life on earth. 
Although Bringsværd wants to warn us about the fallacies of total technology the 
ecological emphasis sums up as equally totalitarian. This reveals the ambiguous aspects 
of the novel in its ideological discrepancy between an emancipatory agenda and holism 
that renders notions of freedom impossible.  
In general, questions of freedom are omitted or held irrelevant in the cosmic 
schemes of science fiction. Some vision an apocalyptic end and future that cannot be 
changed. The main character in Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (2003) ends the 
film with the words: We were never meant to stop it from happening, merely survive 
it. A more optimistic fatalism was exhibited by Buckminster Fuller and Arthur C. 
Clarke who saw the development of technology as synonymous with the development 
of the universe and these as synonymous with progress of man. All is one, man is all 
and becoming God is inevitable. But being God is what Bringsværd is warning us 
about: Man and machine. Machine and man. The perfect creature. The complete 
human. So we thought then.167  
The medieval Church despised the body. So do many of the technological 
utopias, as they treat it as an irksome and embarrassing atavism in relation to the 
eternity promised by an abstract nature. The dream behind the all-encompassing 
Swarm implies a fascination with cheating death by emerging with a purely abstract 
form and disregarding the body which is seen as a jailhouse instead of a Stubberudian 
fortress. The Faustian myth of cheating death and achieving immortality often borrows 
from ancient beliefs on pseudo-mythological levels. This is the case in films such as 
Dune (1984) and Immortel (ad vitam) (2004).  
The assertion of Henri Bergson that the task of life is to impose indetermination 
and a certain free creativity on matter has in Web become a human prerogative decreed 
and imposed by the technological nature. As one of the characters chosen by the Swarm 
to immortality says:  
We walk together into a firmament of glowing points and lines. Jona has been 
here much longer than me. He says every point is like a nerve cell. He says the 
inside of my head looks somewhat like this. He says the Swarm wants to build a 
                                                
167 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 272: Dere blandet dere med så mange. Til sist 
også med maskiner. Og det  gjorde dere mest lykkelig av alt! For dere så at blandningen var mer 
menneskelig enn dere selv. Den var alt dere håpet og higet etter. Menneske og maskin. Maskin og 
menneske. Den perfekte skapning. Det fullkomne mennesket. Trodde vi den gang.  
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bridge between organic and electronic brains. He says that he and I are going to 
be a part of this bridge, where brain tissue is mixed with electronic circuits. 
Instilled coincidences are necessary if the Swarm wants to be complete  and 
only humans can give them.168 
 
The Dream of Biotic Unity 
Our relation to other species has always been contradictory. We are friends with 
some of them. We eat others. And a few  we just kill. Why is it like that? 
When did we make these choices? And where have all the others gone  the 
whole earthly multitude of living creatures that once existed here  all of them 
we now just meet in fairy-tales.169 
Dreams of hybridizations of the human and animal, Satyrs and other mythical figures, 
are as old as the belief in circles of life, but Darwins theory of the common descent of 
life gave new impetus to anthropomorphic description. Biological diversity is a central 
principle of ecology and is in the theory of deep ecology followed by maximum 
symbiosis. Indeed, increased diversity should automatically lead to increased 
symbiosis  both biological and cultural. In ecological terms, symbiosis resulting in 
hybridizations  symbiogenesis, is nothing more than desirable out of the principle of 
diversity of life.  
Today, genetic engineering renders ancient images of hybridizations of animals 
and man more plausible. Bio-technology and genetic engineering are common themes 
in much of contemporary science fiction. The blending of man and machine is 
increasingly brought up since the Industrial Revolution and Frankenstein (1818). 
Although the obvious ethical dilemmas of genetic science, the advancements within this 
field of research are increasingly treated as inevitable, sometimes as natural as mans 
cultivation and breeding of plants and animals. In fact, man has become the Creator of 
replicas such as in the motion-picture Blade Runner (1982) and of mechas in 
                                                
168 Ibid., p. 429: Sammen går vi inn i en stjernehimmel av lysende punkter og streker. Jona har vært her 
mye lenger enn jeg. Han sier at hvert punkt er lik en nervecelle. Han sier innsiden av hodet mitt ser 
omtrent slik ut. Han sier Svermen vil bygge en bro mellom organiske og elektroniske hjerner. Han sier at 
han og jeg skal være en del av denne broen, hvor hjernevev blandes med elektroniske kretser. For hvis 
Svermen skal bli fullkommen, må det også podes inn tilfeldigheter  og slike er det bare mennesker som 
kan gi den. 
169 Ibid., p. 229: Vårt forhold til andre arter har alltid vært selvmotsigende. Vi er venner med noen av 
dem. Andre spiser vi. Og noen fåbare dreper vi. Hvorfor er det slik? Når traff vi disse valgene? Og 
hvor er det blitt av alle de andre hele den jordiske hærskare av levende skapninger som en gang fantes 
her  alle dem vi nå bare møter i eventyr. 
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Artificial Intelligence: A.I. (2001). In some cases bio-technology has become 
synonymous with a well of reserve-organs for the wealthy, as in the motion-picture The 
Island (2005). It is similar to the dystopia pictured before the apocalyptic transition in 
Web, where the genetically engineered creatures are merely living meatballs.170 
In Web, the mythical creatures of human-animal hybrids have become more than 
fairy tales. The creation of mixes and monsters is a psychological reaction to the 
increasing extinction of the wild and the natural. The impetus for creating mythical 
figures and new animals is the effect of a nostalgic reminiscence over exotic and 
extinct species. The men that still were masters in their own house were lonely. But they 
had dreams that they made come true in drims  mythological characters that were 
created for joy and wonder. They were all the odd fantasy-figures humans 
always have dreamed of. And with genetic technology and new splicing methods 
we could for the first time experience real unicorns, centaurs and mermaids.171 
The theme is elaborated elsewhere in Bringsværds authorship. In Oslo 2084 the 
fantastical figure is treated as an embodiment of hubris, a kind of inverted dog: friend 
as enemy.172 This, because all old dreams became true  and all nightmares, because 
there was those that found pleasure in raising werewolves and demons.173 As such, the 
theme resembles a mythical re-adaptation of Shelleys Frankenstein: the Modern 
Prometheus (1818), commonly claimed to be the first science-fiction story, with a 
matching plot and morale: So goes with a world that doesnt see what it does and 
doesnt understand what it has created.174 
In Oslo 2084 man is his mind and memory: We are what we think. We are what 
we remember.175 In Web man is extended to his dreams  we are what we dream of. 
But memories and dreams insist, they do not ask. Man may choose to disregard them, 
but he cannot choose what he dreams or what his memories are constituted of. While 
mankind falls into techno-collective dream sleep as depicted in the play The Rat-
                                                
170 See ibid., p. 136. 
171 Ibid., p. 143: skapt til glede og forundring. De var alle de merkelige fantasivesener menneskene alltid 
hadde drømt om. Og med genteknikk og nye spleisemetoder kunne vi for første gang oppleve virkelige 
enhjørninger, kentaurer og havfruer. 
172 Tor Åge Bringsværd & Jon Bing: Oslo 2084: Fire fortellinger om fremtidige forbrytelser (Oslo: Pax, 
2004), p. 78.  
173 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 143: Alle gamle drømmer ble virkelige  og 
alle mareritt  for det fantes også dem som fant glede i å mane frem varulver og demoner. 
174 Ibid., p. 163: Slik går det med en verden som ikke ser hva den gjør og som ikke forstår hva den har 
skapt. 
175 Tor Åge Bringsværd & Jon Bing: Oslo 2084: Fire fortellinger om fremtidige forbrytelser (Oslo: Pax, 
2004), p. 46.  
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Virgin, the scientific dream facilitated by technology turns into a nightmare. In the 
play man went willingly to sleep while the Rat-Virgin was contracted to take care of all 
dreams that became nightmares, those things that gnaver her i huset  to borrow the 
words of Ibsen in Lille Eyolf. In Web, man is still faced with the same social conditions 
as in Ibsens time. One of the last humans of the Bringsværdian old order of says: 
Never forget: you are a bit of everything. They hate the likes of you in the City. Look 
at yourself as weed. Refuse you your right to live. Wish to weed yourself out.176 The 
point of Keatss remains: in dreams must mans responsibility begin. The mind behind 
the locked door, the unconscious, must be held responsible. As Bringsværd writes in 
The Rat-Virgin: You need to pick a side even in a dream!177 
But what side is it that we should pick, and what is the dream that we should 
awaken from? The dream modern man dreams, seems to be the presumption that man is 
alone with himself in the world. As Erlend Loes main character already remarked: We 
are born alone and we die alone. Its just to get used to that sooner or later. Loneliness is 
fundamental in the whole construction.178 In Web the assumption that the fundamental 
construction of life is loneliness is precisely what is being opposed. The ecological 
emphasis in a holistic framework reveals Bringsværds critique to be against modern 
day individualism in a godless universe:  
I think humans were lonely. As lonely as gods. They knew everything, they 
owned everything  but had nobody to share it with. Thats why they created 
creatures  in their own image. Not animals. Not humans. But us.179 
The human condition as one of utter loneliness might result in what Peter Wessel Zapffe 
calls cosmic pain. Cosmic pain is the result of mans realization of his utter 
unsuitability to his environment, since he understands the laws of entropy and knows 
that entropy is his fate.180 The tragic aspect of cosmic pain seems to be that man can 
never see his happiness in the present but only in retrospect. This makes his present a 
well of anguish with vague memories of happier times.  
                                                
176 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 215: Glem aldri det: du er litt av hvert. I Byen 
hater de slike som deg. Ser på deg som ugress. Nekter deg livets rett. Ønsker å luke deg bort. 
177 Ibid., p. 263: Selv i en drøm må du velge side! 
178 Erlend Loe: Doppler (Oslo: Cappelen, 2004), pp. 36 & 42.  
179 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), p. 248: Jeg tror menneskene var ensomme. Like 
ensomme som guder. De kunne alt, de eide alt  men hadde ingen å dele det med. Derfor skapte de seg 
vesener  i sitt eget bilde. Ikke dyr. Ikke mennesker. Men oss. Italics are Bringsværds. 
180 See Peter Reed & David Rothenberg (eds.): Wisdom in the Open Air: The Norwegian Roots of Deep 
Ecology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 39-43. 
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While the Gaia-scientists in line with Zapffean misanthropic philosophy in D. 
Keith Manos The Bridge (1973) decree universal suicide out of ecological 
considerations, Web visions another sort of remedy for the pain: solidarity with eco-
systems. The morale of Bringsværds play is: without solidarity we all are cripples like 
little Eyolf in Ibsens drama. Yet, what we should feel compassion towards is not only 
fellow humans, but the entire biotic community. The power that Bringsværd wants to 
reinstate is not a resurrected god but the entire earth. The message is repeated in an 
interview with Dagbladet.181 Web reveals a subtle longing for unity, manifest in the 
dream of bridging the abyss between the human and the animal. If Doppler wishes for 
animal company because of their muteness and Tore Stubberuds hero wants to become 
an animal, Bringsværd wants us to become their friends. If dreams are a concrete form 
of revelation, the revelation is that man should not have distanced himself from animals. 
From being utterly alone, man needs to find his friends in plantlife and especially the 
animal kingdom: 
I dreamed that all animals and humans stood on each side of a narrow but 
bottomless crevice. We could have easily stepped over. But nobody did. 
Suddenly we felt the ground beneath us quiver and shake. It was the gap that 
slowly expanded. The distance to the animals grew.182 
While Zapffe thinks man is exluded from nature because he understands it, man is in 
Web excluded by nature because he refused to understand it. The emancipatory agenda 
emphasizing enlightenment makes the otherwise dystopian vision one of hopeful 
despair. However, Bringsværd is misanthropic. The ghost-busting character Osram, 
after killing rest of mankind still safely asleep in their collective dream sleep, ends 
Bringsværds play The Rat-Virgin with the answer A good conscience to the 
question Whats in it for you  for what you have done?183 
The novel is equivocal in its message, since Bringsværds science fiction 
odyssey is simultaneously a glorification and degradation of spirited man. Although the 
immediate message of the novel is dystopian inasmuch as man is being accused of a 
Promethean transgression, the latent undercurrent seems to glorify his ingenious 
                                                
181 See Dagbladet Saturday, 16th july, 2005, Eva Bratholm: Møte med snille vesener: [Forfatteren] mener 
vi mennesker setter nesa i været og sjelden reflekterer over vår egen plass i økosystemet. 
182 Tor Åge Bringsværd: Web (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2005), pp. 187-188: Jeg drømte at alle dyr og alle 
mennesker sto på hver sin side av en smal, men bunnløs kløft. Vi kunne lett ha skrittet over. Men ingen 
gjorde det. Plutselig kjente vi at marken begynte å dirre og riste under oss. Den var kløften som langsomt 
utvidet seg. Avstanden til dyrene vokste.   
183 See ibid., p. 273.  
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inventive skills. What makes the vision ambiguous  a Faustian transgression and a 
Promethean ambition  is the romantic view of the world as an organic whole combined 
with the emancipatory credo of modernity. But it is not spiritualism, but scienticism that 
gives the cosmological architecture meaning  nature is understood by the methods 
established by the Promethean transgression. What is different in Bringsværds 
authorship compared to the beliefs of deep ecology and Næss, is the authors 
simultaneous technological turn-on and turn-off. However, there is evidence that the 
furiously anti-technological attitude among environmentalists has changed for the 
opposite, as we shall see in the fifth chapter. As such, the novel is positioned in the 
mainstream  in-between the technological and natural milieus. Its meaning is given 
by the paradigms of the second scientific revolution that are superimposed on a 
framework of Kantian holism and emancipation: rights have become biotic and 
ecological emancipation comparable to what Michel Houellebecq names a terminal 
ideology. This makes the representation of nature (and the environmentalism) an 
idiosyncratic blend not so remote from Næss.  
Frankly, Web is dry reading because of its social-democratic socio-ecological 
emphasis that drowns the poignant observations on modern-day technology in the nice 
tone of the author. Maybe we should give some attention to the senses and not only to 
memory, meaning knowledge? The core of the novels plot and criticism centres on the 
lack of integrated personalities, but an integrated person is made up by senses and 
memory simultaneously. The question remains: is it possible to find a compromise 
between Stubberudian senses and Bringsværdian memory? 
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Chapter V: Conclusions and Commentaries 
It was scarcely plausible that the species destined to succeed us would be, to the 
same degree, a social species; since my childhood the idea that concluded all 
discussions, that put an end to all disagreements, the idea around which I had 
most often seen an absolute peaceful consensus form, could be summed up 
pretty much as follows: Essentially, youre born alone, you live alone and you 
die alone Sociability had had its day, it had played its historic role; it was 
indispensable in the early years of the appearance of human intelligence, but it 
was today just a useless and encumbering vestige.  
 - Michel Houellebecq, The Possibility of an Island 184 
 
The Character of Our Crisis 
The aim of this thesis has been to explore environmentalism and literature featuring 
civilization critique from the perspective of a crisis of nature. The motivation of this 
study was to find out the status of environmentalism today, by way of analyzing 
literature dealing with a crisis of nature.  
This part of my study is meant to test some of the questions posed by fiction on 
people who work on environmental thought in Norway. I have conducted informal 
interviews with Per Ariansen, senior lecturer at the University of Oslo; Arne Kalland, 
professor in social-anthropology at the University of Oslo; and Frederic Hauge, the 
president of the Bellona Foundation.185 What all the interviewed men have in common is 
their daily work with environmental issues, both on intellectual and more practical 
levels. The interviews were conducted in a fashion of experiment, meaning that their 
foremost purpose was to comment further on the literature discussed. The purpose of the 
interviews was to probe whether the fears and ideas proposed by fiction find resonance 
among people who daily deal with the environmental crisis. What do they for example 
think of some of the visions that the analyzed literature presents us with? The interviews 
also provided insights that will help in formulating a conclusion on the character of our 
crisis. Is literature alone in depicting the end of humanity as we know it?  
                                                
184 Michel Houellebecq: The Possibility of an Island (London: Phoenix, 2006), p. 366-367. 
185 Per Ariansen, senior lecturer located at Centre for Development and the Environment at the University 
of Oslo, interviewed 22.5.2006; Arne Kalland, professor at the Department of social-anthropology at the 
University of Oslo, interviewed 23.5.2006; Frederic Hauge, president of the Bellona Foundation, 
interviewed in Oslo 24.5.2006.  
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Much of contemporary literature exploiting the apocalyptic paradigm touches 
upon a lack of authenticity, as noted in the first chapter. J.G. Ballard claims that the 
writer of apocalyptic events wishes to remake zero by provoking conceived social and 
cultural boundaries. It is an act of symbolic suicide.186 Apocalyptic and utopian 
impulses are similar, in that a total apocalypse would be as impossible to imagine as a 
realized utopia is impossible to achieve. Apocalypse, the total destruction of culture, is 
impossible as long as man is made by his language. Utopias are impossible as long as 
man continues to be guided by his emotions. Nevertheless, and as already argued in the 
first chapter, any kind of self-reflectiveness going beyond Panglossian optimism would 
indicate utopian tendencies.  
Utopian elements in narratives have always an insular tendency. But the 
strategies in protecting the gates to utopias differ: God has cherubs at his gate, in Alex 
Garlands The Beach (1996) the pictured natural utopia must be a secret in order to 
remain a utopia. In Norwegian nature narratives the outside world is too distant  and 
strange. If utopias and dystopias are psychological reactions to writing by the 
paradigms of apocalypse, the return to the woods is a psychological and intellectual 
reaction to the lack of authenticity in urban and modern Norway. In a tragic paradox, 
the dreams of natural utopias all point to the fact that the de-structuring process187 of 
dystopias is about de-structuring sociability. The symbolical suicide Ballard discusses 
has become synonymous with a symbolical killing of man. Freud thought civilizations 
raison dêtre is to defend us against nature. Today, nature is being defended against 
civilization.  
It is a curiosity that a supposed sea-faring nation does not produce sea-fiction 
from an environmental perspective. The cultural expressions are about the woods and 
the mountains, and those occasional pastoral settings in-between those. There is no sea 
of wrath, no whales or a Poseidon possessed with a bad temper. The in the woods 
biased cultural memory of a nation surrounded by water suggests that the project of 
nasjonsbyggerne and their wood-worldview has been successful. It is perhaps even 
                                                
186 In Brian Ash (ed.): The Visual Encyclopaedia of Science Fiction (New York: Harmony Books, 1977), 
p. 130. Here quoted in W. Warren Wagar: Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 175: The catastrophe story, whoever may tell it, represents a 
constructive and positive act by the imagination rather than a negative one, an attempt to confront the 
terrifying void of a patently meaningless universe by challenging it at its own game, to remake zero by 
provoking it in every conceivable way. 
187 W. Warren Wagar writes in Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1982), p. 195, that myths of destruction symbolize the destructuring process whereby 
one civilization is replaced with another. 
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more curious that women authors are absent from the discussion. Kristine Hestad is the 
exception that makes the rule, but even she just wants to fall in love. Either women have 
other problems to consider, or then they are like the emancipated people of de 
Toqueville: indifferent.  
Environmental narratives could to some extent be considered public 
recreational grief. This does not necessarily imply a downgrading of the occasionally 
poignant observations of environmental fiction. It is only Tor Åge Bringsværd that still 
wants to save the world, but his methods are socio-scientific and therefore quite 
uninspiring. His cosmic and all-embracing concepts make distinctions altogether 
obsolete  his project is in fact a culmination of the soft Enlightenment in its hope for 
global emancipation. The narratives seem to act as some sort of social safety-vents 
where anger, fear, sadness and contempt are publicly displayed and re-enacted as a 
cleansing ritual from social and cultural pollution. Tore Stubberuds hedonism is 
materialistic  and if other people exist they are either angels in disguise or sexual 
objects, or then they are simply disposed with. The paradox is that his messenger-hero 
embodies the idealized, unaffected wu-wei lifestyle, but absolute self-centeredness rules 
since the body is the only measure. Erlend Loe offers us an escapist ideology of no-
ideology where pollution is synonymous with other people, while his main character 
wants to embody wu-wei, something that paradoxically can only be found in 
ethnotourism. 
According to Thure Erik Lund, literature exhibiting an apocalyptic fascination 
makes modern life a bearable lie, and acts as both trøstelitteratur og 
skremselsdyrkning.188 The same mechanisms console and frighten, and manage thus to 
justify our lives in modern society. Similarly, Ronny Ambjörnsson thinks utopias act as 
some sort of chosen traumas.189 The claim is valid in visions that deal with the 
environmental crisis, since chosen traumas act as remainders of some unjust or wrong 
condition that must be met with retribution. In this case the wrongdoings against nature. 
The content of a chosen trauma is to a certain degree imposed by context  having a 
life-lie requires that others let you have them, as Ibsen shows in The Wild Duck (1884). 
                                                
188 See Thure Erik Lunds essay Litteraturens politiske virke in Forgreininger. Essay og annen prosa 
(Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), esp. p. 139. 
189 Ronny Ambjörnsson: Fantasin till makten! Utopiska idèer i västerlandet under fem hundra år 
(Stockholm: Ordfront, 2005), pp. 219-220: Dessa chosen traumas fungerar som ständiga påminnelser 
om en grundläggande orätt som måste rättas till. Nationen [or in this case: nature] vill ta revansch, 
utopisten skaka om och förändra (om inte på annat sätt så åtminstone i fantasin). För utopisten har 
traumat en samhällelig innebörd. 
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A revealing story is told by Per Ariansen, senior lecturer at the University of Oslo 
studying ethics and currently concerned in dissecting the topic of trust. According to 
Ariansen, students, when confronted with a scenario of an environmental problem and a 
no-cost solution to it  as a thought experiment  did not see the problem being solved. 
The solution of an environmental problem did not make the students happy. On the 
contrary, they were all furious.190 Ariansen suggests, as an amateur mass 
psychologist, that it should be viewed as part of a flagellation syndrome. The 
conclusion to the psychology behind the irrational flagellation syndrome offered by 
Ariansen and called cheap, might not be that cheap: Life without something that is 
wrong is almost unbearable. Arne Kalland, professor in social-anthropology interested 
in Asian spirituality and currently studying discourses on whales and whaling, 
recognizes the psychology and offers the same explanation: By taking away peoples 
life-lies you also remove their lust for life.191  
In Doppler the values are masculine and the forest preferably empty of other 
people, and thus clean. Tragically, the Norwegian forest is not real enough for Erlend 
Loes main character. Neither is Norway. Doppler is a ghost-busting ghost. The attempt 
to find salvation in friluftsliv is interesting as it is as a means out of the crisis, scorned or 
treated somewhat indifferently by most. Ariansen explains: A number of people find 
much enjoyment in testing out their survival strategies, and good for them. But other 
people play hockey. Probably even Loe plays hockey.  
Take away Tore Stubberuds live-stock and he would most likely lose his 
appetite. The dream of a pre-civilization Golden Age is reinforced by the apocalyptic 
theme that acts as literary device allowing the main character to travel back in time. The 
life-lie is situated on Norwegian ground, and is sustained by the chain of reasoning: 
tradition is natural and natural is healthy. In Stubberuds case, the position is 
                                                
190 The thought experiment and startling conclusion that Per Ariansen presented me with: I remember 
asking several classes to join me in a thought experiment: Suppose we hear on the news that global 
warming was due to a very unfortunate error on a computer-chip and that it has been corrected now, gone 
through the calculations again and as it is Co2 has likely no effect upon the planet. So now we can drive 
cars from morning until night. The question was: is this good news? Does it make you happy? No. They 
were all furious. So you wonder: is it that they hate cars? Some got so furious they got up and left the 
room. Even though it was a make-belief.  
191 As Arne Kalland says when confronted with the make-belief scenario of Per Ariansen: Du fratar dem 
troen. Hva er de han sier i Villanden hvis du fratar folk livsløgnen så fratar du også lysten til å leve. Jeg 
har alltid spekulert om det der i klimasaken. Vi har to klare teorier mot hverandre. Den ene sier at dette er 
menneskeskapt, og at vi må sette i gang mottiltak for å redde jorden. Og det koster. Den andre sier at dette 
stort sett er skapt av solen  det kan ikke gjøres veldig mye med. Og vi skulle tro at sol-teorien var den 
lettest fordøyelig, for folk flest. Men sånn er det ikke. Fordi hvis du sier at det er solen så har du samtidig 
sagt at du ikke kan gjøre noe med det. Sier du at det er menneskeskapt, så kan du være helt. 
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preferably on his four, taking the world in, as he writes. Maybe Kalland is right. He 
says the average Norwegian still has one foot in the barn.192 He is as average as the 
Norwegian that needs life-lies in Ibsenss Wild Duck. On the other hand, Frederic 
Hauge, president of the Bellona Foundation and a longtime environmentalist concerned 
with energy-resources and the climate, could not care less about Norwegian identity 
vested in rural nature. He does not mind the peasant, but raising children in the 
Norwegian countryside is probably not a good idea: a natural setting does not 
necessarily bring about normal people.193  
Science is not a solution but the problem was a common stance in earlier times. 
Today the views are the opposite: technology is the new ritual which can never be 
proven wrong. Kalland calls an anti-technological lifestyle as a means out of the crisis 
bullshit and the same is implied by Ariansen. Hauge says: Jeg sier ikke at 
teknologien kan løse alle problemer, men jeg sier det er helt avgjørende for å løse de 
fleste av dem. The dream of the Enlightenment is alive: science and technology will 
turn anomalies into normalities, and unveil the veiled in nature. But the technological 
nature remains veiled: its future is a mystery and a simultaneous turn-off and turn-on for 
Tor Åge Bringsværd. Take away his emancipatory mission and hope for biotic peace, 
love and happiness and he would probably turn as sour as Doppler.  
Kalland repeated Ibsens Wild Duck when asked about the irrational need of 
environmentalists to scourge themselves. In this case it seems Ibsen should be repeated 
to Norwegian nature-thinkers: nature is not found by ripping up all that seems 
                                                
192 Excerpts from the discussion on the role of Norwegian agriculture and an answer to the question 
whether there exists a Norwegian nature tradition that differs from an international or European context: 
AK: Jeg setter pris på kulturlandskapet Og hvis man skal gjøre om landskapet til et rekreasjonsområde 
og til friluftsliv så blir det mye, mye fattigere. Mye døere landskap. Og det jeg setter pris på er 
mangfoldet vi har i norsk jordbruk  Hun [Nina Witoszek] har kanskje et poeng i at vi fremdeles har en 
fot i gården. Altså at vi er så pass opportunister og har jordbruket så tett innpå oss at det farger vårt 
forhold til naturen. Og der gjør at vi ikke blir så ekstreme som man ofte blir på kontinentet når det gjelder 
miljøarbeide. At vi får et mer pragmatisk forhold til det å håndtere naturen, mer brukende holdning enn 
værende holdning. Det tror jeg hun hat et poeng, men å trekke det tilbake til Vikingtider tror jeg ikke 
har noe for seg. Men jeg tror vi fremdeles har kort vei til gården. 
193 As Frederic Hauge says when asked on the role of Norwegian agriculture in the environmental crisis: 
Når jeg jobber i et land som har inntekter fra fossil energi som finansierer oss og hvor de fossile gassene 
som vi selger blir til 2.7 % av verdens samlede klimautslipp, så uansett hvor økologisk jeg får norske 
bønder til å dyrke gulrøtter, så gagner det ikke internasjonalt vern. Om jeg jobber masse med økologisk 
dyrking så betyr det ikke noe internasjonalt  
TR: Borde vi glemme å dyrke norsk jord? 
FH: Nej. Det er kjempekoselig med bønder. Men det er enkelte steder man kommer i Norge og lurer på 
om det er nødvendig å bo der eller om det er barnemishandling? Jeg tror det vil være en katastrofe for 
turistnæringen hvis man skulle komme til Nord-Norge og de ikke var noe jordbruk Fra nærings- og 
distriktspolitiske hensyn så er det [norsk jordbruk] viktig, men det er ikke avgjørende i miljøkampen. 
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unnatural; when man takes as his task to unveil the false lies of others, he ends up 
viewing others as false lies.  
Even if nature offers a refuge, it is traumatic. It may seem that both the 
fictional and nonfictional Norwegians consulted have been struck by hopelessness, 
which is an intensification of meaningless. An overexploitation of the apocalyptic 
paradigm may be one cause to why no one seems willing to discuss the future: when 
the future can be cancelled at any time, it becomes meaningless or even painful to think 
about it. In this sense it might seem that modern man has become necrophiliac in his 
essence, something Eric Fromm warned of in his time. In any case, the threat of a 
world-end does not offer human warmth, or promote a thinking based on continuity. 
Kalland offers an explanation. He thinks the media and bureaucratic apparatus are 
responsible of crisis-amplification which has lead fatalistic hopelessness and fear, 
besides ill-located government funding and an institutionalization of the crisis.194 The 
interviewed men seem reluctant to talk about the future of nature. As such, they are no 
different than the general public. Ariansen says: I dont think very many people lay 
awake at night worrying. Or then the interviewed men follow the discussed novels in 
their pattern of critique. All in all, the negative form of critique prevails and 
constructive critique seems to be as good as in comatose. To the question of how to 
overcome the crisis, the answers from the interviewed Norwegians were vague: 
headshakes, commitments to democracy, and the assurance of the need to go about the 
channels of the political system. However, there was one exception. I reformulated 
Ariansens claim and asked Hauge one last question  if he lays awake at night 
worrying. The reply was: I sit up at night working with this, god damn. Following the 
lesson that Ibsen thought us, it seems Hauge wants to be the hero disinterested in killing 
the life-lie that sustains his life of work.  
                                                
194 Here a part of the answer given to the question How do you think the scope and urgency of the 
environmental crisis is portrayed today? AK: Både media og miljøbevegelsen driver krisemaksimering. 
De har evnen til å male fanden på veggen  å gjøre dette hele til noe urgent. Det er urgent og hvis vi 
ikke stiller opp går det til helvete. Hvis man leser aviser, så er det stort sett det inntrykket man får. Det er 
veldig sjelden noen tar til motmæle. Eller spør: hvordan er det nå med vår jord? Men miljøet er mye bedre 
enn den har vært før. Luften er renere enn for eksempel femten eller tyve år siden. Du kan fiske i 
Thamesen, det har du ikke kunnet gjøre siden 1280-årene. Tokyo er en av verdens reneste byer. Før tretti 
år siden var den en av de verste. Det er masse ting som har blitt mye, mye bedre enn det var før. When 
asked to name effects of  crisis-amplification Arne Kalland answers as follows: Vi bruker penger på gale 
ting. Og det gjør folk redde, bekymret. Det får ungdom til å spørre hva er vitsen  med livet stiller vi 
så gærnt at vi ødelegger naturen? Hvorfor pokker skal vi stille opp for samfunnet for? Det sprer 
fatalisme og håpløshet, på grunn av denne forferdelige svartmalingen hele tiden. 
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Russell Jacoby claims that the dwindling notion of utopias is inextricably linked 
to a growing impoverishment of Western imagination, which is a result of loss of 
unstructured childhoods.195 For Richard Stivers the causes to an impoverishment of 
natural language is due to the decline in the use of metaphors, a growing vagueness of 
meaning, and the profileration of ephemeral symbols.  
Firstly, the loss of metaphor is a consequence of words having become either 
technical terms with one designate meaning or signs of emotional identification. In this 
case the woods and nature more generally provide for all the emotional identification 
needed, while Stubberuds worldview reveals the lacunas of a life dictated by emotion. 
Bringsværds scientific explanations of technology reveal the nature of using technical 
terms, but which are open to interpretation because of his Janus-faced cosmology. 
According to Stivers the greater rationalization of language and the increasing emphasis 
of emotion perfectly reflect the technological civilization of our age, which 
simultaneously enlarges the sphere of technical reason and that of instinctual emotion at 
the expense of subjective reason.196 The increasing significance of instinctual 
emotion is reverberated in the cultural display of emotions. The difference in the 
Darwinian and Freudian school is the view on how man should act upon his feelings. 
Darwin thought that by at least a subtle ignorance or suppression of emotions they 
would diminish, while the Freudian school thought the opposite. Suppression would in 
the end lead to a neurotic personality. This Freudian view has prevailed over the 
Darwinian, with the result that our emotional lives have become perhaps more intensely 
public than ever before.197 The importance of emotions is also reverberated in the 
cultural display of narratives that act as both frightening and consoling. The recreational 
display of emotions seems to have a relation to the inflation in shock-effect, besides 
exhibiting apocalyptic fatigue. The psychological problem of shock is that it no longer 
is effective, likely due to its overuse and the historical events of the last century. The 
decrease of a shock-effect seems to have diminished in equal ratio to morally bent 
utopias, since being shocked implies moral boundaries or an unthinkable. The 
paradoxical suspicion is that the no-shock effect is related to scientific values that 
environmentalists embrace  values that by the same token are ethical values. And the 
                                                
195 See Russell Jacoby: Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Thought (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 22-31. 
196 Richard Stivers: The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 
150. 
197 See Stuart Walton: Humanity: an Emotional History (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), introduction. 
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science of the day is precisely a science of unthinkables and anomalies, if not outright 
catastrophes as Bringsværd depicts.  
Secondly, the vagueness of meaning is due to a language that is unable to 
express anything immediately meaningful for man. Meaning can only be obtained by 
natural language. That is, by language that is willing to discuss the human, social 
beliefs, and moral considerations. Natural language is thus always ethical language. 
Kalland does not leave much hope for ethics. He thinks utopian free-thinking is 
dangerous because there always will be people that cannot distinguish plans from 
daydreams or better from worse198. He says we must take man as he comes. This is 
obvious, but does not diminish the fact that we should have opinions on how to take 
man: distinguishing better from worse is the prerequisite for any ethical considerations, 
taken that man has freedom of choice. Stivers argues that qualitative concepts like love 
and freedom may increasingly have nothing to refer to in reality as technological 
civilization, which is essentially quantitative makes ethical meaning superfluous.199 
Ethical meaning requires social maturity, which is again dependent on social 
interaction, which again, to be meaningful, rests on ethical action. Unfortunately, 
regression or the wish to regress to everwoods does not suggest that the depicted 
Norwegian will be social  or that he should mature socially. This is foreboded in Loes 
novel which does not see man as a social (or mature) species. Tore Stubberuds novel 
envisions the logical next step of anti-sociability, which is the putting to death of 
morality  the envisioned man has entered the realm of biology, which marks the end of 
man as moral species. In a logical culmination, Bringsværd sees the end of man as such, 
whereas his ethical considerations encompass the whole planet and are therefore not 
natural but simply alien to man.  
Finally, the salience of transitory symbols is the effect of their sterilized 
character: self-referentialism has become the only universalism. Language has become a 
cloister or a cage: we are critically predisposed, yet immune to the impacts of criticism 
since it remains in essence self-referential. The crisis portrayed in the novels has very 
little to do with clean air, resource depletion or even overpopulation. More than 
                                                
198 AK: Pol Pot, Khmer Rouge, et klart eksempel på økofascisme. Teknologifientlighet til tusen. Alle 
skulle ut på jorda og begynne og dyrka jorda igjen. Byene skulle legges ned osv. Kunnskap skulle ut. Det 
er et utopisk økologisk samfunn som Pol Pot prøvde å innføre. 
TR: Nå snakker du om når drømmene blir virkelighet. Kan vi skille mellom utopisk fritenkning og? 
AK: Ja, det kan du. Men det er noen som ikke kan det. Før eller siden kommer den gærningen, som ikke 
gjør det skillet. 
199 Richard Strives: The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 
151. 
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discussing how to overcome an environmental crisis, the novels discuss the natural 
way to overcome their own troubles. In both Loes and Stubberuds worlds the natural 
life is the self-sufficient life that only includes the self. Bauman elaborates: 
The most common troubles of individuals-by-fate are these days non-additive. 
They are not amenable to summing up into a common cause. They may be 
put beside each other, but they will not congeal. One may say that they are 
shaped from the beginning in such a way as to lack the interfaces allowing them 
to dovetail with other peoples troubles.200 
The crux with civilization critique is that it may be as alienating as the alienation it 
criticizes. Society is the theme of critique in the analyzed novels, but, paradoxically, the 
social realm is omitted. This is one of the lacunas of civilization critique  unwilling or 
uninterested to discuss what makes civilization possible.  
The feature of the reviewed fiction seems to be a double estrangement: man has 
estranged himself both from himself and from the environment. This is not only because 
the theme and refuge of visions is nature; the environmental crisis is as much a part of 
the symptom as of the diagnosis of the malaise in society. As already argued in the first 
chapter, literature is created from the raw stuff that is our reality, while it 
simultaneously recreates to a certain degree. This is because language never can 
withdraw from its social and cultural context. The distilled views of the three authors 
reflect not only the state of contemporary literature, but also environmentalism to a 
certain degree. From an environmentalist perspective, Del Ivan Janik willingly admits 
that the modern environmental consciousness has replaced the anthropocentric legacy of 
Western culture with a scientific and biotic view on the world, and represents such a 
significant departure that it might rightly be given the name posthumanism.201 We 
may even discuss to what extent the portrayed social apocalypse is a Western tragedy, if 
we consider Michel Houellebecqs representation of sociability as a useless and 
encumbering vestige. Accordingly, Frank Furedi argues that the pressing question 
today is not whether humans will survive the next century but whether our humanness 
will survive it.202  
                                                
200 Zygmunt Bauman: Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 35.  
201 Del Ivan Janik: Environmental Consciousness in Modern Literature: Four Representative Examples in 
George Sessions (ed.): Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), p. 105.  
202 Frank Furedi: Til kamp mot den nye misantropien in Morgenbladet 12.-18. May 2006 nr. 19, pp. 16-
18: Alt snakket om hvorvidt mennesket kan overleve viser at vi er ved et vendepunkt i tilliten til 
mennesket  og derfor er vår tids egentlige spørsmål ikke om mennesket overleve det enogtyvende 
århundret, men om vår tro på mennesket kan overleve det  Misantropien truer med å senke oss ned i en 
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This study has demonstrated how little modern fiction has to propose for the 
human, since he seems to be of little interest for the authors. The novels illustrate a 
dehumanized language, and do not point to a revival of natural language: the authors are 
unwilling to discuss a moral consciousness that does not exclude man or forebode his 
end. The frightening conclusion of this study is that humanism seems to be a thing of 
the past. This is the real tragedy in an environmentally enlightened country that 
repeatedly invokes the image of itself as a promoter of peace and human rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
middelaldersk fordom der vi blir mørkredde for oss selv. Under slike forhold kan man gjøre ett av to: Vi 
kan gi avkall på de menneskelige kvaliteter som har bidratt til å forvandle verden og hengi oss til den 
rådende fatalismen, eller vi kan gjøre det motsatte. Istedenfor å oppgi troen på mennesket kan vi bruke 
vår skaperkraft til å styre vår fremtid. Vi bør slutte å spekulere over hva som vil skje med oss og heller 
prøve å finne svar på spørsmålet: Hva må vi gjøre for at fremtiden skal bli mer human? 
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